Federalist No. 14

Answering the Objection that Big Government is Unwieldy

by James Madison

Generated summaryA republic, unlike a direct democracy, can stretch across a large territory, because representation lets citizens govern through elected delegates instead of gathering in one place, so the Union's sheer size is no obstacle to republican government.

Key points

The objection that a republic cannot span a large territory confuses a republic with a democracy.
A democracy, where the people govern in person, must stay small; a republic, governing through representatives, may extend far.
Europe gave us representation, but America has made it the basis of large, extensive republics.
A republic’s true limit is whether its representatives can convene; the Union, smaller than Germany or Poland, lies well within it.
The general government is confined to enumerated national objects; the states keep authority over all the rest.
Nearly every state is a frontier, so even those farthest from the Union’s heart most need its strength.
Reject the voice of disunion: the most alarming novelty of all is to tear the Union apart to preserve liberty.

We have seen why the Union is necessary. It is our bulwark against foreign danger and the keeper of peace among ourselves. It guards our commerce and our other common interests. It is the only substitute for the standing armies that have destroyed the liberties of the Old World. And it is the proper remedy for the disease of faction, which has proved fatal to other popular governments, and whose alarming symptoms our own has already shown.

OriginalWE HAVE seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against foreign danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the guardian of our commerce and other common interests, as the only substitute for those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the Old World, and as the proper antidote for the diseases of faction, which have proved fatal to other popular governments, and of which alarming symptoms have been betrayed by our own.

One thing remains in this branch of our inquiry: to answer an objection drawn from the great extent of country that the Union embraces. A few remarks on it are the more fitting because the enemies of the new Constitution are exploiting the common prejudice about how large a republic can practically be, using imaginary difficulties to supply the solid objections they try in vain to find.

OriginalAll that remains, within this branch of our inquiries, is to take notice of an objection that may be drawn from the great extent of country which the Union embraces. A few observations on this subject will be the more proper, as it is perceived that the adversaries of the new Constitution are availing themselves of the prevailing prejudice with regard to the practicable sphere of republican administration, in order to supply, by imaginary difficulties, the want of those solid objections which they endeavor in vain to find.

The error that confines republican government to a narrow district has been refuted in earlier papers. I note here only that it arises chiefly from confusing a republic with a democracy, and applying to the one reasoning that fits only the other. The true difference between these forms I have also touched on before.

OriginalThe error which limits republican government to a narrow district has been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I remark here only that it seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a republic with a democracy, applying to the former reasonings drawn from the nature of the latter. The true distinction between these forms was also adverted to on a former occasion.

The difference is this: in a democracy the people meet and govern in person; in a republic they assemble and govern through their representatives and agents. A democracy must therefore be confined to a small spot; a republic can be spread over a large region. To this source of the error some celebrated writers have added an artifice of their own. Being subjects of a monarchy, absolute or limited, they tried to heighten its advantages, or excuse its evils, by contrasting them with the vices of the republican form, and they offered as examples of that form the turbulent democracies of ancient Greece and modern Italy. Under this confusion of names, it was easy to transfer to a republic what belongs only to a democracy, including the claim that it can exist only among a small number of people living within a small territory.

OriginalIt is, that in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region. To this accidental source of the error may be added the artifice of some celebrated authors, whose writings have had a great share in forming the modern standard of political opinions. Being subjects either of an absolute or limited monarchy, they have endeavored to heighten the advantages, or palliate the evils of those forms, by placing in comparison the vices and defects of the republican, and by citing as specimens of the latter the turbulent democracies of ancient Greece and modern Italy. Under the confusion of names, it has been an easy task to transfer to a republic observations applicable to a democracy only; and among others, the observation that it can never be established but among a small number of people, living within a small compass of territory.

