The Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence

The people of America are now called on to decide one of the most important questions ever put before them, and it deserves a serious, comprehensive view. Nothing is more certain than the necessity of government, and it is equally undeniable that the people must cede some natural rights to give any government the powers it requires. The question worth weighing is this: should we be, for all general purposes, one nation under one federal government? Or should we divide into separate confederacies, giving the head of each the same kind of powers we are advised to place in one national government?

Until lately, the received and uncontradicted opinion was that the prosperity of the people of America depends on their remaining firmly united. Our best and wisest citizens have directed their wishes, prayers, and efforts toward that object. But politicians now appear who insist this opinion is wrong: safety and happiness should be sought not in union but in dividing the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties. However extraordinary this new doctrine may seem, it has advocates, including some who once firmly opposed it. Whatever produced this change, the people would not be wise to adopt these new ideas without being fully convinced that they rest on truth and sound policy.

It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America is not a set of detached and distant territories but one connected, fertile, wide-spreading country. Providence has blessed it with varied soils and productions and watered it with countless streams. A chain of navigable waters surrounds its borders as if to bind it together, and the world’s noblest rivers offer easy highways for mutual aid and trade. With equal pleasure I note that Providence has given this one connected country to one united people. We descend from the same ancestors, speak the same language, profess the same religion, hold the same principles of government, and share similar manners and customs. Fighting side by side through a long and bloody war, we won our liberty and independence together. This country and this people seem made for each other. It seems the design of Providence that an inheritance so fit for a band of brothers should never be split into unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.

Similar sentiments have prevailed among every class of people here. For all general purposes we have always been one people, each citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and protection. As a nation we have made peace and war; as a nation we have defeated our common enemies; and as a nation we have formed alliances, made treaties, and entered into compacts with foreign states.

A strong sense of the value of union led the people very early to institute a federal government to preserve and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a political existence, while their homes burned and their fellow citizens bled. War left little room for the calm, mature reflection that must precede a wise and well-balanced government for a free people. It is no wonder that a government created in times so inauspicious proved, on trial, greatly deficient and inadequate to its purpose.

This intelligent people saw and regretted these defects. Still as attached to union as in love with liberty, they recognized the immediate danger to the first and the more distant danger to the second. Persuaded that ample security for both required a more wisely framed national government, they convened, as with one voice, the convention at Philadelphia. That convention was composed of men who held the people’s confidence, many of them already distinguished for patriotism, virtue, and wisdom in times that tried men’s minds and hearts. In a mild season of peace, with minds free of other cares, they passed months in cool, daily consultation. Unawed by power and moved only by love of country, they presented and recommended to the people the plan of their unanimous councils. Admit, for it is the fact, that this plan is only recommended, not imposed; but it is recommended neither to blind approval nor to blind rejection, and it deserves the calm, candid consideration its magnitude demands. Such consideration, as I noted in the last paper, is more to be wished than expected; experience teaches us not to hope for too much. Well-grounded fears of imminent danger once led the people of America to form the memorable Congress of 1774. That body recommended certain measures, and events proved its wisdom. Yet the press quickly teemed with pamphlets and weekly papers against those very measures. Officers of government serving their own interest, and others misled by wrong estimates, old attachments, or ambition, labored to persuade the people to reject the advice. Many were deceived, but the great majority reasoned and decided judiciously. They saw that the Congress consisted of wise and experienced men from every part of the country, who pooled useful information and studied their country’s true interests. Such men had a personal stake in the public liberty and prosperity, and duty as well as inclination would lead them to recommend only what they truly judged prudent. So the people followed their advice, despite every art used to deter them. If the people had reason to trust that Congress, few of whose members were then fully tried or generally known, they have still greater reason now to respect the judgment of the convention. Some of that Congress’s most distinguished members, proved since in patriotism and ability and grown old in political knowledge, sat in this convention and carried their experience into it. Every Congress from the first onward, and the late convention as well, has invariably agreed with the people that the prosperity of America depends on its Union. Preserving and perpetuating that Union was the people’s great object in forming the convention, and it is the great object of the plan the convention recommends. Why, then, do some men now try to depreciate the Union’s importance, and why is it suggested that three or four confederacies would serve better than one? I am persuaded that the people have always thought right on this subject; their universal attachment to the Union rests on great and weighty reasons, which I shall develop and explain in the papers that follow.

