Federalist Nos. 17-20: Federal Governments Tends Towards Separation of Its Members Rather Than Tyranny Over Them

One argument against giving too much power to the national government is that it could take away powers from the states. Even under the reasonable assumption that people love power, I am at a loss to imagine what temptation the people running the national government would have to take powers from the states. Things like regulating police does not seem to be a major allurement. Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to be only real objects of desire for the ambitious, and these are exactly the powers that ought be federalized anyways. Civil justice proceedings, agriculture, and similar items provided by local legislation are just not desirable powers at higher levels. It is improbable that a federal government would want to usurp those powers because they are troublesome and don’t add to the prestige of the offices.

OriginalAN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been stated and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. It may be said that it would tend to render the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to leave with the States for local purposes. Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power which any reasonable man can require, I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons intrusted with the administration of the general government could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that description. The regulation of the mere domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements to ambition. Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects which have charms for minds governed by that passion; and all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first instance, to be lodged in the national depository. The administration of private justice between the citizens of the same State, the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature, all those things, in short, which are proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable that there should exist a disposition in the federal councils to usurp the powers with which they are connected; because the attempt to exercise those powers would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory; and the possession of them, for that reason, would contribute nothing to the dignity, to the importance, or to the splendor of the national government.

Even if the national government wanted to take power away from the states, it would be difficult for them to do so. It is easier for the state governments to take power from the national government. This is because prudent state governments have greater influence over the people. This shows that all federal systems have an inherent weakness, so great care must be taken in organizing them to give the national government as much force as is compatible with liberty.

OriginalBut let it be admitted, for argument's sake, that mere wantonness and lust of domination would be sufficient to beget that disposition; still it may be safely affirmed, that the sense of the constituent body of the national representatives, or, in other words, the people of the several States, would control the indulgence of so extravagant an appetite. It will always be far more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the State authorities. The proof of this proposition turns upon the greater degree of influence which the State governments if they administer their affairs with uprightness and prudence, will generally possess over the people; a circumstance which at the same time teaches us that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness in all federal constitutions; and that too much pains cannot be taken in their organization, to give them all the force which is compatible with the principles of liberty.

The superiority of state influence is partly because of the diffusive construction of the national government, but mostly due to the type of policy items states attend to.

People tend to be more attached to things that are closer to them. This means that people usually feel more connected to their state government than to the government of the whole country, unless the government of the whole country is really good.

OriginalIt is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are commonly weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object. Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the people of each State would be apt to feel a stronger bias towards their local governments than towards the government of the Union; unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better administration of the latter.

There are a lot of small things that the local governments will be responsible for, and these will have a big influence on all parts of the community. But it would take too long to explain all of these, so it’s not worth it.

OriginalThis strong propensity of the human heart would find powerful auxiliaries in the objects of State regulation. The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily fall under the superintendence of the local administrations, and which will form so many rivulets of influence, running through every part of the society, cannot be particularized, without involving a detail too tedious and uninteresting to compensate for the instruction it might afford.

State governments have an important advantage: the everyday management of criminal and civil justice. This is the most powerful and attractive source of people’s loyalty to the government. It helps people respect and appreciate the government by making them feel secure in their lives and property. This cement of society will be administered almost wholly by the states, assuring a sovereignty over their citizens powerful enough to rival the power of the union.

OriginalThere is one transcendant advantage belonging to the province of the State governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a clear and satisfactory light,--I mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, is the most powerful, most universal, and most attractive source of popular obedience and attachment. It is that which, being the immediate and visible guardian of life and property, having its benefits and its terrors in constant activity before the public eye, regulating all those personal interests and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake, contributes, more than any other circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of the people, affection, esteem, and reverence towards the government. This great cement of society, which will diffuse itself almost wholly through the channels of the particular governments, independent of all other causes of influence, would insure them so decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render them at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently, dangerous rivals to the power of the Union.

The operations of the national government are less seen by regular people. Most people would not notice the benefits from it. It does not usually affect people’s feelings and so people will not usually feel an obligation or loyalty for it. This has been seen in all federal governments we know and ones that are similar.

OriginalThe operations of the national government, on the other hand, falling less immediately under the observation of the mass of the citizens, the benefits derived from it will chiefly be perceived and attended to by speculative men. Relating to more general interests, they will be less apt to come home to the feelings of the people; and, in proportion, less likely to inspire an habitual sense of obligation, and an active sentiment of attachment. The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified by the experience of all federal constitutions with which we are acquainted, and of all others which have borne the least analogy to them.

The old feudal systems were like confederacies. They had a leader, ruler, or king that was in charge of the whole country with a lot of subordinates controlling large pieces of land. The higher level subordinates had their own sovereign power within their domain. As a result, they often challenged the king and fought each other. The king was not strong enough to stop them and it was a time of chaos.

OriginalThough the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly speaking, confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that species of association. There was a common head, chieftain, or sovereign, whose authority extended over the whole nation; and a number of subordinate vassals, or feudatories, who had large portions of land allotted to them, and numerous trains of INFERIOR vassals or retainers, who occupied and cultivated that land upon the tenure of fealty or obedience, to the persons of whom they held it. Each principal vassal was a kind of sovereign, within his particular demesnes. The consequences of this situation were a continual opposition to authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars between the great barons or chief feudatories themselves. The power of the head of the nation was commonly too weak, either to preserve the public peace, or to protect the people against the oppressions of their immediate lords. This period of European affairs is emphatically styled by historians, the times of feudal anarchy.

When the king was strong and good at ruling, he would have more authority. But usually the nobles had more power than him. In some cases, the king’s rule was completely thrown away and the nobles became like their own rulers. In other cases, the king was able to take back his power because the nobles were so tyrannous over their followers. If the nobles had been more kind and just, they would usually have beaten the king.