The mistake passed the more easily because most of the popular governments of antiquity were democracies, and even in modern Europe, to which we owe the great principle of representation, there is no example of a government founded wholly on that principle. If Europe deserves credit for discovering this powerful device in government, by which the will of the largest political body can be concentrated and directed to any object the public good requires, America can claim the credit of making that discovery the basis of broad and extensive republics.

OriginalSuch a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as most of the popular governments of antiquity were of the democratic species; and even in modern Europe, to which we owe the great principle of representation, no example is seen of a government wholly popular, and founded, at the same time, wholly on that principle. If Europe has the merit of discovering this great mechanical power in government, by the simple agency of which the will of the largest political body may be concentred, and its force directed to any object which the public good requires, America can claim the merit of making the discovery the basis of unmixed and extensive republics.

It is only to be regretted that any of her citizens should wish to rob her of the further credit of displaying its full power in the broad system now under her consideration.

The natural limit of a democracy is the distance from the center that still lets the most remote citizens gather as often as their public duties require, taking in no more people than can share in those duties. The natural limit of a republic is the distance from the center that barely lets its representatives meet as often as public business demands. Do the limits of the United States exceed that distance? No one will say so who remembers that the Atlantic coast is the longest side of the Union; that for thirteen years the representatives of the states have been almost continually assembled; and that the members from the most distant states have missed no more sessions than those near Congress.

OriginalAs the natural limit of a democracy is that distance from the central point which will just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as often as their public functions demand, and will include no greater number than can join in those functions; so the natural limit of a republic is that distance from the centre which will barely allow the representatives to meet as often as may be necessary for the administration of public affairs. Can it be said that the limits of the United States exceed this distance? It will not be said by those who recollect that the Atlantic coast is the longest side of the Union, that during the term of thirteen years, the representatives of the States have been almost continually assembled, and that the members from the most distant States are not chargeable with greater intermissions of attendance than those from the States in the neighborhood of Congress.

To judge this matter better, let us look at the actual size of the Union. Its limits, fixed by the treaty of peace, are the Atlantic on the east, the line of thirty-one degrees on the south, the Mississippi on the west, and on the north an irregular line running in places beyond the forty-fifth degree and in others as low as the forty-second. Reckoning from the thirty-first to the forty-fifth degree gives nine hundred and seventy-three miles; from thirty-one to forty-two, seven hundred and sixty-four and a half; the mean is about eight hundred and sixty-nine miles. The mean distance from the Atlantic to the Mississippi is probably no more than seven hundred and fifty. Compared with several countries of Europe, our system plainly can be made to fit. It is not much larger than Germany, where a diet representing the whole empire is always in session, or than Poland before its late partition, which had a national diet of its own. And in Britain, small as it is, the representatives from the northern tip of the island travel as far to the national council as the most remote members of our Union would. Favorable as this view is, more can be said to make it still clearer.

OriginalThat we may form a juster estimate with regard to this interesting subject, let us resort to the actual dimensions of the Union. The limits, as fixed by the treaty of peace, are: on the east the Atlantic, on the south the latitude of thirty-one degrees, on the west the Mississippi, and on the north an irregular line running in some instances beyond the forty-fifth degree, in others falling as low as the forty-second. The southern shore of Lake Erie lies below that latitude. Computing the distance between the thirty-first and forty-fifth degrees, it amounts to nine hundred and seventy-three common miles; computing it from thirty-one to forty-two degrees, to seven hundred and sixty-four miles and a half. Taking the mean for the distance, the amount will be eight hundred and sixty-eight miles and three-fourths. The mean distance from the Atlantic to the Mississippi does not probably exceed seven hundred and fifty miles. On a comparison of this extent with that of several countries in Europe, the practicability of rendering our system commensurate to it appears to be demonstrable. It is not a great deal larger than Germany, where a diet representing the whole empire is continually assembled; or than Poland before the late dismemberment, where another national diet was the depositary of the supreme power. Passing by France and Spain, we find that in Great Britain, inferior as it may be in size, the representatives of the northern extremity of the island have as far to travel to the national council as will be required of those of the most remote parts of the Union. Favorable as this view of the subject may be, some observations remain which will place it in a light still more satisfactory.

