The Easy Federalist

The Federalist 59:

Written by Alexander Hamilton

This paper has not yet been reviewed by a human. The following is a machine simplification by OpenAI.

The Constitution allows the national legislature to have the final say on how its members are elected. This is the topic that we will be discussing now.

This is what it says: The state legislatures decide when, where, and how elections for senators and representatives are held. But Congress can make or change these rules whenever they want – except when it comes to choosing senators. People who are against the Constitution in general have criticized this part, as have people who are more moderate in their criticism. Even one person who generally approves of the Constitution has found this part to be questionable.

I was wrong to think that any other part of the plan was better than this one. It is clear that any government needs to be able to protect itself. Any reasonable person will agree that the plan should stick to this rule. However, there may be times when this has to be broken, if something else is needed. Even then, it’s not perfect, and it could lead to problems in the future.

It won’t be argued that an election law can be written and put in the Constitution to fit any change in the country’s situation. So, it must be accepted that a discretionary power over elections needs to exist. It can be seen that there are three ways to organize this power. It could be in the national legislature, the state legislatures, or both. The Convention decided the last option was best. Local administrations will control elections in the first place, and the national authority can step in if needed for safety.

It’s clear that if the state governments had control over national elections, the union would be in danger. It’s not likely that they would neglect to do this, but it’s still a risk. There’s no good reason to take this chance. We shouldn’t assume that the state governments would abuse their power, since it’s just as likely that the national government would. It’s more reasonable to put the responsibility in the hands of the union, since that’s where it should be anyway.

What if an article was added to the constitution that gave the US the power to control state elections? Anyone can easily see how wrong this would be. It would be a misuse of power and a way to get rid of state governments. It would be just as wrong to make the national government depend on the state governments for its survival. It’s clear that each government should rely on itself to stay alive.

Opponents of this idea may argue that the way the national senate is set up could lead to the danger that the state legislatures have too much control over federal elections. It could be said that if the state legislatures do not appoint senators, it would damage the union. This means that the state legislatures should be trusted with the responsibility of regulating federal elections, as the state’s interest in keeping its representation in the national council will prevent them from abusing this power.

This argument may seem valid, but if you look closer it won’t hold up. It’s true that state legislatures could destroy the national government by not appointing senators. But just because they can do it in one situation, doesn’t mean they should be able to do it in all situations. There could be cases where the bad effects of such power would be worse and there would be no good reason to have it in the system like the convention did with the senate. Even though it was the right choice to make this trade-off to get the necessary advantage or greater good, it doesn’t mean that the same choice should be made when there is no need or greater good.

It is clear that the national government is more at risk from state legislatures controlling the elections of its House of Representatives than from those same legislatures appointing the members of its Senate. Senators are chosen for six years, with a third of them changing every two years, and no state can have more than two senators. With this system in place, a few states combining temporarily to not appoint senators would not be enough to stop the Senate from existing or working. A permanent combination of states would be more of a worry, but that would only happen if the people were unhappy with the government and wanted it gone. No good citizen would want that.

When it comes to the U.S. House of Representatives, elections for members are supposed to happen every two years. If the state legislatures were the only ones in charge of regulating these elections, it could lead to a difficult situation for the country. If the leaders of a few of the most important states made a plan to stop the election from happening, it could even lead to the breaking apart of the union.

Not denying that having each state represented in the federal government will protect against abuse of power over its elections by state legislatures, it is still not considered completely secure. People in America can be devoted to the union, but their local rulers may be motivated by their own personal gain and a powerful faction in each state to oppose it. This difference of opinion between the people and their leaders can be seen in some states. If separate confederacies are made, it will increase the chances of ambition, and a few influential people in the most significant states can use their exclusive power to control elections to the national government. They might take advantage of any dissatisfaction among the people and bring an end to the union. It must be remembered that other countries may be jealous of a strong union and government, and foreign powers may attempt to overthrow it. Therefore the preservation of the union should not be left to anyone whose interests may not be in faithfully protecting it.

The Federalist 60:

Written by Alexander Hamilton

This paper has not yet been reviewed by a human. The following is a machine simplification by OpenAI.

We have seen that the federal government can’t safely have power over elections. Let’s look at the dangers of trusting the union itself with the ultimate choice. It’s not likely that any state would be excluded from representation. But it might be used to elect some people and keep others out, by making it hard for everyone to take part in the choice. This seems like a far-fetched idea. It’s unlikely that such a bad attitude would ever be in the national councils. Even if it was, it would be more obvious.

It is unlikely that this attempt would be successful because it would cause a rebellion of the majority of people, led by the state governments. It is possible that in certain chaotic times, certain people might have their freedom taken away by a majority, but it is hard to believe that a privilege so important in this country would be taken away by the government without a revolution happening.

There are more specific reasons why we should not worry. The different ingredients that will make up the national government, and the way they will be used in its different branches, will get in the way of any plans for voting. People in different parts of the country have different ways of owning property, have different personalities, and do things differently. Even though living in the same government will help people’s opinions and feelings become more similar, there are physical and moral causes that will keep them different. The biggest difference will be in how the different parts of the government are formed. Representatives will be elected by the people, senators by the state legislatures, and presidents by electors chosen by the people. Most likely, this won’t create a common interest in any particular group of voters.

It’s impossible for any rules about “time and manner” that the national government might set to affect the choice of senators. No matter what the rules are, the state legislatures will never be influenced by them. So, why would the senate agree to a preference they weren’t included in? Even if it only applied to one branch of the legislature, why bother if it can’t be used for the other branch too? It would cancel out the composition of one branch with the other. The state legislatures would have to agree for it to work, so it doesn’t really matter where the power is placed.

