The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
Generated summaryHamilton and Madison argue that a large confederate union, not a small state, is the real fix for the instability that has destroyed every popular government before now, since size and structure make faction harder to organize and insurrection impossible to spread.
Federalist 9
Generated summaryA confederate republic lets member states keep their own governments while gaining the combined strength to stop any one state's insurrection, corruption, or usurpation from overtaking the rest of the union.Key points
A firm Union is the great barrier against domestic faction and insurrection.
The petty republics of Greece and Italy were scenes of ceaseless turmoil, and despotism’s advocates use their disorders to argue against republican liberty itself.
But the science of politics has improved, giving us separation of powers, checks and balances, judges holding office during good behavior, and representation.
To these I add one more improvement: enlarging the sphere by consolidating smaller states into one confederacy.
Opponents cite Montesquieu for small republics, but his models were tinier than our states, and his rule would drive us to monarchy or a swarm of clashing commonwealths.
Montesquieu himself endorses the confederate republic: it joins a republic’s internal advantages to a monarchy’s external force, and lets the sound parts quell insurrection or usurpation in any one.
The objection that a true confederacy cannot touch individuals is arbitrary; the plan keeps the states as constituent parts, with Senate representation and reserved powers.
A firm Union will be of the utmost importance to the peace and liberty of the states, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. No one can read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without horror at the constant turmoil and the rapid revolutions that kept them vibrating between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they show occasional calms, these serve only as short-lived contrasts to the furious storms that follow. If brief intervals of happiness appear, we view them with regret, knowing they will soon be overwhelmed by sedition and party rage. And when momentary rays of glory break through the gloom, they dazzle us briefly while reminding us that the vices of government tarnished the bright talents for which those celebrated lands are justly famous.
OriginalA FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrast to the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then intervals of felicity open to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret, arising from the reflection that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time admonish us to lament that the vices of government should pervert the direction and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted endowments for which the favored soils that produced them have been so justly celebrated.
From the disorders of those republics, the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments not only against republican government but against civil liberty itself. They declare all free government inconsistent with the order of society. Happily for mankind, a few glorious structures built on liberty have flourished for ages and refuted their gloomy reasoning. I trust America will become the broad and solid foundation of other structures no less magnificent, permanent monuments of their errors.
OriginalFrom the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms of republican government, but against the very principles of civil liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust, America will be the broad and solid foundation of other edifices, not less magnificent, which will be equally permanent monuments of their errors.
Yet these portraits of republican government were fair copies of the originals. If no better models could have been devised, liberty’s enlightened friends would have had to abandon that form of government as indefensible. But the science of politics, like most sciences, has greatly improved, and we now understand principles the ancients knew imperfectly or not at all. Among them are the distribution of power into distinct departments, legislative checks and balances, courts of judges who serve during good behavior, and representation of the people by deputies they elect. These discoveries are wholly new, or perfected mainly in modern times, and they are powerful means of keeping the excellences of republican government while lessening or avoiding its imperfections.
OriginalBut it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched of republican government were too just copies of the originals from which they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of government as indefensible. The science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellences of republican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided.
To this catalogue I venture to add one more improvement, however novel it may appear: the enlargement of the orbit within which such systems revolve. This may mean a single state’s dimensions or the consolidation of several smaller states into one great confederacy; the consolidation concerns us here, and I will examine the single state in another place. The usefulness of a confederacy in suppressing faction, guarding the internal tranquility of states, and increasing their external force and security is not a new idea. It has been practiced in different countries and ages, and it has the sanction of the most approved writers on politics.
The opponents of the proposed plan have diligently cited Montesquieu’s observations on the necessity of a small territory for republican government. But they seem not to know what that great man says elsewhere in his work, or where the principle they embrace will lead. When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the models he had in mind were far smaller than almost every one of these states. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means be compared with the models he reasoned from. Taking his ideas on this point as the criterion of truth would drive us to a hard choice: refuge in the arms of monarchy, or an infinity of little, jealous, clashing commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord.