OriginalWhen the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike temper and of superior abilities, he would acquire a personal weight and influence, which answered, for the time, the purpose of a more regular authority. But in general, the power of the barons triumphed over that of the prince; and in many instances his dominion was entirely thrown off, and the great fiefs were erected into independent principalities or States. In those instances in which the monarch finally prevailed over his vassals, his success was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those vassals over their dependents. The barons, or nobles, equally the enemies of the sovereign and the oppressors of the common people, were dreaded and detested by both; till mutual danger and mutual interest effected a union between them fatal to the power of the aristocracy. Had the nobles, by a conduct of clemency and justice, preserved the fidelity and devotion of their retainers and followers, the contests between them and the prince must almost always have ended in their favor, and in the abridgment or subversion of the royal authority.

This statement is not based on guesses or guesses. Scotland is an example that shows this is true. In Scotland, early on, the nobles were connected to their followers like family. The aristocracy was too powerful for the king until Scotland and England joined together. This union made the nobles obey laws like England did, which had laws about how people had to act.

OriginalThis is not an assertion founded merely in speculation or conjecture. Among other illustrations of its truth which might be cited, Scotland will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of clanship which was, at an early day, introduced into that kingdom, uniting the nobles and their dependants by ties equivalent to those of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant overmatch for the power of the monarch, till the incorporation with England subdued its fierce and ungovernable spirit, and reduced it within those rules of subordination which a more rational and more energetic system of civil polity had previously established in the latter kingdom.

The state governments in a confederacy can be compared to feudal baronies. This is good, because the people trust and support the state governments. That support helps the states oppose any attempts of the national government to encroach on their power. However, it would be good if they are not able to counteract its legitimate and necessary authority. There is a rivalry balancing power between individuals and political bodies.

OriginalThe separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared with the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that from the reasons already explained, they will generally possess the confidence and good-will of the people, and with so important a support, will be able effectually to oppose all encroachments of the national government. It will be well if they are not able to counteract its legitimate and necessary authority. The points of similitude consist in the rivalship of power, applicable to both, and in the CONCENTRATION of large portions of the strength of the community into particular DEPOSITORIES, in one case at the disposal of individuals, in the other case at the disposal of political bodies.

A look back at what has happened with confederate governments will show us the importance of this idea. We have made a lot of mistakes by not paying attention to it and our distrust has been in the wrong place. In the following papers we will discuss this in more detail.

The most important of ancient confederacies was the union of the Greek city-states joined together under the Amphyctionic council. It poses an instructive example for the present confederation of the American states.

These city-states were all independent and had equal votes, and the council made decisions for the good of all. The council had the power to go to war, to settle disagreements between the states, to fine the aggressing parties, to employ the whole force of the group against the disobedient, and to admit new members. The Amphyctionic council also acted as the guardians of religion and the riches of temple of Delphos, where they had the right to decide disputes involving the temple’s occupants and its visitors. The council members swore to protect and defend the united cities, punish those who broke this promise, and take revenge on those who stole from the temple.

OriginalThe members retained the character of independent and sovereign states, and had equal votes in the federal council. This council had a general authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged necessary for the common welfare of Greece; to declare and carry on war; to decide, in the last resort, all controversies between the members; to fine the aggressing party; to employ the whole force of the confederacy against the disobedient; to admit new members. The Amphictyons were the guardians of religion, and of the immense riches belonging to the temple of Delphos, where they had the right of jurisdiction in controversies between the inhabitants and those who came to consult the oracle. As a further provision for the efficacy of the federal powers, they took an oath mutually to defend and protect the united cities, to punish the violators of this oath, and to inflict vengeance on sacrilegious despoilers of the temple.

In theory, the powers of the Amphyctionic council seemed strong enough to handle most things. In some ways, they even had more power than what was listed in the agreement that brought the city-states together. The council had control over religion, which was centrally important to maintaining governing power. They also had the right to force cities to obey and were sworn to do so if needed.

OriginalIn theory, and upon paper, this apparatus of powers seems amply sufficient for all general purposes. In several material instances, they exceed the powers enumerated in the articles of confederation. The Amphictyons had in their hands the superstition of the times, one of the principal engines by which government was then maintained; they had a declared authority to use coercion against refractory cities, and were bound by oath to exert this authority on the necessary occasions.

In practice, however, the council did not work well. The people who were sent to represent the city-states on the council were chosen by the cities and ultimately held the power. This caused problems, and the council ended up falling apart. The stronger city-states tyrannized over the others. Athens ruled for 73 years, Sparta ruled for 29 years, and Thebes also had a turn ruling.

OriginalVery different, nevertheless, was the experiment from the theory. The powers, like those of the present Congress, were administered by deputies appointed wholly by the cities in their political capacities; and exercised over them in the same capacities. Hence the weakness, the disorders, and finally the destruction of the confederacy. The more powerful members, instead of being kept in awe and subordination, tyrannized successively over all the rest. Athens, as we learn from Demosthenes, was the arbiter of Greece seventy-three years. The Lacedaemonians next governed it twenty-nine years; at a subsequent period, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans had their turn of domination.

According to Plutarch, the representatives from the stronger city-states would often intimidate or bribe the representatives from the weaker city-states, and the stronger city-states would usually win.

Even when they were at war with other countries like Persia and Macedon, the city-states did not work together and were often tricked or paid off by the enemy. During times of peace, there were often conflicts and violence within the city-states.

