Answering the Objection that Big Government is Unwieldy
by James Madison
Generated summaryA republic, unlike a direct democracy, can stretch across a large territory, because representation lets citizens govern through elected delegates instead of gathering in one place, so the Union's sheer size is no obstacle to republican government.Key points
The objection that a republic cannot span a large territory confuses a republic with a democracy.
A democracy, where the people govern in person, must stay small; a republic, governing through representatives, may extend far.
Europe gave us representation, but America has made it the basis of large, extensive republics.
A republic’s true limit is whether its representatives can convene; the Union, smaller than Germany or Poland, lies well within it.
The general government is confined to enumerated national objects; the states keep authority over all the rest.
Nearly every state is a frontier, so even those farthest from the Union’s heart most need its strength.
Reject the voice of disunion: the most alarming novelty of all is to tear the Union apart to preserve liberty.
We have seen why we need the Union: bulwark against foreign danger, keeper of peace among ourselves, guardian of our commerce. It is the only substitute for the standing armies that destroyed Old World liberty. And it is the remedy for faction, which has proved fatal to other popular governments and already shows alarming symptoms in ours. One objection remains: the Union’s great extent. Its enemies work the common prejudice about a republic’s size, inventing difficulties for want of solid ones.
OriginalWE HAVE seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against foreign danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the guardian of our commerce and other common interests, as the only substitute for those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the Old World, and as the proper antidote for the diseases of faction, which have proved fatal to other popular governments, and of which alarming symptoms have been betrayed by our own.
All that remains, within this branch of our inquiries, is to take notice of an objection that may be drawn from the great extent of country which the Union embraces. A few observations on this subject will be the more proper, as it is perceived that the adversaries of the new Constitution are availing themselves of the prevailing prejudice with regard to the practicable sphere of republican administration, in order to supply, by imaginary difficulties, the want of those solid objections which they endeavor in vain to find.
Earlier papers refuted that error. I remark here only that it arises chiefly from confusing a republic with a democracy. In a democracy the people meet and govern in person. In a republic they govern through their representatives. A democracy must therefore be confined to a small spot; a republic may be spread over a large region. Under that confusion of names, what fits a democracy alone was transferred to a republic: that it suits only a small people and territory.
OriginalThe error which limits republican government to a narrow district has been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I remark here only that it seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a republic with a democracy, applying to the former reasonings drawn from the nature of the latter. The true distinction between these forms was also adverted to on a former occasion.
It is, that in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region. To this accidental source of the error may be added the artifice of some celebrated authors, whose writings have had a great share in forming the modern standard of political opinions. Being subjects either of an absolute or limited monarchy, they have endeavored to heighten the advantages, or palliate the evils of those forms, by placing in comparison the vices and defects of the republican, and by citing as specimens of the latter the turbulent democracies of ancient Greece and modern Italy. Under the confusion of names, it has been an easy task to transfer to a republic observations applicable to a democracy only; and among others, the observation that it can never be established but among a small number of people, living within a small compass of territory.
The fallacy passed the less noticed, since most popular governments of antiquity were democracies. Even modern Europe, which gave us the great principle of representation, shows no government founded wholly on it. If Europe has the merit of finding this device, America can claim the merit of making it the basis of broad and extensive republics. I regret only that any of her citizens would deny her the merit of showing its full power here.
OriginalSuch a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as most of the popular governments of antiquity were of the democratic species; and even in modern Europe, to which we owe the great principle of representation, no example is seen of a government wholly popular, and founded, at the same time, wholly on that principle. If Europe has the merit of discovering this great mechanical power in government, by the simple agency of which the will of the largest political body may be concentred, and its force directed to any object which the public good requires, America can claim the merit of making the discovery the basis of unmixed and extensive republics.
It is only to be lamented that any of her citizens should wish to deprive her of the additional merit of displaying its full efficacy in the establishment of the comprehensive system now under her consideration.