Those who promote the idea of substituting several distinct confederacies for the plan of the convention seem clearly to foresee that rejecting it would put the continuance of the Union in the utmost jeopardy. That certainly would be the case; and I sincerely wish every good citizen to see, just as clearly, that if the Union ever dissolves, America will have reason to exclaim, in the words of the poet: “Farewell! A long farewell to all my greatness.”

An intelligent and well-informed people seldom adopt a mistaken opinion about their interests and hold to it for years. That fact commands respect for the view Americans have so long and uniformly held: that they should remain firmly united under one federal government with powers sufficient for all general and national purposes. The more attentively I consider the reasons behind this opinion, the more convinced I become that they are cogent and conclusive.

Among the many objects to which a wise and free people must direct their attention, providing for their safety seems to be the first. Safety touches a great variety of circumstances; here I mean only security for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, against dangers from foreign arms and influence and against similar dangers arising at home. Foreign dangers come first in order, so I take them up first. Let us examine, then, whether the people are right in their opinion that a cordial Union, under an efficient national government, affords the best security that can be devised against hostilities from abroad.

The number of wars, past and future, will always be in proportion to the number and weight of the causes, real or pretended, that provoke or invite them. It is worth asking, then, whether united or disunited America is likely to give more just causes of war; if united America gives the fewest, the Union tends most to keep us at peace. Just causes of war arise, for the most part, from violations of treaties or from direct violence. America already has treaties with six foreign nations, and all but Prussia are maritime powers able to annoy and injure us. She also trades extensively with Portugal, Spain, and Britain; Spain and Britain are our neighbors besides. It is of high importance to our peace that we observe the laws of nations toward all these powers. One national government will observe them more perfectly and punctually than thirteen separate states or three or four distinct confederacies.

Once an efficient national government is established, the best men in the country will not only consent to serve it but will generally be appointed to manage it. Local influence may fill state assemblies, senates, courts, and executive offices, but national office will demand a wider reputation for talents. The national government will also have the widest field of choice, so it will never lack proper persons, as some states do. Hence its administration, political counsels, and judicial decisions will be more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of individual states, and therefore more satisfactory to other nations and safer for us.

Under the national government, treaties and the laws of nations will always be interpreted in one sense and executed in the same manner. Rulings on the same questions in thirteen states, or three or four confederacies, will not always agree; their courts are appointed by different governments and swayed by different local laws and interests. The convention deserves the highest praise for committing such questions to courts appointed by, and answerable only to, one national government.

The prospect of immediate loss or gain may tempt the governing party in one or two states to swerve from good faith and justice. Such temptations do not reach the other states or the national government, so they will prove fruitless and good faith will be preserved. The treaty of peace with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.

Even a willing governing party in a state may be unable to prevent the injustice or punish the aggressors, since the temptation springs from circumstances peculiar to that state and touches many of its people. The national government, standing outside those circumstances, will neither commit the wrong itself nor lack the power and the will to prevent or punish it in others. So far, then, as violations of treaties and the laws of nations, whether designed or accidental, give just causes of war, they are less to be feared under one general government than under several smaller ones. As to just causes of war from direct and unlawful violence, it seems equally clear to me that one good national government affords vastly more security. Such violence more often springs from the passions and interests of one or two states than from those of the whole Union. The present federal government, feeble as it is, has not occasioned a single Indian war; but individual states, unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have provoked several, at the cost of many innocent lives. Spanish and British territories border some states and not others, so causes of quarrel with those powers fall chiefly on the bordering states. Under sudden irritation and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury, they are the most likely to excite war by direct violence. Nothing can remove that danger so effectually as a national government whose wisdom and prudence will not be inflamed by local passions.

The national government will not only give fewer just causes of war; more temperate and cool than the offending state, it will also be better able to settle them amicably. The pride of states, like that of men, disposes them to justify all their actions and resist acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors. The national government, free of that pride, will proceed with moderation and candor to find the best way out of the difficulty. Besides, a strong united nation’s acknowledgments, explanations, and compensations are often accepted as satisfactory when the same offers from a weak state or confederacy would be rejected. In 1685 Genoa offended Louis XIV and tried to appease him. He demanded that its Doge, or chief magistrate, come to France with four senators to ask his pardon and receive his terms, and Genoa had to submit for the sake of peace. Would he have demanded, or received, such humiliation from Spain, Britain, or any other powerful nation?