OriginalTo this catalogue of circumstances that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil government, I shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on a principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the new Constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single State or to the consolidation of several smaller States into one great Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately concerns the object under consideration. It will, however, be of use to examine the principle in its application to a single State, which shall be attended to in another place. The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to guard the internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their external force and security, is in reality not a new idea. It has been practiced upon in different countries and ages, and has received the sanction of the most approved writers on the subject of politics. The opponents of the plan proposed have, with great assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government. But they seem not to have been apprised of the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of his work, nor to have adverted to the consequences of the principle to which they subscribe with such ready acquiescence. When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means be compared with the models from which he reasoned and to which the terms of his description apply. If we therefore take his ideas on this point as the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative either of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord, and the miserable objects of universal pity or contempt.
Some writers on the other side seem aware of this dilemma, and they have even been bold enough to hint that dividing the larger states would be desirable. Such a desperate expedient might multiply petty offices for men whose influence reaches no further than circles of personal intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or happiness of the people of America.
OriginalSome of the writers who have come forward on the other side of the question seem to have been aware of the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at the division of the larger States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of petty offices, answer the views of men who possess not qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or happiness of the people of America.
Montesquieu’s own words, in fact, favor the Union. Taken in his sense, his rule would only call for reducing the size of the largest members of the Union. It says nothing against joining them all in one confederate government, and that is the true question before us. Far from opposing a general union of the states, he explicitly treats a confederate republic as the means of extending the sphere of popular government and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism.
It is very probable, he writes, that mankind would eventually have been forced to live always under the government of a single person, had they not contrived the confederate republic. That form of constitution has all the internal advantages of republican government together with the external force of a monarchy. Under it, several smaller states agree to become members of a larger one, an assemblage of societies that grows by new associations until it can provide for the security of the whole united body. A republic of this kind, he adds, can withstand an external force and support itself without internal corruptions.
OriginalReferring the examination of the principle itself to another place, as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to remark here that, in the sense of the author who has been most emphatically quoted upon the occasion, it would only dictate a reduction of the SIZE of the more considerable MEMBERS of the Union, but would not militate against their being all comprehended in one confederate government. And this is the true question, in the discussion of which we are at present interested. So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to a general Union of the States, that he explicitly treats of a confederate republic as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism. "It is very probable," (says he) "that mankind would have been obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC." "This form of government is a convention by which several smaller STATES agree to become members of a larger ONE, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the united body." "A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without any internal corruptions. The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences."
If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not command equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Too great an influence over one state would alarm the rest; if he subdued a part, the states still free could overpower him before his usurpation settled. Should a popular insurrection break out in one state, the others can quell it; should abuses creep into one part, the parts that remain sound reform them. Even if the confederacy itself dissolved, its members would preserve their sovereignty.
Original"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he had usurped and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation." "Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty."
Composed of small republics, such a government enjoys the internal happiness of each; through the association, it gains all the external advantages of large monarchies. I quote these passages at length because they summarize the principal arguments for the Union and correct the false impressions drawn from misapplying other parts of Montesquieu’s work. They also bear directly on the design of this paper: to show the tendency of the Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.
Original"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the advantages of large monarchies." I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting passages, because they contain a luminous abridgment of the principal arguments in favor of the Union, and must effectually remove the false impressions which a misapplication of other parts of the work was calculated to make. They have, at the same time, an intimate connection with the more immediate design of this paper; which is, to illustrate the tendency of the Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.
Some have raised a distinction, more subtle than accurate, between a confederacy and a consolidation of the states. A confederacy, they say, restricts its authority to the member states in their collective capacities and never reaches the individuals who compose them; on this view, the national council should have no concern with internal administration. An exact equality of suffrage between the members has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of confederate government. These positions are in the main arbitrary; they are supported neither by principle nor by precedent. Governments of this kind have usually operated as the distinction supposes, but most show extensive exceptions, proving there is no absolute rule on the subject. And I will show that wherever this principle has prevailed, it has caused incurable disorder and weakness in government.
