Generated summaryJohn Jay's four essays on why union guards America from foreign war: one people is safer than rival confederacies, gives enemies fewer pretexts, and can pool its defense.
Federalist 2
Generated summaryAmerica is already one people: one connected country, one language, one war won together. Splitting into rival confederacies would break a nation that seems made to be whole.Key points
The choice is one nation under one federal government or a cluster of separate confederacies; America’s prosperity depends on firm union.
Providence gave one connected country to one united people — shared ancestors, language, religion, and a war fought side by side.
Framed in haste at the nation’s birth, the first federal government proved inadequate, so the people convened the Philadelphia convention.
Its plan is only recommended, not imposed; as the people once trusted the wise Congress of 1774, they have greater reason to respect this convention.
Those who urge separate confederacies foresee that rejecting the plan imperils the Union, whose dissolution would be a long farewell to America’s greatness.
The people of America must decide one of the greatest questions ever put to them. Government is needed, and a people must cede some natural rights to empower it. Should we be, for all general purposes, one nation under one federal government? Or should we split into separate confederacies, each holding the powers we are advised to lodge in one? Until lately no one doubted that our prosperity depends on staying firmly united. Now politicians insist we should seek safety not in union but in dividing the States. The people would be unwise to adopt that doctrine without being fully convinced that it rests on truth and sound policy.
OriginalWHEN the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of the most important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it, will be evident. Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite powers. It is well worthy of consideration therefore, whether it would conduce more to the interest of the people of America that they should, to all general purposes, be one nation, under one federal government, or that they should divide themselves into separate confederacies, and give to the head of each the same kind of powers which they are advised to place in one national government.
It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion that the prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest citizens have been constantly directed to that object. But politicians now appear, who insist that this opinion is erroneous, and that instead of looking for safety and happiness in union, we ought to seek it in a division of the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties. However extraordinary this new doctrine may appear, it nevertheless has its advocates; and certain characters who were much opposed to it formerly, are at present of the number. Whatever may be the arguments or inducements which have wrought this change in the sentiments and declarations of these gentlemen, it certainly would not be wise in the people at large to adopt these new political tenets without being fully convinced that they are founded in truth and sound policy.
It has often given me pleasure that independent America is one connected, wide-spreading country. Providence gave this one country to one united people. We come from the same ancestors, speak the same language, follow the same religion, hold the same principles of government, and share similar manners. Fighting side by side through a long and bloody war, we won our liberty and independence together. This inheritance is fit for a band of brothers. Providence seems to have meant that it never be split into unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.
OriginalIt has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America was not composed of detached and distant territories, but that one connected, fertile, wide-spreading country was the portion of our western sons of liberty. Providence has in a particular manner blessed it with a variety of soils and productions, and watered it with innumerable streams, for the delight and accommodation of its inhabitants. A succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain round its borders, as if to bind it together; while the most noble rivers in the world, running at convenient distances, present them with highways for the easy communication of friendly aids, and the mutual transportation and exchange of their various commodities. With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people--a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and independence. This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.
For all general purposes we have always been one people, each citizen enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and protection. As a nation we have made peace and war, beaten our common enemies, and made treaties abroad. Prizing union, the people set up a federal government almost as soon as they had a political existence. Their homes were burning then, and their citizens bleeding. Such times left no room for the calm thought a well-balanced government needs. No wonder it proved deficient on trial.
OriginalSimilar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and denominations of men among us. To all general purposes we have uniformly been one people each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and protection. As a nation we have made peace and war; as a nation we have vanquished our common enemies; as a nation we have formed alliances, and made treaties, and entered into various compacts and conventions with foreign states.
A strong sense of the value and blessings of union induced the people, at a very early period, to institute a federal government to preserve and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a political existence; nay, at a time when their habitations were in flames, when many of their citizens were bleeding, and when the progress of hostility and desolation left little room for those calm and mature inquiries and reflections which must ever precede the formation of a wise and well-balanced government for a free people. It is not to be wondered at, that a government instituted in times so inauspicious, should on experiment be found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it was intended to answer.
