The Federalist 15:
Written by Alexander Hamilton
In the preceding papers, I have tried to show why union will make you safer and happier. I have shown how you are exposed to danger by disunion forces of ambition, greed, jealousy, and misrepresentation. In the next papers, we will discuss other undiscovered facts and arguments. This road we may travel may not suit you, but it is important, and I will try to remove the obstacles you face. Let’s examine how the current confederation is insufficient to preserve the union.
Why discuss an issue to which everyone agrees, even our dissenters? Even if for different reasons, we all agree that our current system is imperfect and that we need to do something to avoid impending anarchy. The facts supporting this are overwhelming.
We may be at the last stage of national humiliation. We feel wounded and degraded. Our responsibilities are subjects of constant embarrassments. We owe debts to foreigners and our own citizens that we cannot pay. We have territories in the hands of foreign powers that we cannot repel for lack of troops, treasury, and unified government. We are entitled to navigate the Mississippi, but Spain prevents us. We’ve abandoned public credit. Our economy which feeds national wealth is at its lowest point. Our government does not demand foreign respect because our ambassadors have no real power. Our real estate does not reflect true value because of the lack of private and public confidence. This is also reflected in our credit market, where borrowing and lending is at its narrowest limits because of insecurity in our system. We are blessed with natural advantages but have accrued disorder, poverty, and insignificance.
- Discussion: How do you think maintaining an air of respectability should play into politics?
The principles that brought us here are the same ones which would deter us from adopting the new constitution. My countrymen, let us stand for our safety, peace, dignity, and reputation and break from the tradition that has led us astray.
Everyone agrees that our system is broken, but this concession from anti-federalists is useless if they won’t act to fix it. They say the government lacks energy but won’t grant it that needed energy. Their goals are repugnant and paradoxical. They want to increase federal authority without decreasing state authority. They want to have a sovereign union but also maintain sovereignty for its members. They are blindly devoted to having states-within-a-state. This shows that our troubles don’t stem from partial imperfections, but from structural problems that must be change.
If the states wanted to maintain their sovereignty and drop union, the same problems would exist but would at least be consistent. We would abandon a confederate government and remain a simple alliance. We would be vulnerable to alternating between friends and foes and subject to the pressures of foreign powers.
If we want to avoid this situation, we must add the elements which differentiate a united government from a group of governments. We must extend the authority of the union to the citizens, the only proper objects of government.
Government implies the power of making laws. Laws imply penalties for disobedience. If there is no penalty for disobedience, then purported “laws” will actually be recommendations. Penalties can only be inflicted in two ways: (1) by the courts and law enforcement, or (2) by military force. The first kind applies to men, the second kind to states that courts cannot enforce. This second instance requires the hard power of the military. When in a union, if only the composite communal bodies wield authority, then every breach of laws must involve a state of war. Military execution becomes the only instrument of civil disobedience. Such a state does not deserve the name of government, and smart men wouldn’t be happy with such a system.
- Discussion: What do you think of Hamilton’s argument? If a state transgressed a federal law, but only states held enforcement power, do you think war must follow? How does the claim that “laws imply penalties” relate to a claim that “penalties should be enforced”?
We were told that states would not breach federal authority because common interest would incentivize compliance. More experience makes these expectations appear wild. These expectations demonstrated ignorance of how human affairs are conducted and disguises the original needs for establishing government. Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without constraint. Have we determined that bodies of men are more virtuous than individuals? Rather, the opposite can be inferred for obvious reasons. When the consequences of bad actions spread among many, it does not cause the same reputational damage as it would for an individual. Tribalism will motivate people to do things in groups that they would blush to do in private.
- Discussion: How do you think scale plays into government? How do the needs for government change at local, state, national, and international levels?
- Discussion: Does Hamilton’s inference that bodies of men are less virtuous than individuals strengthen or weaken his point for government?
- Discussion: The government budget exemplifies Hamilton’s last sentence in this paragraph. Public insolvency has been accepted for decades while we would blush at personal insolvency. What other failures are overlooked at the government level that would not pass at the personal level?
In addition, those who exercise sovereign power will have an eye towards all those who would seek to restraint their power. In every union of smaller sovereignties, this spirit will cause weaker states to digress from common cause. This is not unexpected. It has its origin in the love of power. Controlled power has as its enemy the force that does the controlling. This simple proposition teaches us not to expect that individual states will be ready to execute the resolutions of the union.
If we cannot execute the measures of the current confederacy, then without change it is unlikely they will ever be executed. Each state will do as they please regardless of its legality. All propositions will be judged relative to their perceived short-term interests. Local affairs will stray decisions from what is best for the nation.
And this process will repeat in each state, all plans of the whole foiled by the nonconforming opinions of the parts. Those who have participated in assemblies know how difficult it is when there is no external pressure to resolve. They know how impossible it is to force each state to cooperate towards common pursuits.