OriginalA distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a CONFEDERACY and a CONSOLIDATION of the States. The essential characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction of its authority to the members in their collective capacities, without reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. It is contended that the national council ought to have no concern with any object of internal administration. An exact equality of suffrage between the members has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a confederate government. These positions are, in the main, arbitrary; they are supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has indeed happened, that governments of this kind have generally operated in the manner which the distinction taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive exceptions to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as example will go, that there is no absolute rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown in the course of this investigation that as far as the principle contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder and imbecility in the government.
A confederate republic is simply “an assemblage of societies,” an association of two or more states into one state; the extent, modifications, and objects of the federal authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the member states keep their separate organization for local purposes, the whole remains in fact and in theory a confederacy, even in perfect subordination to the general authority of the union. The proposed Constitution, far from abolishing the state governments, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, with direct representation in the Senate and exclusive, very important portions of sovereign power left in their hands.
In the Lycian confederacy of twenty-three cities, the largest held three votes in the common council, the middle class two, and the smallest one. That council also appointed every city’s judges and magistrates, the most delicate possible interference in internal administration. Yet Montesquieu says of this association, “Were I to give a model of an excellent Confederate Republic, it would be that of Lycia.” These distinctions, then, never entered the thoughts of that enlightened writer; they are the novel refinements of an erroneous theory.
OriginalThe definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be "an assemblage of societies," or an association of two or more states into one state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the federal authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate organization of the members be not abolished; so long as it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local purposes; though it should be in perfect subordination to the general authority of the union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an association of states, or a confederacy. The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government. In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three CITIES or republics, the largest were entitled to THREE votes in the COMMON COUNCIL, those of the middle class to TWO, and the smallest to ONE. The COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and magistrates of the respective CITIES. This was certainly the most, delicate species of interference in their internal administration; for if there be any thing that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is the appointment of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this association, says: "Were I to give a model of an excellent Confederate Republic, it would be that of Lycia." Thus we perceive that the distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this enlightened civilian; and we shall be led to conclude, that they are the novel refinements of an erroneous theory. PUBLIUS
Federalist 10
Generated summaryFaction cannot be removed without destroying liberty itself, so the cure is to control its effects, and a large republic does this by multiplying interests and parties until no single faction, especially a majority one, can easily combine and dominate the whole.Key points
The Union’s chief advantage is its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.
A faction is any group, majority or minority, united by a passion or interest adverse to others’ rights or the common good.
Faction can be cured two ways — by removing its causes or controlling its effects — but its causes cannot be removed without destroying liberty itself.
Those causes are sown in human nature, above all in the unequal distribution of property, so we must instead control faction’s effects.
A minority faction the majority can simply outvote; the real danger is a majority faction, which popular government otherwise lets oppress at will.
A pure democracy cannot check a majority faction; only a republic, governing through elected representatives, opens the cure.
Extend the sphere: a large republic holds so many parties and interests that an oppressive majority is harder to form and harder to unite.
So in the extent and structure of the Union lies a republican remedy for the diseases most common to republican government.
Among the many advantages promised by a well-built Union, none deserves fuller treatment than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular government is never so alarmed for its fate as when he sees how prone it is to this dangerous vice. He will value, then, any plan that cures it without violating the principles he holds dear. Instability, injustice, and confusion in the public councils have in truth been the mortal diseases by which popular governments everywhere have perished. They remain the favorite theme from which the enemies of liberty draw their most plausible arguments. The improvements the American constitutions made on the popular models of the past cannot be admired too much. But it would be false partiality to claim that they have removed this danger as fully as was hoped. Our most thoughtful and virtuous citizens complain, the friends alike of public and private faith and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable. They complain that the public good is ignored in the clash of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided not by the rules of justice and the rights of the weaker party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. Much as we might wish these complaints had no ground, the facts will not let us deny that they are in some degree true. A fair review will show that some of our troubles have been wrongly blamed on our governments. But it will also show that other causes alone cannot explain many of our heaviest misfortunes, and above all the growing distrust of public engagements and alarm for private rights echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These are chiefly, if not wholly, the effects of the unsteadiness and injustice that a factious spirit has brought into our public affairs. By a faction I mean a number of citizens, whether a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and moved by some common impulse of passion or interest that runs against the rights of other citizens, or against the permanent and collective interests of the community.
OriginalAMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations. By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
There are two ways to cure the mischiefs of faction: remove its causes, or control its effects. And there are two ways to remove its causes: destroy the liberty essential to its existence, or give every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests. The first remedy is worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, the food without which it instantly dies. But to abolish liberty because it feeds faction would be as foolish as to wish away the air because it gives fire its power. Liberty is essential to political life, and we cannot destroy it to be rid of faction.
OriginalThere are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects. There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests. It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second cure is as impractical as the first would be unwise. As long as human reason remains fallible, and men are free to use it, they will form different opinions. As long as reason is tied to self-love, opinions and passions will act on each other, and passions will fasten onto opinions. Men differ in their faculties, and from those different faculties the rights of property arise. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From protecting different and unequal faculties for acquiring property come different degrees and kinds of property. These shape the views of their owners, and society divides into different interests and parties. The seeds of faction are thus sown in the nature of man. We see them everywhere, more or less active as circumstances allow. A zeal for rival opinions in religion, in government, and in much else; an attachment to rival leaders competing for power; or a devotion to others whose fortunes stir the passions: all these have in turn divided mankind, inflamed mutual hatred, and made men far readier to oppress each other than to work for the common good. So strong is this tendency that where no real occasion offers, the most frivolous and imaginary distinctions have been enough to kindle unfriendly passions and violent conflict. But the most common and lasting source of factions has been the varied and unequal distribution of property. Those who own property and those who do not have always formed distinct interests, as have creditors and debtors. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, and many lesser interests grow up of necessity in every civilized nation, dividing it into different classes with different sentiments and views. Regulating these many clashing interests is the chief task of modern legislation, and it draws the spirit of party and faction into the ordinary work of government.
OriginalThe second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties. The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
No man is allowed to judge his own cause, because his interest would bias his judgment and might corrupt his integrity. With equal or greater reason, a body of men should not be both judges and parties at once. Yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation but judicial decisions, not about the rights of single persons, but about the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of lawmakers but advocates for the very causes they decide? Is a law proposed about private debts? The creditors are parties on one side, the debtors on the other. Justice should hold the balance; yet the parties are themselves the judges, and the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Should domestic manufactures be protected by restrictions on foreign ones, and how far? The landed and the manufacturing classes would answer differently, and neither, probably, with sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes seems to demand the strictest impartiality; yet no act offers a dominant party greater temptation to trample the rules of justice. Every shilling they overcharge the weaker number is a shilling saved in their own pockets. It is vain to say that enlightened statesmen will adjust these clashing interests and bend them all to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. And such an adjustment often cannot be made at all without weighing indirect and distant considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest one party finds in disregarding the rights of another.
OriginalNo man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets. It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.
The conclusion is this: the causes of faction cannot be removed, and relief must be sought only in controlling its effects. If a faction is less than a majority, the republican principle supplies relief, for the majority can defeat its designs by a regular vote. Such a minority may clog the government and disturb society, but it cannot carry out its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is caught up in a faction, however, popular government itself lets it sacrifice both the public good and the rights of other citizens to its ruling passion. To secure the public good and private rights against such a faction, and yet preserve the spirit and form of popular government, is the great object of our inquiry. Let me add that this is the great goal by which popular government can be rescued from the disgrace it has long borne, and made worthy of the esteem and adoption of mankind.
OriginalThe inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS. If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.
How can this object be reached? Clearly by only one of two ways. Either the same passion or interest must be kept from seizing a majority at the same time, or the majority that shares it must be made unable, by their number and scattered situation, to combine and act on their schemes of oppression. If impulse and opportunity are allowed to meet, we know that neither moral nor religious motives can be trusted to hold men back. They fail to restrain injustice in individuals, and they lose force as more people combine, just when that force is most needed.
OriginalBy what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.