After the war with Xerxes, Sparta wanted to kick some of the city-states out of the council because they had not been loyal. Athens opposed this because they would lose more supporters than Sparta and Sparta would become more powerful. This shows that the council was not effective, the stronger city-states were ambitious and jealous, and the weaker city-states were dependent and weak. In theory, all the city-states were supposed to be equal, but in reality, the weak states became subordinate to stronger ones.

OriginalAfter the conclusion of the war with Xerxes, it appears that the Lacedaemonians required that a number of the cities should be turned out of the confederacy for the unfaithful part they had acted. The Athenians, finding that the Lacedaemonians would lose fewer partisans by such a measure than themselves, and would become masters of the public deliberations, vigorously opposed and defeated the attempt. This piece of history proves at once the inefficiency of the union, the ambition and jealousy of its most powerful members, and the dependent and degraded condition of the rest. The smaller members, though entitled by the theory of their system to revolve in equal pride and majesty around the common center, had become, in fact, satellites of the orbs of primary magnitude.

If the Greeks had been as smart as they were brave, they would have learned from their mistakes and used the peace after their victory over Persia to fix the council. Instead, Athens and Sparta were too proud of their victories and became rivals and then enemies. They caused more problems for each other than they had suffered at the hands of Xerxes. Their jealousy, fear, hatred, and injuries led to the Peloponnesian war, which ended with the defeat and slavery of the Athenians, who had begun it.

OriginalHad the Greeks, says the Abbe Milot, been as wise as they were courageous, they would have been admonished by experience of the necessity of a closer union, and would have availed themselves of the peace which followed their success against the Persian arms, to establish such a reformation. Instead of this obvious policy, Athens and Sparta, inflated with the victories and the glory they had acquired, became first rivals and then enemies; and did each other infinitely more mischief than they had suffered from Xerxes. Their mutual jealousies, fears, hatreds, and injuries ended in the celebrated Peloponnesian war; which itself ended in the ruin and slavery of the Athenians who had begun it.

A weak government is troubled by internal disagreements, and these disagreements often lead to more problems from outside. The Phocians were fined by the council for digging up sacred ground that belonged to the temple of Apollo. The Phocians, with the support of Athens and Sparta, refused to accept the punishment. Thebans and some other city-states tried to uphold the authority of the council and protect the temple. Since they were weaker, they asked for help from Philip of Macedon, who had secretly been trying to take over Greece. Philip used his influence and money to win over leaders in some cities, and he used their support to join the council. He used his tricks and military power to take control of the council.

OriginalAs a weak government, when not at war, is ever agitated by internal dissentions, so these never fail to bring on fresh calamities from abroad. The Phocians having ploughed up some consecrated ground belonging to the temple of Apollo, the Amphictyonic council, according to the superstition of the age, imposed a fine on the sacrilegious offenders. The Phocians, being abetted by Athens and Sparta, refused to submit to the decree. The Thebans, with others of the cities, undertook to maintain the authority of the Amphictyons, and to avenge the violated god. The latter, being the weaker party, invited the assistance of Philip of Macedon, who had secretly fostered the contest. Philip gladly seized the opportunity of executing the designs he had long planned against the liberties of Greece. By his intrigues and bribes he won over to his interests the popular leaders of several cities; by their influence and votes, gained admission into the Amphictyonic council; and by his arts and his arms, made himself master of the confederacy.

The principle on which the council was founded caused these problems. A wise person said that if Greece had a stronger council and stayed united, they would not have been conquered by Macedon and could have stopped the expansion of Rome.

The Achaean league was another group of Greek city-states that make a valuable example.

It was better organized than the Amphyctionic council. Although it suffered a similar fate, it did not equally deserve it.

The cities in the league kept their own local governments, chose their own officials, and were equal to each other. The council that represented the cities had the sole power to make peace and war, to send and receive ambassadors, to make agreements with other countries, and to choose a leader to command their armies. With the advice and consent of ten of the senators, this leader also administered the government in recess of the senate and was a primary actor when in session. At first, there were two pretors, but after experimentation they decided to only have one.

OriginalThe cities composing this league retained their municipal jurisdiction, appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect equality. The senate, in which they were represented, had the sole and exclusive right of peace and war; of sending and receiving ambassadors; of entering into treaties and alliances; of appointing a chief magistrate or praetor, as he was called, who commanded their armies, and who, with the advice and consent of ten of the senators, not only administered the government in the recess of the senate, but had a great share in its deliberations, when assembled. According to the primitive constitution, there were two praetors associated in the administration; but on trial a single one was preferred.

It seems that the cities in the league had the same laws, customs, weights and measures, and money. It is not clear how much of this was due to the council. It is more certain, however, that the cities were compelled to follow the same laws and customs. When Sparta joined the league, it had to give up its own laws and adopt those of the Achaeans. The previous Amphyctionic council allowed Sparta to keep its own government and laws. This shows a material difference between the two council systems.

OriginalIt appears that the cities had all the same laws and customs, the same weights and measures, and the same money. But how far this effect proceeded from the authority of the federal council is left in uncertainty. It is said only that the cities were in a manner compelled to receive the same laws and usages. When Lacedaemon was brought into the league by Philopoemen, it was attended with an abolition of the institutions and laws of Lycurgus, and an adoption of those of the Achaeans. The Amphictyonic confederacy, of which she had been a member, left her in the full exercise of her government and her legislation. This circumstance alone proves a very material difference in the genius of the two systems.

It is unfortunate that there is not more information about this political group. If we knew more about how it worked, it might teach us more about how federal governments should work than any other system with which we are familiar.

All the historians who wrote about the Achaean league agree that its government was more fair and just and there was less violence and unrest among the people than in the cities that were independent. The democracy in the cities of the league did not cause problems because it was balanced by the authority and laws of the council.