Currently, thirteen individual states all must agree on every important point. The current disagreements of the states have brought national government to a standstill. Congress scarcely possesses the ability to function while states decide upon a replacement for our shell of a government. These problems did not come at once. At first, each state had unequal degrees of compliance to national law. The freeloading states became models for the states were bearing a disproportionate amount of the burden. Successively each state withdrew its support until our national government is now about to collapse.
The Federalist 16:
Written by Alexander Hamilton
History shows a connection between how confederate a government is and how likely it is to fail. There are many examples. The best counterexamples were the historical Lycian and Achaean leagues. They were the most free from the mistake of confederation without full union, and they have been the most applauded.
The principle of confederation without full union is the parent of anarchy. We see that delinquencies by constituent members are natural. Whenever they happen, the only constitutional remedy is force, and thus lead to civil war.
It remains to be seen how such a bad government could even be capable of fixing those situations. If there is not a large army, at ready disposal to the national government, it would not be able to use force. Even if it could use force, it would mean war between different parts of a confederacy where the strongest wins. The winner may not be the one with the constitutional authority. It would be rare that the problem at hand would be from a single state, and if there were more than one, they would unite. Even without this common interest, large states with power over neighbors could make them join their cause. The uncooperative states could make bad arguments to convince cooperative states to join their cause. This could more likely take place if rulers of larger states plan their violations ahead. They could presumably convince the leaders of adjacent states to follow them. If they could not find domestic allies, they could find foreign ones. Foreign powers would be incentivized to involve themselves in the internal conflicts of a feared rival. Once war starts, there is no moderation. If the joint arms of the union pressed upon a violative state, then pride and resentment would carry them to extremes to avoid disgrace. The first war of this kind would end the union.
This may end the confederacy with violence. We are currently experiencing its more natural death if we do not substantially renovate the federal system. It is unlikely that cooperative states would support the union by engaging in war against uncooperative states. They would be more likely to pursue the milder action of matching the uncooperative members. The guilt of all would become the security of all. Our experience has proven this. It is difficult to determine when force could be properly employed. Failures to contribute financially to the union would be the most common delinquency. In these cases, it would be impossible to determine whether failure to pay was from malice or inability. The pretense of the latter would always be available. It would have to be very flagrant cases that would justify forced compulsion. It is easy to see that this problem would create factions of bias and oppression.
It doesn’t seem hard to prove that the states ought not to prefer constitution that must be held together by armed force. Such a scheme, if even possible, would degenerate into military despotism and be impractical. There would not be enough resources to maintain control over the larger states, much less form such an army in the first place. Looking fifty years in the future, they will be even bigger and less manageable. These aspirations are less realistic than the spirit of historical heroes taming monsters.
Military enforced legislation has never worked, even for confederacies with smaller members. It has rarely been employed except against weaker members. In most instances, these attempts to coerce the disobedient have started civil wars.
If it is possible to construct a federal government capable of regulating common concerns and maintaining peace, then it must be founded on opposite principles. It must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens. It must not be dependent on state legislatures but must itself be empowered to employ force to execute its resolutions. The majesty of national authority must manifest through federal courts. The federal government, like that of each state, must be able to address the hopes and fears of individuals. It must have the ability to execute the powers with which it is entrusted, as all governments do.
One may object that if any state should oppose the federal government, it could at any time block the execution of its laws. This would bring the same issue of force to matter.
This objection vanishes when we recognize the difference between non-compliance and active resistance. If operating under a confederacy of state legislatures, one must only act evasively to escape a federal law. This neglect of duty may be disguised to not create alarm for the safety of the constitution. State leaders may even gain political points form evading federal impositions.
But if the execution of the laws were not bound by state legislatures but by the citizens themselves, then the uncooperative states could not act without active resistance. No evasion of duty would be enough. They would be obliged to act in the national interest. Attempting to avoid their duty would be dangerous considering a federal constitution capable of its own defense. It would only be possible with a majority faction in the legislature, concurrent judiciary, and the support of the people. Unless the judges conspired with the legislature, they would pronounce the majority faction’s stance unconstitutional. Unless the spirit of the state representatives tainted them, the people would throw their weight behind the federal government. These attempts would not be made lightly, because they would be dangerous. This, except for cases of tyrannical exercise of federal powers.
- Discussion: Do you think a state, and its constituents, ought to be bound by force to federal laws if their state does not consent to them?
Opposition to the federal government from seditious individuals could be dealt with in the same way as from state governments. Federal authorities could enforce law just as local authorities do. The federal government could also quiet insurrections better than any single member could. As for full-fledge revolutions, no form of government can always avoid or control them. It is vain to hope to guard against unforeseeable events, and useless to object to government that can’t do the impossible.
The Easy Federalist 
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