This intelligent people saw and regretted these defects. Still attached to union and to liberty, they saw the danger threatening the first and, in time, the second. Persuaded that both needed a more wisely framed national government, they convened, as with one voice, the convention at Philadelphia. Its members held the people’s confidence, many known for patriotism, virtue, and wisdom. In peace, unawed by power, they spent months in cool, daily consultation, then recommended their unanimous plan.
The plan is only recommended, not imposed. It asks neither blind approval nor blind rejection, but the calm, candid thought the subject demands. Every Congress since the first, and the late convention as well, has agreed with the people that America’s prosperity depends on its Union. Why, then, do some men now belittle the Union, or urge that three or four confederacies would serve better than one? I am persuaded the people have always thought right, on weighty reasons I shall explain in later papers.
OriginalThis intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects. Still continuing no less attached to union than enamored of liberty, they observed the danger which immediately threatened the former and more remotely the latter; and being persuaded that ample security for both could only be found in a national government more wisely framed, they as with one voice, convened the late convention at Philadelphia, to take that important subject under consideration. This convention composed of men who possessed the confidence of the people, and many of whom had become highly distinguished by their patriotism, virtue and wisdom, in times which tried the minds and hearts of men, undertook the arduous task. In the mild season of peace, with minds unoccupied by other subjects, they passed many months in cool, uninterrupted, and daily consultation; and finally, without having been awed by power, or influenced by any passions except love for their country, they presented and recommended to the people the plan produced by their joint and very unanimous councils. Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only RECOMMENDED, not imposed, yet let it be remembered that it is neither recommended to BLIND approbation, nor to BLIND reprobation; but to that sedate and candid consideration which the magnitude and importance of the subject demand, and which it certainly ought to receive. But this (as was remarked in the foregoing number of this paper) is more to be wished than expected, that it may be so considered and examined. Experience on a former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine in such hopes. It is not yet forgotten that well-grounded apprehensions of imminent danger induced the people of America to form the memorable Congress of 1774. That body recommended certain measures to their constituents, and the event proved their wisdom; yet it is fresh in our memories how soon the press began to teem with pamphlets and weekly papers against those very measures. Not only many of the officers of government, who obeyed the dictates of personal interest, but others, from a mistaken estimate of consequences, or the undue influence of former attachments, or whose ambition aimed at objects which did not correspond with the public good, were indefatigable in their efforts to persuade the people to reject the advice of that patriotic Congress. Many, indeed, were deceived and deluded, but the great majority of the people reasoned and decided judiciously; and happy they are in reflecting that they did so. They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and experienced men. That, being convened from different parts of the country, they brought with them and communicated to each other a variety of useful information. That, in the course of the time they passed together in inquiring into and discussing the true interests of their country, they must have acquired very accurate knowledge on that head. That they were individually interested in the public liberty and prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their inclination than their duty to recommend only such measures as, after the most mature deliberation, they really thought prudent and advisable. These and similar considerations then induced the people to rely greatly on the judgment and integrity of the Congress; and they took their advice, notwithstanding the various arts and endeavors used to deter them from it. But if the people at large had reason to confide in the men of that Congress, few of whom had been fully tried or generally known, still greater reason have they now to respect the judgment and advice of the convention, for it is well known that some of the most distinguished members of that Congress, who have been since tried and justly approved for patriotism and abilities, and who have grown old in acquiring political information, were also members of this convention, and carried into it their accumulated knowledge and experience. It is worthy of remark that not only the first, but every succeeding Congress, as well as the late convention, have invariably joined with the people in thinking that the prosperity of America depended on its Union. To preserve and perpetuate it was the great object of the people in forming that convention, and it is also the great object of the plan which the convention has advised them to adopt. With what propriety, therefore, or for what good purposes, are attempts at this particular period made by some men to depreciate the importance of the Union? Or why is it suggested that three or four confederacies would be better than one? I am persuaded in my own mind that the people have always thought right on this subject, and that their universal and uniform attachment to the cause of the Union rests on great and weighty reasons, which I shall endeavor to develop and explain in some ensuing papers.