OriginalOne important fact seems to be witnessed by all the historians who take notice of Achaean affairs. It is, that as well after the renovation of the league by Aratus, as before its dissolution by the arts of Macedon, there was infinitely more of moderation and justice in the administration of its government, and less of violence and sedition in the people, than were to be found in any of the cities exercising SINGLY all the prerogatives of sovereignty. The Abbe Mably, in his observations on Greece, says that the popular government, which was so tempestuous elsewhere, caused no disorders in the members of the Achaean republic, BECAUSE IT WAS THERE TEMPERED BY THE GENERAL AUTHORITY AND LAWS OF THE CONFEDERACY.

We should not assume that there were no conflicts within the individual cities or that everything was perfectly orderly within the council. Actually, the council went through many changes and eventually failed.

The Achaean league was not as important as the Amphyctionic council when both were still active. When the Amphyctionic council was defeated by Macedon, the Achaean league was spared. Later, the cities in the Achaean league were divided and some were controlled by Macedonian garrisons or local rulers. A few cities reunited and freed themselves from their rulers, and soon most of the Peloponnesus was part of the league. Macedon was unable to stop the league’s growth due to its own conflicts. The league almost united all of Greece, but Sparta and Athens were jealous of its success and caused the plan to fail. The league then sought help from the kings of Egypt and Syria against Macedon, but they were betrayed by Cleomenes, the king of Sparta, who wanted to attack the Achaean cities himself. His relationship with the Egyptian and Syrian princes allowed him to breach their engagements with the league. The Achaeans were forced to submit to either Cleomenes or to Macedon. They chose the latter; Macedon defeated Cleomenes and the Achaeans accepted Macedonian control. The Achaeans learned that a victorious and powerful ally is just another name for a master. Eventually, they asked the Romans for help and together conquered Macedon. But the Romans then caused conflicts within the league and convinced the cities to leave the league by promising them their independence. The league fell apart and the Romans easily defeated the weakened cities. The Achaeans were defeated and Achaia was conquered and is still under Roman control.

OriginalWhilst the Amphictyonic confederacy remained, that of the Achaeans, which comprehended the less important cities only, made little figure on the theatre of Greece. When the former became a victim to Macedon, the latter was spared by the policy of Philip and Alexander. Under the successors of these princes, however, a different policy prevailed. The arts of division were practiced among the Achaeans. Each city was seduced into a separate interest; the union was dissolved. Some of the cities fell under the tyranny of Macedonian garrisons; others under that of usurpers springing out of their own confusions. Shame and oppression erelong awaken their love of liberty. A few cities reunited. Their example was followed by others, as opportunities were found of cutting off their tyrants. The league soon embraced almost the whole Peloponnesus. Macedon saw its progress; but was hindered by internal dissensions from stopping it. All Greece caught the enthusiasm and seemed ready to unite in one confederacy, when the jealousy and envy in Sparta and Athens, of the rising glory of the Achaeans, threw a fatal damp on the enterprise. The dread of the Macedonian power induced the league to court the alliance of the Kings of Egypt and Syria, who, as successors of Alexander, were rivals of the king of Macedon. This policy was defeated by Cleomenes, king of Sparta, who was led by his ambition to make an unprovoked attack on his neighbors, the Achaeans, and who, as an enemy to Macedon, had interest enough with the Egyptian and Syrian princes to effect a breach of their engagements with the league. The Achaeans were now reduced to the dilemma of submitting to Cleomenes, or of supplicating the aid of Macedon, its former oppressor. The latter expedient was adopted. The contests of the Greeks always afforded a pleasing opportunity to that powerful neighbor of intermeddling in their affairs. A Macedonian army quickly appeared. Cleomenes was vanquished. The Achaeans soon experienced, as often happens, that a victorious and powerful ally is but another name for a master. All that their most abject compliances could obtain from him was a toleration of the exercise of their laws. Philip, who was now on the throne of Macedon, soon provoked by his tyrannies, fresh combinations among the Greeks. The Achaeans, though weakened by internal dissensions and by the revolt of Messene, one of its members, being joined by the AEtolians and Athenians, erected the standard of opposition. Finding themselves, though thus supported, unequal to the undertaking, they once more had recourse to the dangerous expedient of introducing the succor of foreign arms. The Romans, to whom the invitation was made, eagerly embraced it. Philip was conquered; Macedon subdued. A new crisis ensued to the league. Dissensions broke out among it members. These the Romans fostered. Callicrates and other popular leaders became mercenary instruments for inveigling their countrymen. The more effectually to nourish discord and disorder the Romans had, to the astonishment of those who confided in their sincerity, already proclaimed universal liberty(1) throughout Greece. With the same insidious views, they now seduced the members from the league, by representing to their pride the violation it committed on their sovereignty. By these arts this union, the last hope of Greece, the last hope of ancient liberty, was torn into pieces; and such imbecility and distraction introduced, that the arms of Rome found little difficulty in completing the ruin which their arts had commenced. The Achaeans were cut to pieces, and Achaia loaded with chains, under which it is groaning at this hour.

I hav summarized this important history because it teaches multiple lessons from the Achaean council. It also shows that federal groups are more likely to cause chaos among the member cities than to create tyranny in the governing body itself.

OriginalI have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this important portion of history; both because it teaches more than one lesson, and because, as a supplement to the outlines of the Achaean constitution, it emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal bodies rather to anarchy among the members, than to tyranny in the head. PUBLIUS 1. This was but another name more specious for the independence of the members on the federal head.

In the last paper, we learned from ancient confederacies, but there are other similar groups worth paying attention to. One of which is the Germanic body.