What should be the focus of this unfair favoritism in the government? Should it be used to decide between different types of jobs and businesses, or between different kinds of property or different amounts of property? Will it favor rich landowners, or rich people with money, or businesses, or factories? Or, in the words used by people who don’t like the Constitution, will it give advantages to wealthy and powerful people and ignore the rest of society?

It is likely that those with either land or money will compete for favoritism in our nation’s decisions. I think it is much less likely that either will take control of the national councils than of the local councils. This means that it is much less likely that those with land or money will have more power than the other.

The states are all different when it comes to how much they depend on agriculture and commerce. Most focus on agriculture and in some, like a few, the influence of commerce is almost equal. The more either of these are used, the more they will be reflected in the national representation. This is better than just one state’s representation because it has a greater variety of interests, and so it won’t favor one side more than the other.

In a country where most people are farmers, and everyone is represented equally, the government will mostly be made up of people from the farming class. As long as this is true for the state legislatures, it will also be true for the federal senate. This means that the farming class will still have power in the government, and it is unlikely that the farming class will be replaced with people from the merchant class. This applies to both the senate and the house of representatives. It is unlikely that either of these parts of the federal government will be biased towards the merchant class.

It’s possible that the national government could be biased towards the landed class, giving them a monopoly on the federal administration. But, it’s less likely to happen than with the individual state governments. There’s no reason why the landed class would need to violate the Constitution since they would already have a lot of power. People who understand the importance of commerce, especially when it comes to revenue, would be aware of how damaging it would be to keep those with the best understanding of commerce out of the management of it. So, it’s unlikely that the national government would show any bias against commerce.

I would rather talk briefly about the chance of having a preference based on differences in industry and property. It seems like the objectors are talking about favoring wealthy and well-born people over others. They think this can be done by having a small representative body, or by not allowing people to vote for that body.

In order to give the wealthy and well-born people preference, there needs to be a way to discriminate between places of election. But is everyone from these groups in the same place in each state? Are they all in towns and cities, or are they spread out across the country? If it’s the latter, then the plan of limiting the places of elections wouldn’t help the desired purpose. The only way to do this is by setting qualifications for people to vote or be voted for. However, this is not something that the national government can do, since their authority is limited to the times, places, and manner of elections. The qualifications of people who can vote or be voted for are already written in the Constitution and can’t be changed.

It may be argued that the suggested plan could be successful. Even if all worries about the danger of the experiment were put aside, it would still be hard for the national rulers to carry out the plan without a military force strong enough to make the people obey. It has been argued before why this would be impossible. To show how wrong this objection is, let’s suppose that such a force did exist and the government had it. What would happen then? Would the rulers bother to make laws to give some people a preference? No, they would want to keep their power and so they would act to keep themselves in office by taking control. They would be afraid that the people, who are very protective of their rights, would come together from all parts of the states to the voting places to overthrow their rulers and put in people who would stand up for them.

The Federalist 61:

Written by Alexander Hamilton

This paper has not yet been reviewed by a human. The following is a machine simplification by OpenAI.

Opponents of the plan of the convention that deals with elections will sometimes admit that it is proper, but only if it was accompanied by a statement that all elections must be held in the counties where the electors live. This, they say, is needed to stop any abuse of the power. This declaration would not cause any harm, but it would not really provide much more protection from the danger either. People who look at the subject carefully will see that the power has nothing to do with any risk to the public liberty.

If people who get worried easily would look at the laws in their state, they would find that most of them have a lot of freedom in terms of elections. To make it easier to understand, we’ll look at the state of New York. The law in New York only says that people in the counties vote for members of the assembly and people in districts vote for members of the senate. This means that it would be easy for the state to keep people from voting by only having elections in one place. For example, if only Albany can vote for the county and district, then only people in Albany will be able to pick who their representatives are. Even if the election is close by, like 20 miles away, it could be hard for some people to make it. So, the same kind of issues that people may have with the national government can also be found in state governments.

If it is said that the mistakes in the state constitutions are an excuse for those in the proposed plan, I would answer that the state constitutions have never been blamed for not protecting liberty. So, it seems that the objections to the plan are due to someone’s predetermined opposition, not an honest search for the truth. People who think that mistakes in the state constitutions don’t matter can’t be argued with, but they should explain why representatives of one state are more likely to protect liberty than representatives of thirteen states. They should also show that it is more likely for a powerful group in one state to prefer certain voters than for a similar group to be in control of representatives from thirteen states with different local conditions, beliefs, and interests.

Up until now, my observations have only been to prove that the power will be in a safe place if it is placed in the manner that is proposed. But there is also a positive advantage to this plan. This advantage is having uniformity in the time of elections for the federal house of representatives. This uniformity could be very important for the public welfare. If each state chooses a different time for elections, there could be as many different periods as there are months in the year. This could cause problems because the same spirit could remain in the body. This could be avoided if everyone had elections at the same time. I think it would be better to have a total dissolution of the body at once rather than having gradual changes over time.

Uniformity is important during elections in order to make sure that the Senate is regularly rotated, and in order to make sure that the legislature meets each year at a set time.

One might ask, why wasn’t a specific time set in the Constitution? Those who oppose the plan of the Convention in this state are usually also supporters of the Constitution of this state. The same question can be asked about that Constitution. The best answer is that it was something that the legislature could decide on their own. It might have been found inconvenient after testing. The same answer can be given to the other side. It is also important to remember that the possible danger of a gradual change is only a theory. It would not be wise to make it a part of the Constitution if it would take away some states’ convenience of having the elections for their own government and for the national government at the same time.

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