Those who urge separate confederacies in place of the plan seem clearly to foresee that rejecting it would put the Union in the utmost jeopardy. It would, and I wish every good citizen to foresee it as clearly. Whenever the Union dissolves, America will have reason to exclaim, with the poet: “Farewell! A long farewell to all my greatness.”
OriginalThey who promote the idea of substituting a number of distinct confederacies in the room of the plan of the convention, seem clearly to foresee that the rejection of it would put the continuance of the Union in the utmost jeopardy. That certainly would be the case, and I sincerely wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every good citizen, that whenever the dissolution of the Union arrives, America will have reason to exclaim, in the words of the poet: "FAREWELL! A LONG FAREWELL TO ALL MY GREATNESS." PUBLIUS
Federalist 3
Generated summaryOne national government gives foreign powers fewer just causes of war. It keeps treaties and the law of nations more steadily than thirteen states could.Key points
A cordial Union under an efficient national government is the best security against foreign war, for it will give the fewest just causes of war.
Safety is a free people’s first object, and wars run in proportion to the causes that provoke them.
Just causes spring from treaty violations or direct violence; one national government observes the law of nations more perfectly and rules uniformly through its own courts.
Direct violence springs more from one or two states than from the whole — feeble as it is, the Union has caused no Indian war, while single states have provoked several.
Cooler than an offended state and free of its pride, the national government settles disputes more amicably, its amends accepted where a weak state’s would be spurned.
A well-informed people seldom mistakes its interests for long. So the view Americans have long held earns respect: firm union under one federal government, with powers enough for all national purposes. The more closely I weigh the reasons for it, the more sound they appear. Safety is a free people’s first care: peace kept safe from foreign arms and influence. Does a cordial Union, under an efficient national government, guard us best against attack from abroad?
OriginalIT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and national purposes. The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that they are cogent and conclusive.
Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their SAFETY seems to be the first. The SAFETY of the people doubtless has relation to a great variety of circumstances and considerations, and consequently affords great latitude to those who wish to define it precisely and comprehensively. At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE, as from dangers of the LIKE KIND arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in order, it is proper it should be the first discussed. Let us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial Union, under an efficient national government, affords them the best security that can be devised against HOSTILITIES from abroad.
Wars come in proportion to the number and weight of their causes, real or pretended. If united America gives fewer just causes than disunited, the Union does most for peace. Just causes rise mostly from broken treaties or direct violence. We hold treaties with six foreign nations, all sea powers but Prussia, able to injure us. Our peace turns on keeping the law of nations toward them. One national government will keep it better than thirteen states, or three or four confederacies.
OriginalThe number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the causes, whether REAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or INVITE them. If this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many JUST causes of war are likely to be given by UNITED AMERICA as by DISUNITED America; for if it should turn out that United America will probably give the fewest, then it will follow that in this respect the Union tends most to preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations. The JUST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation of treaties or from direct violence. America has already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us. She has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with respect to the two latter, has, in addition, the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to. It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four distinct confederacies.
Once it is established, the best men will consent to serve and generally be appointed. Local influence can fill a state assembly; national office asks a wider reputation, and offers the widest choice. Its administration, counsels, and judgments will be wiser than the states’, will please other nations more, and keep us safer.
OriginalBecause when once an efficient national government is established, the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country, or other contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government,--especially as it will have the widest field for choice, and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the States. Hence, it will result that the administration, the political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more SAFE with respect to us.
Under one national government, treaties and the law of nations are read and enforced in one sense. Rulings in thirteen states, or in several confederacies, will not always agree; their courts answer to different governments and local interests. A present gain may tempt the governing party in one or two states to swerve from good faith. Reaching no other state, and barely touching the national government, the temptation fails.
OriginalBecause, under the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner,--whereas, adjudications on the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by different and independent governments, as from the different local laws and interests which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of the convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national government, cannot be too much commended.
Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and consequently having little or no influence on the national government, the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.