A democracy reaches only as far as its most remote citizens can gather as often as their public duties require. A republic reaches as far as its representatives can meet as often as public business demands. Do the Union’s limits exceed that distance? No one will say so who remembers three things. The Atlantic coast is our longest side. For thirteen years our representatives have met almost continually. The most distant members have missed no more sessions than those nearest Congress.
OriginalAs the natural limit of a democracy is that distance from the central point which will just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as often as their public functions demand, and will include no greater number than can join in those functions; so the natural limit of a republic is that distance from the centre which will barely allow the representatives to meet as often as may be necessary for the administration of public affairs. Can it be said that the limits of the United States exceed this distance? It will not be said by those who recollect that the Atlantic coast is the longest side of the Union, that during the term of thirteen years, the representatives of the States have been almost continually assembled, and that the members from the most distant States are not chargeable with greater intermissions of attendance than those from the States in the neighborhood of Congress.
The Union runs about eight hundred and sixty-nine miles from north to south. From the Atlantic to the Mississippi it probably runs under seven hundred and fifty. Set against several countries of Europe, our system plainly fits. Britain is far smaller. Yet its representatives from the northern tip travel as far to the national council as our most remote members would.
OriginalThat we may form a juster estimate with regard to this interesting subject, let us resort to the actual dimensions of the Union. The limits, as fixed by the treaty of peace, are: on the east the Atlantic, on the south the latitude of thirty-one degrees, on the west the Mississippi, and on the north an irregular line running in some instances beyond the forty-fifth degree, in others falling as low as the forty-second. The southern shore of Lake Erie lies below that latitude. Computing the distance between the thirty-first and forty-fifth degrees, it amounts to nine hundred and seventy-three common miles; computing it from thirty-one to forty-two degrees, to seven hundred and sixty-four miles and a half. Taking the mean for the distance, the amount will be eight hundred and sixty-eight miles and three-fourths. The mean distance from the Atlantic to the Mississippi does not probably exceed seven hundred and fifty miles. On a comparison of this extent with that of several countries in Europe, the practicability of rendering our system commensurate to it appears to be demonstrable. It is not a great deal larger than Germany, where a diet representing the whole empire is continually assembled; or than Poland before the late dismemberment, where another national diet was the depositary of the supreme power. Passing by France and Spain, we find that in Great Britain, inferior as it may be in size, the representatives of the northern extremity of the island have as far to travel to the national council as will be required of those of the most remote parts of the Union. Favorable as this view of the subject may be, some observations remain which will place it in a light still more satisfactory.
First, the general government is not charged with the whole work of making and carrying out laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain listed objects. These concern all the members of the republic, yet no single state can reach them alone. The state governments keep their proper authority over all other subjects, which can be handled separately.
OriginalIn the first place it is to be remembered that the general government is not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any. The subordinate governments, which can extend their care to all those other subjects which can be separately provided for, will retain their due authority and activity. Were it proposed by the plan of the convention to abolish the governments of the particular States, its adversaries would have some ground for their objection; though it would not be difficult to show that if they were abolished the general government would be compelled, by the principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them in their proper jurisdiction.
Second, the Constitution’s immediate object is to secure the union of the thirteen original states, which we know is workable. Adding new states that arise within or beside them is no less so. Third, improvements will ease travel throughout the Union. Roads will be shortened and better kept, inns multiplied and improved, inland navigation opened along nearly the whole eastern side. And the canals nature has traced, which art can easily finish, will link the western and Atlantic districts.
OriginalA second observation to be made is that the immediate object of the federal Constitution is to secure the union of the thirteen primitive States, which we know to be practicable; and to add to them such other States as may arise in their own bosoms, or in their neighborhoods, which we cannot doubt to be equally practicable. The arrangements that may be necessary for those angles and fractions of our territory which lie on our northwestern frontier, must be left to those whom further discoveries and experience will render more equal to the task.