My last paper gave several reasons why union best secures the people against just causes of war given to other nations. Those reasons show that a national government will give such causes more rarely, and settle them more easily, than the state governments or small separate confederacies could. But safety against foreign force requires more than refusing to give just causes of war. We must also avoid placing ourselves in a situation that invites hostility or insult, for there are pretended causes of war as well as just ones. It is too true, however disgraceful to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they expect to gain anything by it. Absolute monarchs will even make war when their nations gain nothing, for objects merely personal: thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to advance their families or partisans. These motives, which touch only the mind of the sovereign, often lead him into wars that neither justice nor the voice and interests of his people sanction. Such inducements weigh most in absolute monarchies, but others affect nations as often as kings, and some of them grow out of our own situation and circumstances.

With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and we can supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves, despite the bounties and duties meant to prevent it. With them and with most other European nations we are also rivals in navigation and the carrying trade, and none will rejoice to see ours flourish. It cannot grow without diminishing theirs, so their policy will be to restrain rather than promote it. In the trade to China and India we interfere with more than one nation, sharing advantages they had nearly monopolized and supplying ourselves with goods we once bought from them. Nor can the growth of our commerce in our own vessels please nations holding territories on or near this continent. The cheapness and excellence of our productions, our nearness, and the enterprise of our merchants and navigators will give us a larger share of those advantages than their sovereigns wish. Spain finds it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on one side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other. Neither will let the waters between us become channels of mutual trade. From such considerations, jealousy and uneasiness may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other nations, who will not watch our advance in union, power, and consequence with indifference. The people of America know that inducements to war may arise from these circumstances, and from others less obvious at present. When such inducements find a fit time and opportunity, pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting. Wisely, therefore, they consider union and a good national government necessary to keep them in a situation that represses and discourages war instead of inviting it. That situation consists in the best possible state of defense, and it depends on the government, the arms, and the resources of the country.

The safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and it cannot be provided for without government. The question is whether one good government is not more competent for this object than any number. One government can use the talents and experience of the ablest men, wherever in the Union they live, and act on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize and protect the several parts; in treaties it will regard the interest of the whole and of each part as connected with it. And it can apply the resources of the whole to defend any part more easily and quickly than state governments or separate confederacies, which lack concert and unity of system. It can also place the militia under one plan of discipline, with their officers in one line of subordination to the chief magistrate. That consolidates them into a single corps, more efficient than thirteen, or three or four, independent companies. What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed England, the Scotch obeyed Scotland, and the Welsh obeyed Wales? Could those three governments, even if they agreed at all, resist an invasion as effectually as the single government of Great Britain? We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and if we are wise, the time may come when the fleets of America engage attention. But if one national government had not made Britain’s navigation a nursery for seamen and called forth the nation’s means for building fleets, their prowess and thunder would never have been celebrated. Let England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland each keep its own navigation and fleet under its own independent government, and each would soon dwindle into comparative insignificance. Apply these facts to our own case: divided into thirteen governments, or into three or four, what armies could America raise and pay, and what fleets could she hope for? If one part were attacked, would the others fly to its aid and spend their blood and money in its defense? They might rather be flattered into neutrality by specious promises, or too fond of peace to risk their tranquillity for neighbors they envy and are content to see diminished. Such conduct would not be wise, but it would be natural. The history of the states of Greece and of other countries abounds with such instances, and what has so often happened would happen again. But suppose they were willing to help the invaded state: how, when, and in what proportion would men and money be sent? Who would command the allied armies, and from which government would he receive his orders? Who would settle the terms of peace, and in case of dispute, what umpire could decide between them and compel obedience? One government, watching over the common interest and directing the powers and resources of the whole, escapes these embarrassments and does far more for the safety of the people.