Such temptations rise from a state’s own affairs, so even a willing governing party may be unable to punish the aggressors. The national government, standing outside them, will neither do the wrong nor fail to punish it. Broken treaties, meant or not, are therefore less to be feared under one government than several.
Against direct violence, too, one good national government seems to me far safer. Such violence springs oftener from one or two states than from the whole. Quarrels with Spain and Britain fall on the border states, likeliest in sudden anger to start war. Nothing guards against that like a national government no local passion inflames.
OriginalBecause, even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may, and commonly do, result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able, if willing, to prevent the injustice meditated, or to punish the aggressors. But the national government, not being affected by those local circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want power or inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others. So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of treaties and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they are less to be apprehended under one general government than under several lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the SAFETY of the people. As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be derived from any other quarter. Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two States than of the Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the present federal government, feeble as it is; but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants. The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury, will be most likely, by direct violence, to excite war with these nations; and nothing can so effectually obviate that danger as a national government, whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties immediately interested.
Cooler than the offending state, the national government is also better able to settle quarrels. States, like men, are proud, and pride resists repairing an error. Free of that pride, the national government acts with moderation and candor. Amends from a strong united nation are often accepted; from a weak state, spurned.
OriginalBut not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly than the offending State. The pride of states, as well as of men, naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes their acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and offenses. The national government, in such cases, will not be affected by this pride, but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and decide on the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them. Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State or confederacy of little consideration or power. In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV., endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to FRANCE, to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any other POWERFUL nation? PUBLIUS
Federalist 4
Generated summaryNations make war whenever they see a gain, so safety means not inviting attack. One government can pool the militia, the fleets, and the resources of all. Separate confederacies would leave each part to shift for itself.Key points
Safety requires more than giving no just cause of war; one united government is far better able to deter and repel foreign force than separate states or confederacies.
Nations make war whenever they expect to gain, and monarchs even for personal glory — pretended causes are never wanting.
Our own situation breeds rivals in the fisheries, navigation, and trade, and Europe’s powers will not watch our growth with indifference.
The people therefore hold union and good government necessary to a posture that discourages war, resting on the best possible state of defense.
One government can gather the ablest men and apply the resources of the whole to defend any single part; divided, America could raise few armies or fleets.
Foreign nations see us exactly as we are: united we are courted; split and discordant we make a poor, pitiful figure, open to contempt and outrage.
My last paper showed that union best guards us against just causes of war. A national government gives such causes more rarely, and settles them more easily, than the states or separate confederacies could. But safety asks more: we must not invite hostility, for there are pretended causes of war as well as just ones. Nations in general make war whenever they expect to gain by it. Absolute monarchs often make war when their nations gain nothing. They fight for merely personal ends: glory, revenge, ambition, or advancing their families and partisans. Neither justice nor their people sanction such wars. Other motives work on nations as often as on kings, and some grow out of our own situation.
OriginalMY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to by JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those reasons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be more easily accommodated, by a national government than either by the State governments or the proposed little confederacies. But the safety of the people of America against dangers from FOREIGN force depends not only on their forbearing to give JUST causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to INVITE hostility or insult; for it need not be observed that there are PRETENDED as well as just causes of war. It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for the purposes and objects merely personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans. These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people. But, independent of these inducements to war, which are more prevalent in absolute monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are others which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will on examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and circumstances.
With France and Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and can undersell them. With most of Europe we are rivals in navigation and the carrying trade. Ours cannot grow unless theirs shrinks, so their policy is to hold it down. In the trade to China and India we share advantages they had nearly monopolized. Spain shuts the Mississippi against us, Britain the Saint Lawrence. Jealousy may slide into their cabinets, and pretenses for war will never be wanting. So the people wisely hold union and a good national government necessary to a posture that discourages war. That posture is the best state of defense, which rests on our government, our arms, and our resources.