In the early days of Christianity, Germany was made up of seven different groups of people who didn’t have a leader they all followed. The Franks won a war against the Gauls and started the kingdom that took their name. In the ninth century, its warlike monarch Charlemagne conquered many lands to include Germany. When it split off under his sons, it became its own independent empire. But as its vassals become more powerful they threw off the yoke of imperial power and established their own sovereignty. This led to a lot of fighting and chaos in the empire, and the person in charge, the emperor, couldn’t keep everything under control. Over time, the emperor became less and less powerful until there was almost no order in the empire. This lasted until the first Austrian emperor took charge. In the eleventh century, the emperors had a lot of power; by the fifteenth they only had a few symbolic privileges.

OriginalIn the early ages of Christianity, Germany was occupied by seven distinct nations, who had no common chief. The Franks, one of the number, having conquered the Gauls, established the kingdom which has taken its name from them. In the ninth century Charlemagne, its warlike monarch, carried his victorious arms in every direction; and Germany became a part of his vast dominions. On the dismemberment, which took place under his sons, this part was erected into a separate and independent empire. Charlemagne and his immediate descendants possessed the reality, as well as the ensigns and dignity of imperial power. But the principal vassals, whose fiefs had become hereditary, and who composed the national diets which Charlemagne had not abolished, gradually threw off the yoke and advanced to sovereign jurisdiction and independence. The force of imperial sovereignty was insufficient to restrain such powerful dependants; or to preserve the unity and tranquillity of the empire. The most furious private wars, accompanied with every species of calamity, were carried on between the different princes and states. The imperial authority, unable to maintain the public order, declined by degrees till it was almost extinct in the anarchy, which agitated the long interval between the death of the last emperor of the Suabian, and the accession of the first emperor of the Austrian lines. In the eleventh century the emperors enjoyed full sovereignty: In the fifteenth they had little more than the symbols and decorations of power.

Out of this feudal system, which itself had many important features of a confederacy, has grown the federal system of the Germanic empire. It’s powers are vested in representatives called the diet, in the emperor who acts as the executive to and maintains veto power over the diet, and in two courts that handle controversies concerning the empire or conflicts between its members.

OriginalOut of this feudal system, which has itself many of the important features of a confederacy, has grown the federal system which constitutes the Germanic empire. Its powers are vested in a diet representing the component members of the confederacy; in the emperor, who is the executive magistrate, with a negative on the decrees of the diet; and in the imperial chamber and the aulic council, two judiciary tribunals having supreme jurisdiction in controversies which concern the empire, or which happen among its members.

The diet has the power to make laws, start wars, make peace, form alliances, set rules for the military, build fortresses, control money, and admit new members to the empire, and to ban disobedient members. The different parts of Germany are not allowed to do things that might hurt the country, like charging taxes on each other, changing the value of money, harming each other, or granting refuge to criminals. If they break these rules, they can be punished by being banned from the country. The diet and the emperor have the power to judge the members, and the courts can judge the people in their private capacities.

OriginalThe diet possesses the general power of legislating for the empire; of making war and peace; contracting alliances; assessing quotas of troops and money; constructing fortresses; regulating coin; admitting new members; and subjecting disobedient members to the ban of the empire, by which the party is degraded from his sovereign rights and his possessions forfeited. The members of the confederacy are expressly restricted from entering into compacts prejudicial to the empire; from imposing tolls and duties on their mutual intercourse, without the consent of the emperor and diet; from altering the value of money; from doing injustice to one another; or from affording assistance or retreat to disturbers of the public peace. And the ban is denounced against such as shall violate any of these restrictions. The members of the diet, as such, are subject in all cases to be judged by the emperor and diet, and in their private capacities by the aulic council and imperial chamber.

The emperor of Germany has many consequential duties, most important of which is his exclusive right to make proposals to the diet, to negate its resolutions, to name ambassadors, to confer titles, to fill vacant electorates, to found universities, to delegate power, to collect and spent public funds, and to generally watch over public safety. Sometimes, the electors give him advice. The emperor doesn’t own any land in Germany or get paid for his work as emperor, but he does have a lot of wealth and power from these other sources.

OriginalThe prerogatives of the emperor are numerous. The most important of them are: his exclusive right to make propositions to the diet; to negative its resolutions; to name ambassadors; to confer dignities and titles; to fill vacant electorates; to found universities; to grant privileges not injurious to the states of the empire; to receive and apply the public revenues; and generally to watch over the public safety. In certain cases, the electors form a council to him. In quality of emperor, he possesses no territory within the empire, nor receives any revenue for his support. But his revenue and dominions, in other qualities, constitute him one of the most powerful princes in Europe.

Because of all the constitutional powers in the representatives and the leader, one would assume that it must be an exception to the general problems of similar systems. But nothing could be further from the truth. The fundamental principle, of a community of sovereigns represented by a diet, with the laws addressed to those sovereigns, renders the empire incapable of regulating its own members against external dangers.

OriginalFrom such a parade of constitutional powers, in the representatives and head of this confederacy, the natural supposition would be, that it must form an exception to the general character which belongs to its kindred systems. Nothing would be further from the reality. The fundamental principle on which it rests, that the empire is a community of sovereigns, that the diet is a representation of sovereigns and that the laws are addressed to sovereigns, renders the empire a nerveless body, incapable of regulating its own members, insecure against external dangers, and agitated with unceasing fermentations in its own bowels.

There are always fights between the German emperor and the other leaders, and between the leaders and their own states. The government has a hard time getting people to follow its rules and protect the country, and there is a lot of chaos and suffering.

OriginalThe history of Germany is a history of wars between the emperor and the princes and states; of wars among the princes and states themselves; of the licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression of the weak; of foreign intrusions, and foreign intrigues; of requisitions of men and money disregarded, or partially complied with; of attempts to enforce them, altogether abortive, or attended with slaughter and desolation, involving the innocent with the guilty; of general imbecility, confusion, and misery.