First, remember that the general government is not charged with the whole work of making and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain listed objects, which concern all the members of the republic but cannot be reached by any one of them separately. The state governments, which can attend to all the other subjects that can be handled separately, keep their proper authority and activity. Were the plan of the convention proposing to abolish the state governments, its opponents would have some ground for their objection, though even then it would be easy to show that the general government would be forced, by the law of self-preservation, to restore them to their proper jurisdiction.

OriginalIn the first place it is to be remembered that the general government is not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any. The subordinate governments, which can extend their care to all those other subjects which can be separately provided for, will retain their due authority and activity. Were it proposed by the plan of the convention to abolish the governments of the particular States, its adversaries would have some ground for their objection; though it would not be difficult to show that if they were abolished the general government would be compelled, by the principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them in their proper jurisdiction.

A second point is that the immediate aim of the federal Constitution is to secure the union of the thirteen original states, which we know is workable, and to add such further states as may arise within or beside them, which we cannot doubt is equally workable. Whatever arrangements the remote corners of our northwestern frontier may need can be left to those whom later discovery and experience will make fitter for the task.

OriginalA second observation to be made is that the immediate object of the federal Constitution is to secure the union of the thirteen primitive States, which we know to be practicable; and to add to them such other States as may arise in their own bosoms, or in their neighborhoods, which we cannot doubt to be equally practicable. The arrangements that may be necessary for those angles and fractions of our territory which lie on our northwestern frontier, must be left to those whom further discoveries and experience will render more equal to the task.

A third point is that travel throughout the Union will be eased by new improvements. Roads everywhere will be shortened and better kept; inns for travelers will multiply and improve; inland navigation along our eastern side will be opened through nearly the whole length of the thirteen states. And communication between the western and Atlantic districts, and within each of them, will be made ever easier by the many canals that nature has traced across our country and that art can join and complete with little difficulty.

OriginalLet it be remarked, in the third place, that the intercourse throughout the Union will be facilitated by new improvements. Roads will everywhere be shortened, and kept in better order; accommodations for travelers will be multiplied and meliorated; an interior navigation on our eastern side will be opened throughout, or nearly throughout, the whole extent of the thirteen States. The communication between the Western and Atlantic districts, and between different parts of each, will be rendered more and more easy by those numerous canals with which the beneficence of nature has intersected our country, and which art finds it so little difficult to connect and complete.

A fourth and weightier point is that nearly every state will be a frontier on one side or another, and so will have reason, for its own safety, to make some sacrifice for the general protection. The states that lie farthest from the heart of the Union, and share least in the ordinary flow of its benefits, will also be the ones closest to foreign nations, and so on particular occasions will most need the Union’s strength and resources. It may be inconvenient for Georgia, or for our western and northeastern border states, to send their representatives to the seat of government; but it would be far more inconvenient to struggle alone against an invading enemy, or to bear alone the whole cost of the precautions that constant danger demands. If they gain less from the Union in some respects than the nearer states, they gain more in others, and so the proper balance is kept throughout.

OriginalA fourth and still more important consideration is, that as almost every State will, on one side or other, be a frontier, and will thus find, in regard to its safety, an inducement to make some sacrifices for the sake of the general protection; so the States which lie at the greatest distance from the heart of the Union, and which, of course, may partake least of the ordinary circulation of its benefits, will be at the same time immediately contiguous to foreign nations, and will consequently stand, on particular occasions, in greatest need of its strength and resources. It may be inconvenient for Georgia, or the States forming our western or northeastern borders, to send their representatives to the seat of government; but they would find it more so to struggle alone against an invading enemy, or even to support alone the whole expense of those precautions which may be dictated by the neighborhood of continual danger. If they should derive less benefit, therefore, from the Union in some respects than the less distant States, they will derive greater benefit from it in other respects, and thus the proper equilibrium will be maintained throughout.