OriginalWith France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and can supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves, notwithstanding any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own or duties on foreign fish. With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if we suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as our carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree diminishing theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more their policy, to restrain than to promote it. In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with commodities which we used to purchase from them. The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions, added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater share in the advantages which those territories afford, than consists with the wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns. Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the one side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other; nor will either of them permit the other waters which are between them and us to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic. From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect that they should regard our advancement in union, in power and consequence by land and by sea, with an eye of indifference and composure. The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out of these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at present, and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for operation, pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting. Wisely, therefore, do they consider union and a good national government as necessary to put and keep them in SUCH A SITUATION as, instead of INVITING war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible state of defense, and necessarily depends on the government, the arms, and the resources of the country.
The safety of the whole is the whole’s interest, and needs government. Is one good government not more fit for this than many? One can draw the ablest men of the Union, act on uniform principles, and protect each part. It can throw the resources of all behind any part attacked, faster than separate confederacies can, for want of concert. It can put the militia under one discipline and one chief magistrate. One national government built Britain’s fleets; under four governments, each would dwindle. Divided, would our states spend blood and money for a neighbor they envy? If willing, how much aid would each send, who would command, what umpire would settle disputes? One government escapes these troubles.
OriginalAs the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot be provided for without government, either one or more or many, let us inquire whether one good government is not, relative to the object in question, more competent than any other given number whatever. One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or four distinct independent companies. What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales? Suppose an invasion; would those three governments (if they agreed at all) be able, with all their respective forces, to operate against the enemy so effectually as the single government of Great Britain would? We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come, if we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if one national government, had not so regulated the navigation of Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen--if one national government had not called forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets, their prowess and their thunder would never have been celebrated. Let England have its navigation and fleet--let Scotland have its navigation and fleet--let Wales have its navigation and fleet--let Ireland have its navigation and fleet--let those four of the constituent parts of the British empire be under four independent governments, and it is easy to perceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance. Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen or, if you please, into three or four independent governments--what armies could they raise and pay--what fleets could they ever hope to have? If one was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defense? Would there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality by its specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and whose importance they are content to see diminished? Although such conduct would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be natural. The history of the states of Greece, and of other countries, abounds with such instances, and it is not improbable that what has so often happened would, under similar circumstances, happen again. But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of men and money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and from which of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the terms of peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide between them and compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences would be inseparable from such a situation; whereas one government, watching over the general and common interests, and combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole, would be free from all these embarrassments, and conduce far more to the safety of the people.
Foreign nations will see our situation exactly as it is, and act accordingly. Suppose they find an efficient government, prudent trade, a trained militia, sound finances and restored credit, and a free, contented, united people. Then they will sooner court our friendship than provoke our resentment. If instead they find no effectual government, or three or four quarreling confederacies, the case alters. One leans to Britain, another to France, a third to Spain, and all three play us off against each other. What a poor, pitiful figure America would make in their eyes, open not only to contempt but to outrage. When a people so divide, it never fails to be against themselves.
OriginalBut whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one national government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they will act toward us accordingly. If they see that our national government is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual government (each State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient), or split into three or four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies, one inclining to Britain, another to France, and a third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by the three, what a poor, pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! How liable would she become not only to their contempt but to their outrage, and how soon would dear-bought experience proclaim that when a people or family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves. PUBLIUS
Federalist 5
Generated summaryDivided American confederacies would fall into jealousy and rivalry, as Britain’s separate kingdoms once did. That division invites the very foreign meddling that union prevents.Key points
Divided into several confederacies, America would breed jealousy and rivalry among them, leaving them formidable only to each other and open to foreign interference.
Weakness and division at home invite dangers abroad; nothing guards against them like union and good government within.
Britain’s history warns us: one island long divided into three nations, kept almost constantly at war by foreign art despite a common interest.
Split into three or four, each confederacy would pursue its partial interest until envy extinguished affection and they lived in war or its constant fear.
The confederacies could not stay equal — the northern would soon be most formidable, and the rest would envy and fear it, each seeking foreign alliances against its neighbors.