In the sixteenth century, the emperor of Germany fought against some of the other leaders of the country. In one conflict, the emperor was almost captured by the elector of Saxony. The king of Prussia also fought against the emperor and often won. There were so many wars between the different parts of Germany that they fill the history books. Before the peace of Westphalia, Germany was desolated by war for thirty years where the emperor and some of the country were on one side and Sweden and the rest of the country were on the other side. Finally, other countries helped make peace and fundamentally contributed to Germany’s constitution.

OriginalIn the sixteenth century, the emperor, with one part of the empire on his side, was seen engaged against the other princes and states. In one of the conflicts, the emperor himself was put to flight, and very near being made prisoner by the elector of Saxony. The late king of Prussia was more than once pitted against his imperial sovereign; and commonly proved an overmatch for him. Controversies and wars among the members themselves have been so common, that the German annals are crowded with the bloody pages which describe them. Previous to the peace of Westphalia, Germany was desolated by a war of thirty years, in which the emperor, with one half of the empire, was on one side, and Sweden, with the other half, on the opposite side. Peace was at length negotiated, and dictated by foreign powers; and the articles of it, to which foreign powers are parties, made a fundamental part of the Germanic constitution.

If Germany ever needs to defend its whole self, it’s difficult because all the different parts of the country have to talk and argue a lot before they can agree on a plan. This takes a long time and by the time the diet is ready, the enemy has already started fighting.

OriginalIf the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more united by the necessity of self-defense, its situation is still deplorable. Military preparations must be preceded by so many tedious discussions, arising from the jealousies, pride, separate views, and clashing pretensions of sovereign bodies, that before the diet can settle the arrangements, the enemy are in the field; and before the federal troops are ready to take it, are retiring into winter quarters.

Even in times of peace, Germany doesn’t have a strong military because the soldiers are poorly trained, and paid.

The government of Germany tried to fix the problems by dividing the country into smaller parts and giving them the power to enforce the laws. Each smaller part was just a miniature picture of the deformities of the larger political monster. The smaller parts either didn’t fulfill their duties or fought each other like in a civil war. Sometimes, whole parts of the country didn’t follow the rules and just made things worse.

OriginalThe impossibility of maintaining order and dispensing justice among these sovereign subjects, produced the experiment of dividing the empire into nine or ten circles or districts; of giving them an interior organization, and of charging them with the military execution of the laws against delinquent and contumacious members. This experiment has only served to demonstrate more fully the radical vice of the constitution. Each circle is the miniature picture of the deformities of this political monster. They either fail to execute their commissions, or they do it with all the devastation and carnage of civil war. Sometimes whole circles are defaulters; and then they increase the mischief which they were instituted to remedy.

An example proves illustrative. In the city of Donawerth, some public outrages were committed upon the one of its prominent figures. As a result, the city was banned from the Empire and the Duke of Bavaria was given the job of enforcing the punishment. He came to the city with ten thousand soldiers and took control of the city, punishing the people, and claiming the city as part of his own domain.

OriginalWe may form some judgment of this scheme of military coercion from a sample given by Thuanus. In Donawerth, a free and imperial city of the circle of Suabia, the Abbe de St. Croix enjoyed certain immunities which had been reserved to him. In the exercise of these, on some public occasions, outrages were committed on him by the people of the city. The consequence was that the city was put under the ban of the empire, and the Duke of Bavaria, though director of another circle, obtained an appointment to enforce it. He soon appeared before the city with a corps of ten thousand troops, and finding it a fit occasion, as he had secretly intended from the beginning, to revive an antiquated claim, on the pretext that his ancestors had suffered the place to be dismembered from his territory,(1) he took possession of it in his own name, disarmed, and punished the inhabitants, and reannexed the city to his domains.

There are several reasons why this group of people and cities has not completely fallen apart. Most of the members are too weak to stand on their own against foreign powers. Also, the emperor is incentivized to protect his hereditary domain, family pride, and power as a leader in Europe. But these are weak binding forces and create a precarious union, and the repellent forces of self-sovereignty prevent any reform. Other countries also have an interest in preventing this reform because they have their own interests in mind.

OriginalIt may be asked, perhaps, what has so long kept this disjointed machine from falling entirely to pieces? The answer is obvious: The weakness of most of the members, who are unwilling to expose themselves to the mercy of foreign powers; the weakness of most of the principal members, compared with the formidable powers all around them; the vast weight and influence which the emperor derives from his separate and hereditary dominions; and the interest he feels in preserving a system with which his family pride is connected, and which constitutes him the first prince in Europe;--these causes support a feeble and precarious Union; whilst the repellant quality, incident to the nature of sovereignty, and which time continually strengthens, prevents any reform whatever, founded on a proper consolidation. Nor is it to be imagined, if this obstacle could be surmounted, that the neighboring powers would suffer a revolution to take place which would give to the empire the force and preeminence to which it is entitled. Foreign nations have long considered themselves as interested in the changes made by events in this constitution; and have, on various occasions, betrayed their policy of perpetuating its anarchy and weakness.

If the German examples were not enough, Poland is a good example of the problems that come with having a group of local leaders who are not really in charge. The country has been weak and easily controlled by other countries.

OriginalIf more direct examples were wanting, Poland, as a government over local sovereigns, might not improperly be taken notice of. Nor could any proof more striking be given of the calamities flowing from such institutions. Equally unfit for self-government and self-defense, it has long been at the mercy of its powerful neighbors; who have lately had the mercy to disburden it of one third of its people and territories.

Even the Swiss cantons, which are sometimes seen as a successful coalition, are not really connected in a strong confederacy.