Let it be remarked, in the third place, that the intercourse throughout the Union will be facilitated by new improvements. Roads will everywhere be shortened, and kept in better order; accommodations for travelers will be multiplied and meliorated; an interior navigation on our eastern side will be opened throughout, or nearly throughout, the whole extent of the thirteen States. The communication between the Western and Atlantic districts, and between different parts of each, will be rendered more and more easy by those numerous canals with which the beneficence of nature has intersected our country, and which art finds it so little difficult to connect and complete.
Fourth and weightier: nearly every state will be a frontier. Each therefore has reason, for its own safety, to sacrifice something for the general protection. The states farthest from the Union’s heart may share least in its benefits. Yet they lie nearest to foreign nations, and at times most need its strength. It may inconvenience Georgia and our border states to send representatives to the seat of government. Struggling alone against an invader would be worse. Gaining less in some respects, they gain more in others, and the proper balance is kept.
OriginalA fourth and still more important consideration is, that as almost every State will, on one side or other, be a frontier, and will thus find, in regard to its safety, an inducement to make some sacrifices for the sake of the general protection; so the States which lie at the greatest distance from the heart of the Union, and which, of course, may partake least of the ordinary circulation of its benefits, will be at the same time immediately contiguous to foreign nations, and will consequently stand, on particular occasions, in greatest need of its strength and resources. It may be inconvenient for Georgia, or the States forming our western or northeastern borders, to send their representatives to the seat of government; but they would find it more so to struggle alone against an invading enemy, or even to support alone the whole expense of those precautions which may be dictated by the neighborhood of continual danger. If they should derive less benefit, therefore, from the Union in some respects than the less distant States, they will derive greater benefit from it in other respects, and thus the proper equilibrium will be maintained throughout.
I lay these thoughts before you, my fellow citizens. Do not let difficulties, however great they seem, drive you toward disunion. Kindred blood, and blood shed for sacred rights, consecrate our Union. If novelties are to be shunned, the most alarming is to tear us to pieces to preserve our liberties. Why reject an extended republic merely because it is new? It is America’s glory that her people never let blind respect for antiquity, custom, or names overrule their own good sense and experience.
Had the Revolution’s leaders taken no step without a precedent, we might now labor under the forms that have crushed liberty elsewhere. They took a nobler course: a revolution with no parallel, governments with no model on earth, a great confederacy their successors must improve and preserve. If they erred most in the structure of the Union, that was the hardest work of all. Your convention has reshaped it, and you are now to decide.
OriginalI submit to you, my fellow-citizens, these considerations, in full confidence that the good sense which has so often marked your decisions will allow them their due weight and effect; and that you will never suffer difficulties, however formidable in appearance, or however fashionable the error on which they may be founded, to drive you into the gloomy and perilous scene into which the advocates for disunion would conduct you. Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you that the people of America, knit together as they are by so many cords of affection, can no longer live together as members of the same family; can no longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness; can no longer be fellow citizens of one great, respectable, and flourishing empire. Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells you that the form of government recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the political world; that it has never yet had a place in the theories of the wildest projectors; that it rashly attempts what it is impossible to accomplish. No, my countrymen, shut your ears against this unhallowed language. Shut your hearts against the poison which it conveys; the kindred blood which flows in the veins of American citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defense of their sacred rights, consecrate their Union, and excite horror at the idea of their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies. And if novelties are to be shunned, believe me, the most alarming of all novelties, the most wild of all projects, the most rash of all attempts, is that of rendering us in pieces, in order to preserve our liberties and promote our happiness. But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely because it may comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the people of America, that, whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience? To this manly spirit, posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for the example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the American theatre, in favor of private rights and public happiness. Had no important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which a precedent could not be discovered, no government established of which an exact model did not present itself, the people of the United States might, at this moment have been numbered among the melancholy victims of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring under the weight of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest of mankind. Happily for America, happily, we trust, for the whole human race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human society. They reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of the globe. They formed the design of a great Confederacy, which it is incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate. If their works betray imperfections, we wonder at the fewness of them. If they erred most in the structure of the Union, this was the work most difficult to be executed; this is the work which has been new modelled by the act of your convention, and it is that act on which you are now to deliberate and to decide. PUBLIUS