In 1706 Queen Anne urged union on the Scottish Parliament as “the solid foundation of lasting peace.” It would join the whole island and enable it “to resist all its enemies.” Weakness and division at home invite dangers from abroad. One island should plainly be one nation, yet Britain held three kingdoms for ages, almost always at war, their jealousies inflamed by the continental powers. Should America divide into three or four nations, would not the same jealousies arise? Each would pursue its partial interest, not the general interest of all America. Like most bordering nations, they would live in war or constant fear of it.
OriginalQUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall present the public with one or two extracts from it: "An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by this union the whole island, being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions of different interest, will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS ENEMIES." "We most earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present and future happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION." It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted.
The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit by their experience without paying the price which it cost them. Although it seems obvious to common sense that the people of such an island should be but one nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided into three, and that those three were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the continental nations was really the same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series of years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than they were useful and assisting to each other. Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being "joined in affection" and free from all apprehension of different "interests," envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America, would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most other BORDERING nations, they would always be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them.
The warmest advocates of three or four confederacies cannot reasonably suppose they would long stay equal in strength. Grant that they could be formed equal at first: what human contrivance could keep them so? Local circumstances build power in one part and check it in another. Better policy and management would probably raise one government above the rest. We cannot presume that each confederacy would keep the same prudence and foresight for a long succession of years.
OriginalThe most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal footing in point of strength, even if it was possible to form them so at first; but, admitting that to be practicable, yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance of such equality? Independent of those local circumstances which tend to beget and increase power in one part and to impede its progress in another, we must advert to the effects of that superior policy and good management which would probably distinguish the government of one above the rest, and by which their relative equality in strength and consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight would uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long succession of years.
Let one confederacy rise much above her neighbors, as one surely would. Her neighbors would watch her with envy and fear, and favor whatever lowered her. She would soon see it and turn unfriendly herself, for distrust breeds distrust. The North is the region of strength, and local circumstances make the northern confederacy likely to grow the most formidable. Like the northern hive of old, it might swarm into the milder fields of the south. Such neighbors would be borderers only: neither loving nor trusting, formidable only to each other. Those who expect them to form offensive and defensive alliances against foreign enemies are greatly mistaken.
OriginalWhenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on the scale of political importance much above the degree of her neighbors, that moment would those neighbors behold her with envy and with fear. Both those passions would lead them to countenance, if not to promote, whatever might promise to diminish her importance; and would also restrain them from measures calculated to advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much time would not be necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in her neighbors, but also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable to them. Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied. The North is generally the region of strength, and many local circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the proposed confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No sooner would this become evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite the same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of America which it formerly did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash conjecture that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors. They who well consider the history of similar divisions and confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they would be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one another, but on the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us exactly in the situations in which some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz., FORMIDABLE ONLY TO EACH OTHER. From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be formed between these confederacies, and would produce that combination and union of wills of arms and of resources, which would be necessary to put and keep them in a formidable state of defense against foreign enemies.
Each would be a distinct nation, regulating its own trade by its own treaties, and different trade makes different friends abroad. The nation at war with the southern confederacy might be the one the northern most wished to keep at peace. An alliance so contrary to their interests would be hard to form and harder to keep in good faith. Far from Europe, each would dread its neighbors more than distant powers, seeking foreign alliances against them. Foreign fleets enter our ports, and armies our country, far more easily than they leave. Let candid men judge whether dividing America into independent sovereignties would secure us against foreign hostility and meddling.
OriginalWhen did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain were formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their forces against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be DISTINCT NATIONS. Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and commodities are different and proper for different markets, so would those treaties be essentially different. Different commercial concerns must create different interests, and of course different degrees of political attachment to and connection with different foreign nations. Hence it might and probably would happen that the foreign nation with whom the SOUTHERN confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom the NORTHERN confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so contrary to their immediate interest would not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and fulfilled with perfect good faith. Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking different sides. Considering our distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger from one another than from distant nations, and therefore that each of them should be more desirous to guard against the others by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. And here let us not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade or compel them to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and others make in the characters of allies, and what innovations did they under the same character introduce into the governments of those whom they pretended to protect. Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into any given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations. PUBLIUS