They don’t share a treasury, troops (even in war), money, a judiciary, or any other common mark of sovereignty.

The Swiss cantons are held together by their unique location, by their individual weakness, by the fear of stronger neighbors who formerly ruled them. They don’t have many problems with each other because they have similar cultures, they share some possessions, and they need each other’s help to keep the peace. They also have a system for settling disputes between cantons, which involves choosing neutral judges and an umpire to make a final decision in disagreements. All the cantons are bound by this group’s definitive sentence. There are examples of mediators willing to employ force against parties that defect from this agreement.

OriginalThey are kept together by the peculiarity of their topographical position; by their individual weakness and insignificancy; by the fear of powerful neighbors, to one of which they were formerly subject; by the few sources of contention among a people of such simple and homogeneous manners; by their joint interest in their dependent possessions; by the mutual aid they stand in need of, for suppressing insurrections and rebellions, an aid expressly stipulated and often required and afforded; and by the necessity of some regular and permanent provision for accommodating disputes among the cantons. The provision is, that the parties at variance shall each choose four judges out of the neutral cantons, who, in case of disagreement, choose an umpire. This tribunal, under an oath of impartiality, pronounces definitive sentence, which all the cantons are bound to enforce. The competency of this regulation may be estimated by a clause in their treaty of 1683, with Victor Amadeus of Savoy; in which he obliges himself to interpose as mediator in disputes between the cantons, and to employ force, if necessary, against the contumacious party.

The Swiss cantons are similar to the United States in some ways, but they have also had problems with their union. Even if it held together in normal cases, if there were major differences, it failed. There have been violent arguments over religion that have caused the cantons to split ways. There are now Protestant and Catholic diets that govern themselves and leave the general diet with little to do.

OriginalSo far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of comparison with that of the United States, it serves to confirm the principle intended to be established. Whatever efficacy the union may have had in ordinary cases, it appears that the moment a cause of difference sprang up, capable of trying its strength, it failed. The controversies on the subject of religion, which in three instances have kindled violent and bloody contests, may be said, in fact, to have severed the league. The Protestant and Catholic cantons have since had their separate diets, where all the most important concerns are adjusted, and which have left the general diet little other business than to take care of the common bailages.

These separations had another consequence, between the sub-coalitions and foreign governments.

OriginalThat separation had another consequence, which merits attention. It produced opposite alliances with foreign powers: of Berne, at the head of the Protestant association, with the United Provinces; and of Luzerne, at the head of the Catholic association, with France. PUBLIUS 1. Pfeffel, "Nouvel Abrég. Chronol. de l'Hist., etc., d'Allemagne," says the pretext was to indemnify himself for the expense of the expedition.

The United Netherlands is a confederacy that confirms the lessons we’ve just reviewed.

It is composed of seven co-equal and sovereign states, each of which is composed of equal and independent cities. In all important decisions, not only the states, but also the cities, must be unanimous.

The union is represented by the states-general, consisting of about fifty representatives appointed by the states. The states themselves determine the length of their appointed representatives.

The states-general have the power to manage treaties and alliances, military matters, and trade, but they need the agreement of all the provinces to do so. The states-general also appoints ambassadors, manages existing alliances, collects duties on imports and exports, and regulate the mint. The states are not allowed to make their own agreements with other countries or set unfair taxes without the agreement of the rest of the country. Additional administrative groups help execute the federal duties.

OriginalThe States-General have authority to enter into treaties and alliances; to make war and peace; to raise armies and equip fleets; to ascertain quotas and demand contributions. In all these cases, however, unanimity and the sanction of their constituents are requisite. They have authority to appoint and receive ambassadors; to execute treaties and alliances already formed; to provide for the collection of duties on imports and exports; to regulate the mint, with a saving to the provincial rights; to govern as sovereigns the dependent territories. The provinces are restrained, unless with the general consent, from entering into foreign treaties; from establishing imposts injurious to others, or charging their neighbors with higher duties than their own subjects. A council of state, a chamber of accounts, with five colleges of admiralty, aid and fortify the federal administration.

The leader of the union is called the stadtholder, who is now a hereditary prince. The stadtholder has a lot of power because of his title, his wealth, and his connections with other important people in Europe. Perhaps most importantly, as stadholder over the states, he is in charge of appointing certain town mayors, executing provincial decrees, presiding over state courts, and has the power to pardon.

OriginalThe executive magistrate of the union is the stadtholder, who is now an hereditary prince. His principal weight and influence in the republic are derived from this independent title; from his great patrimonial estates; from his family connections with some of the chief potentates of Europe; and, more than all, perhaps, from his being stadtholder in the several provinces, as well as for the union; in which provincial quality he has the appointment of town magistrates under certain regulations, executes provincial decrees, presides when he pleases in the provincial tribunals, and has throughout the power of pardon.

In his role as the stadtholder over the whole union, he also has considerable powers.

In his political capacity, he is responsible for solving disputes between the states, meeting with foreign ambassadors, and appointing representatives to other countries.

In his military role, he is commander-in-chief, provides for forts, and generally regulates military affairs. He appoints officers from colonels to ensigns, as well as the governments of military bases.

In his role related to the navy, he is the top admiral, and similarly controls the naval forces and appointments. He can establish war councils and has final say on execution of their plans.

The stadtholder has an annual income of 300,000 florins and commands an army of around 40,000 people.

However, the government of the United Netherlands has been weak and there have been conflicts between the states, as well as interference from other countries. The country has had difficulties in times of peace and has suffered during times of war.

It has been noted that the United Netherlands has been able to avoid collapse despite its constitution only because its people’s united hatred of Austria.

In theory the union gives the states-general enough power to secure peace, but the infighting of the states yields quite a different result in practice.