From this we may conclude that a pure democracy, by which I mean a small society of citizens who assemble and govern in person, can find no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority. The very form of government lets them communicate and combine, and nothing checks the temptation to sacrifice a weaker party or a hated individual. Such democracies have always been scenes of turbulence and strife, always hostile to personal security and the rights of property, and in general as short in their lives as they were violent in their deaths. The theorists who favored this form supposed that by making men perfectly equal in political rights, they would also make them equal in property, in opinions, and in passions. They were mistaken.
OriginalFrom this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
A republic, by which I mean a government using representation, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure we seek. Let us see how it differs from a pure democracy, and we shall grasp both the nature of the cure and the power it draws from the Union. There are two great differences. First, in a republic the government is delegated to a small number of citizens elected by the rest. Second, a republic can take in a greater number of citizens and a larger stretch of country.
The first difference tends to refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism will be least likely to sacrifice it to passing or partial aims. Under such an arrangement, the public voice, spoken by the people’s representatives, may suit the public good better than if the people themselves had spoken it. But the effect can also run the other way. Men of factious temper, of local prejudice, or of sinister design may win office by intrigue or corruption, and then betray the people’s interests.
The question, then, is whether small or large republics are better suited to choose fit guardians of the public good. Two plain considerations decide it for the large republic. First, however small a republic is, its representatives must reach a certain number, to guard against the schemes of a few; and however large it is, they must stay within a certain number, to guard against the confusion of a crowd. So the representatives do not grow in proportion to the people, and are proportionally more numerous in the small republic. If the share of fit men is no smaller in the large republic than in the small, the large one offers a wider choice, and so a better chance of a fit choice. Second, since each representative in a large republic is chosen by more citizens, it is harder for unworthy candidates to win by the vicious arts too often used in elections. With freer votes, the people are likelier to settle on men of proven and widely known merit.
OriginalA republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union. The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended. The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations: In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice. In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.
It must be admitted that here, as elsewhere, there is a middle point, with drawbacks on either side. Enlarge the body of electors too much, and the representatives lose touch with local circumstances and lesser interests. Reduce it too much, and they grow overly attached to these, and unfit to grasp and pursue great national objects. The federal Constitution strikes a happy balance in this respect: the great and general interests go to the national legislature, the local and particular ones to the state legislatures.
OriginalIt must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.
The other difference is the greater number of citizens and the larger territory that a republic can hold, compared with a democracy. This, above all, makes factious combinations less to be feared in a republic. The smaller the society, the fewer the distinct parties and interests. The fewer the parties, the more often a majority will belong to one. And the smaller the majority, and the tighter the space they occupy, the more easily they can combine and carry out their plans of oppression. Enlarge the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests. You make it less likely that a majority of the whole will share a motive to invade the rights of others. And even if such a motive exists, it will be harder for all who feel it to discover their strength and act together. Where the purpose is unjust or dishonorable, distrust itself checks communication, the more so as more people must agree.
OriginalThe other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
So the same advantage a republic has over a democracy in controlling faction, a large republic has over a small one, and the Union has over the states that compose it. Does the advantage lie in choosing representatives whose enlightened views rise above local prejudice and schemes of injustice? The representatives of the Union are the most likely to have these qualities. Does it lie in the greater security that a greater variety of parties gives against any one party outnumbering and oppressing the rest? The Union’s wider variety of parties adds exactly that security. Does it lie in the greater obstacles to the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here again the extent of the Union gives the plainest advantage. The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame in their own states, but it cannot spread a general fire through the others. A religious sect may sink into a political faction in one part of the confederacy, but the variety of sects spread over the whole guards the national councils against that danger. A rage for paper money, for abolishing debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will less easily infect the whole Union than a single member of it, just as such a disease is likelier to taint a county or a district than an entire state. In the size and proper structure of the Union, then, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most common to republican government. And the pleasure and pride we take in being republicans should fix our zeal in cherishing the spirit and upholding the character of Federalists.
OriginalHence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,--is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage. The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State. In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists. PUBLIUS