Whatever our situation, foreign nations will know and see it exactly as it is, and they will treat us accordingly. If they see an efficient, well-administered government, prudently regulated trade, a disciplined militia, discreetly managed resources and credit, and a free, contented, united people, they will rather cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment. But they may find us without an effectual government, each state doing right or wrong as its rulers please, or split into three or four discordant confederacies. One would incline to Britain, another to France, a third to Spain, and perhaps all three would play us off against one another. What a poor, pitiful figure America would then make in their eyes, liable not only to contempt but to outrage. Dear-bought experience would soon proclaim that when a people or a family so divides, it never fails to be against themselves.

Queen Anne, in her letter of July 1, 1706, to the Scottish Parliament, made observations on the union forming between England and Scotland that merit our attention. She wrote that “an entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace.” It would secure religion, liberty, and property, remove the jealousies between the two kingdoms, and increase their strength, riches, and trade. The whole island, joined in affection and free from any fear of separate interests, would be “enabled to resist all its enemies.” She urged calmness and unanimity, since the enemies of both kingdoms would “use their utmost endeavors to prevent or delay this union.” In the preceding paper I remarked that weakness and divisions at home invite dangers from abroad. Nothing secures us against them better than union, strength, and good government within ourselves. This subject is rich and cannot easily be exhausted.

We know the history of Great Britain best, and it teaches lessons we can profit by without paying the price the British paid. Common sense suggests the people of one island should form one nation, yet for ages they were divided into three, almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars. Their true interests toward the continental nations were the same, yet those nations by art and policy kept their mutual jealousies inflamed. For years the three were more troublesome than useful to each other. Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four nations, would not the same jealousies arise and be cherished? Instead of being “joined in affection” and free from fear of different “interests,” each confederacy would pursue its partial interests rather than the general interests of all America. Envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection. Like most bordering nations, they would live either in disputes and war or in constant fear of them.

Even the most hopeful advocates of three or four confederacies cannot reasonably expect them to remain equal in strength for long, even if it were possible to form them equal at first. What human contrivance could secure such equality? Local circumstances would build power in one part and slow it in another. Beyond that, superior policy and good management would probably distinguish one government above the rest and destroy their relative equality. We cannot presume that each confederacy would show the same sound policy, prudence, and foresight for a long succession of years.

Whenever any one of these nations or confederacies rose much above her neighbors in political importance, as one surely would, the others would view her with envy and fear. Both passions would lead them to favor whatever might diminish her importance, and to withhold whatever might advance or even secure her prosperity. She would soon discern this unfriendly disposition, lose confidence in her neighbors, and grow equally unfriendly toward them. Distrust naturally creates distrust, and nothing destroys good will more quickly than envious jealousies and unfair accusations, whether spoken or implied. The North is generally the region of strength, and local circumstances make it probable that the most northern confederacy would soon be the most formidable. The moment that became evident, this northern hive would stir in the southern parts of America the same feelings it once stirred in southern Europe. It is no rash guess that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air of their more delicate neighbors. Whoever studies the history of similar divisions and confederacies will find abundant reason to fear that these would be neighbors only as borderers. They would neither love nor trust one another, but would fall prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual injury. In short, they would leave us exactly where some nations wish to see us: formidable only to each other. The gentlemen who suppose these confederacies could form offensive and defensive alliances, uniting their wills, arms, and resources against foreign enemies, are therefore greatly mistaken.

When did the independent states into which Britain and Spain were once divided ever unite their forces against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies would be distinct nations, each regulating its foreign commerce by its own treaties. Since their products suit different markets, those treaties would differ essentially, and different commerce creates different attachments abroad. The nation at war with the southern confederacy might be the very one the northern confederacy most wished to keep at peace. An alliance so contrary to immediate interest would be hard to form, and harder to keep in good faith. In America, as in Europe, neighboring nations moved by opposite interests and unfriendly passions would more often take different sides. Considering our distance from Europe, these confederacies would have more reason to fear one another than distant nations. Each would rather guard against the others through foreign alliances than against foreign dangers through alliances among themselves. And we must not forget that it is far easier to receive foreign fleets into our ports and armies into our country than to compel them to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and others make in the character of allies, and what changes did they force on the governments they pretended to protect? Let candid men judge, then, whether dividing America into any number of independent sovereignties would secure us against the hostility and improper interference of foreign nations.