The Federalist 9:
Written by Alexander Hamilton
The Union will be the bulwark against domestic faction and insurrection. History has shown the republics of Greece and Italy in violent swings between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. Where it was peaceful, this was an exception to a violent history.
Despots of those republics have argued not only against republics, but against the principles of civil liberty. They say it is inconsistent with order in society. Happily, freedom has won out. I trust America will be the permanent monument against those despots.
Previous republics were faulty. We now know how well operating on certain principles does in a way the ancients did not. For example, we know how to the separate powers into distinct departments. We know checks and balances, the court system, and representative democracy. These are new discoveries which may minimize the imperfections in the construction of government.
One of the principles used to object to the new Constitution is the enlargement institutions. Montesquieu recommends republics be small: localism. He envisioned much smaller than even the scope of our current states. These states cannot by any means be compared with his models. Taking Montesquieu’s principles as truth, we will be driven to either taking refuge in monarchy or anarchy of many small commonwealths.
Some men seem to want to divide the larger states. This might be because they are not qualified for the current offices, and they want to increase the number of positions of power they could occupy.
Montesquieu’s principles are actually in favor of the Union. Most specifically because a confederate republic avoids the despotism of one man. Smaller states agree to become members of a larger one that can provide for the united security of all and withstand internal corruptions.
Should a single person attempt to thieve power, not all states would support him. If he were to have great power over one subordinate state, this would alarm the rest and thus reduce his power. Should a popular insurrection occur in one state, the others could then quell it.
A united government retains the benefit of small republics and the advantages of large governments.
One of the differences between a confederacy of states versus the consolidation of them into a single government is that the united body should have no control over the individuals. It would merely have power associated with the collective capacities of states. States would still govern their own people.
- Discussion: How would the federal government look if we had stayed to these principles?
The extent and objects of federal authority are matters of discretion. So long as every constituent state still exists it will be a confederate republic. But this would be in name only. The new constitution makes each of the constituent states a meaningful part of the national sovereignty with direct representation in the Senate. It also leaves important exclusive power to the states.
The Federalist 10:
Written by James Madison
One of the main benefits of Union is their better ability to control the violence of faction. Populist governments are more likely to be factional, and the instability it creates causes them to collapse. The various state constitutions should be admired for their improvements, but it would be biased to say they are perfect. There are complaints everywhere that the state governments are still too unstable and prone not to justice but to power grabs by majority parties. The factious spirit taints our public administrations.
There are two methods for curing factionalism: removing its causes or controlling its effects. There are two methods of removing its causes: destroying the liberty to dissent or giving every citizen the same opinion. It is utterly true that destroying the liberty to dissent is worse than the disease of factionalism. Freedom to dissent might cause factions, but it is as essential to political life as air is to animal life.
- Discussion: What do you make of Madison’s freedom of thought stance? How do you think it applies to today? Do you think there ought be limits on where liberty to dissent may be curtailed in order to reduce factionalism (see: far-left Antifa or far-right Qanon).
Causing everyone to think the same is as impracticable as suppressing freedom of expression is unwise. Factionalism is thus sown into the nature of man. There are many things which inflame it, but none so much as the unequal distribution of property. Landowners versus renters, creditors versus debtors, capitalists and their workers; the regulation of these interfering interests is the main reason for modern government.
Any one man would be a bad adjudicator between these conflicting interests because his own biases would seep in. A body of men are just as unfit if they are a party to the decision. And, as it were, most political decisions affect large bodies of citizens. And the legislators are thus biased in turn. The most powerful faction shall be expected to win, rather than be the most just.
We are brought to the conclusion that we cannot remove the causes of factionalism but must be content to control its effects. When an extreme faction is in the minority, republican government can outvote it and deny its ends. Securing the public good from a majority faction is harder, however, and it is to that end we will dedicate more thought.
So: how do we solve this? Either (1) the overbearing desires of the majority must be prevented, or (2) the majority must be stopped from oppressing.
A pure democracy cannot mitigate for the tyranny of the majority. This is why such democracies have been short lived, as violent minorities fight for their rights. Theoreticians have falsely assumed the equality in political voting equates to equality in civil liberties.
A republic can solve this by choosing the wisest citizens, whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely sacrificed for short-term gains. Representative democracy might be better for the public good than pure democracy. The number of representatives must be large enough to avoid the influence of a few extremists, but small enough to avoid being unruly. The greater the size of the electorate, the more likely we are to select the best people.
If the electorate is too big, the representatives will know less about local circumstances. But if the electorate is too small, they will become too attached to the local circumstances at the cost of national well-being. The proposed constitution forms a happy distribution of power between national and state legislatures.
The smaller the community, the less distinct interests and thus the greater possibility for a tyranny of the majority. The larger the community, the less likely any interest will maintain a majority, and the more difficult for them to coordinate.
It appears that the same benefit of controlling factionalism that a republic has over a democracy is offered by scale. A large republic has this advantage over a small republic (i.e., a Union over the states composing it). This is because it is more likely to have enlightened representatives, it is less likely for any one faction to gain a majority, and it is harder for any supposed majority to coordinate.
- Discussion: Do you agree with Madison that larger bodies are less likely to have oppressive factions? Does his tripartite argument (better representatives, more ideological diversity, and coordination problem) ring true to you?
The Easy Federalist 
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