I lay these considerations before you, my fellow citizens, trusting the good sense that has so often marked your decisions. Do not let difficulties, however great they seem or however fashionable the error behind them, drive you into the gloomy and perilous scene to which the advocates of disunion would lead you. Do not listen to the unnatural voice that tells you the people of America can no longer live as members of one family. We are bound together by so many cords of affection. That voice would tell you we can no longer be the mutual guardians of our happiness, no longer fellow citizens of one great and flourishing empire. Do not listen, either, to the voice that peevishly calls the proposed government a novelty in the world, one never seen in the theories of the wildest dreamers, one that rashly attempts the impossible. No, my countrymen, shut your ears to this unholy language, and shut your hearts to its poison. The kindred blood in the veins of American citizens, and the mingled blood they have shed for their sacred rights, consecrate their Union. The thought of their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies should fill us with horror. And if novelties are to be shunned, believe me, the most alarming novelty of all is to tear us into pieces in order to preserve our liberties and happiness. But why reject the experiment of an extended republic merely because it includes something new? It is the glory of the people of America that they have paid a decent respect to the opinions of former times and other nations, yet not bowed blindly to the past, to custom, or to mere names. They have trusted their own good sense, their knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience. To this manly spirit posterity will owe the enjoyment, and the world the example, of the many innovations made on the American stage for private rights and public happiness. Suppose the leaders of the Revolution had taken no step without a precedent, and set up no government without an exact model. The people of the United States might now be counted among the sad victims of misguided counsels. At best they would be laboring under some of the forms that have crushed the liberties of the rest of mankind. Happily for America, and we trust for the whole human race, they took a new and nobler course. They achieved a revolution with no parallel in the history of human society. They raised frameworks of government with no model anywhere on earth. They designed a great confederacy, which it falls to their successors to improve and preserve. If their work shows imperfections, we should wonder how few they are. If they erred most in the structure of the Union, that was the hardest work of all. And it is the very work now reshaped by the act of your convention, the act on which you are to deliberate and decide.

OriginalI submit to you, my fellow-citizens, these considerations, in full confidence that the good sense which has so often marked your decisions will allow them their due weight and effect; and that you will never suffer difficulties, however formidable in appearance, or however fashionable the error on which they may be founded, to drive you into the gloomy and perilous scene into which the advocates for disunion would conduct you. Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you that the people of America, knit together as they are by so many cords of affection, can no longer live together as members of the same family; can no longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness; can no longer be fellow citizens of one great, respectable, and flourishing empire. Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells you that the form of government recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the political world; that it has never yet had a place in the theories of the wildest projectors; that it rashly attempts what it is impossible to accomplish. No, my countrymen, shut your ears against this unhallowed language. Shut your hearts against the poison which it conveys; the kindred blood which flows in the veins of American citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defense of their sacred rights, consecrate their Union, and excite horror at the idea of their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies. And if novelties are to be shunned, believe me, the most alarming of all novelties, the most wild of all projects, the most rash of all attempts, is that of rendering us in pieces, in order to preserve our liberties and promote our happiness. But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely because it may comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the people of America, that, whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience? To this manly spirit, posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for the example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the American theatre, in favor of private rights and public happiness. Had no important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which a precedent could not be discovered, no government established of which an exact model did not present itself, the people of the United States might, at this moment have been numbered among the melancholy victims of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring under the weight of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest of mankind. Happily for America, happily, we trust, for the whole human race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human society. They reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of the globe. They formed the design of a great Confederacy, which it is incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate. If their works betray imperfections, we wonder at the fewness of them. If they erred most in the structure of the Union, this was the work most difficult to be executed; this is the work which has been new modelled by the act of your convention, and it is that act on which you are now to deliberate and to decide. PUBLIUS