The states-general also is empowered to levy taxes from each state, but this never could be executed because the poorest states cannot pay their equal share.

It is practice to waive these articles of the constitution. The danger of delaying funds obliges the consenting richer provinces to pay and then attempt to collect reimbursement as they can.

OriginalIn matters of contribution, it is the practice to waive the articles of the constitution. The danger of delay obliges the consenting provinces to furnish their quotas, without waiting for the others; and then to obtain reimbursement from the others, by deputations, which are frequent, or otherwise, as they can. The great wealth and influence of the province of Holland enable her to effect both these purposes.

This has sometimes led to the use of force to collect the money, which is scary when one member may be stronger than all the rest, but even more impracticable when several of the states are of equal power and will defend against each other.

OriginalIt has more than once happened, that the deficiencies had to be ultimately collected at the point of the bayonet; a thing practicable, though dreadful, in a confederacy where one of the members exceeds in force all the rest, and where several of them are too small to meditate resistance; but utterly impracticable in one composed of members, several of which are equal to each other in strength and resources, and equal singly to a vigorous and persevering defense.

In addition, foreign countries have been able to interfere in the country’s decisions by speaking to the states and cities directly, and there have been many examples of this behavior.

In times of crisis, the states-general of the United Netherlands sometimes violate the constitution. For example, in 1688, they signed a treaty even though it was against the law. The treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which recognized the independence of the United Netherlands, was also made without the agreement of one of the states. Even in a recent treaty with Great Britain they ignored the principle of unanimity. A weak constitution will either transgress its boundaries to generate its necessary power, or it will dissolve. If its dissolution goes to a dangerous extreme depends on the situation. Tyranny may grow more often out of defective constitutions than out of the full exercise of larger constitutional powers.

OriginalIn critical emergencies, the States-General are often compelled to overleap their constitutional bounds. In 1688, they concluded a treaty of themselves at the risk of their heads. The treaty of Westphalia, in 1648, by which their independence was formerly and finally recognized, was concluded without the consent of Zealand. Even as recently as the last treaty of peace with Great Britain, the constitutional principle of unanimity was departed from. A weak constitution must necessarily terminate in dissolution, for want of proper powers, or the usurpation of powers requisite for the public safety. Whether the usurpation, when once begun, will stop at the salutary point, or go forward to the dangerous extreme, must depend on the contingencies of the moment. Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the assumptions of power, called for, on pressing exigencies, by a defective constitution, than out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional authorities.

Despite the problems caused by the stadtholder, it has been suggested that the country would have fallen apart already if it wasn’t for his influence in the states. The wealthy and influential state of Holland has also kept the country together when the stadtholder was not in power.

OriginalNotwithstanding the calamities produced by the stadtholdership, it has been supposed that without his influence in the individual provinces, the causes of anarchy manifest in the confederacy would long ago have dissolved it. "Under such a government," says the Abbe Mably, "the Union could never have subsisted, if the provinces had not a spring within themselves, capable of quickening their tardiness, and compelling them to the same way of thinking. This spring is the stadtholder." It is remarked by Sir William Temple, "that in the intermissions of the stadtholdership, Holland, by her riches and her authority, which drew the others into a sort of dependence, supplied the place."

These are not the only circumstances which contributed to chaos and the breakdown of the government. Other countries played a role by trying to influence the political system in ways that harm unity.

The true patriots have tried at least four times to create special assemblies to remedy the broken system; they have found it impossible to unite the public councils in reforming the known problems of the existing constitution. Let us pause to mourn this precautionary tale of history, and be sad for the calamities brought to mankind by its differing opinions and selfish passions.

OriginalThe true patriots have long bewailed the fatal tendency of these vices, and have made no less than four regular experiments by EXTRAORDINARY ASSEMBLIES, convened for the special purpose, to apply a remedy. As many times has their laudable zeal found it impossible to UNITE THE PUBLIC COUNCILS in reforming the known, the acknowledged, the fatal evils of the existing constitution. Let us pause, my fellow-citizens, for one moment, over this melancholy and monitory lesson of history; and with the tear that drops for the calamities brought on mankind by their adverse opinions and selfish passions, let our gratitude mingle an ejaculation to Heaven, for the propitious concord which has distinguished the consultations for our political happiness.

There was also a plan to create a national tax, but this faced opposition and failed.

The unhappy people are suffering from uprisings, interstate fights, foreign invasions, and a crisis of destiny. People around the world are watching the spectacle. We hope that these challenges will lead to changes in their government that will bring them closer together and create a peaceful, free, and happy country.

OriginalThis unhappy people seem to be now suffering from popular convulsions, from dissensions among the states, and from the actual invasion of foreign arms, the crisis of their destiny. All nations have their eyes fixed on the awful spectacle. The first wish prompted by humanity is, that this severe trial may issue in such a revolution of their government as will establish their union, and render it the parent of tranquillity, freedom and happiness: The next, that the asylum under which, we trust, the enjoyment of these blessings will speedily be secured in this country, may receive and console them for the catastrophe of their own.

I will not apologize for spending so much time on all of these historical precedents. Experience exposes truth, and we must respect the patterns that continually arise. The important truth revealed here is that a sovereignty over sovereigns as distinguished from individuals is a mistake in theory and in practice. It subverts the order and goals of politics by substituting violence in place of law.

OriginalI make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contemplation of these federal precedents. Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The important truth, which it unequivocally pronounces in the present case, is that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity, by substituting VIOLENCE in place of LAW, or the destructive COERCION of the SWORD in place of the mild and salutary COERCION of the MAGISTRACY. PUBLIUS

Federal Governments Tends Towards Separation of Its Members Rather Than Tyranny Over Them

Federalist 17

Federalist 18

Federalist 19

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