The Utility of the Union in Respect to the Economy and a Navy
by Alexander Hamilton
Generated summaryA united America can bargain from strength: it can force European powers to compete for access to its markets, build a shared navy no single state could afford, and grow a domestic trade that thirteen separate states never could. Disunion strips away that leverage and leaves each state weak and exploitable.Key points
Union gives American commerce and a navy the strength to face Europe; disunion leaves us its prey.
Fearing our commerce, Europe’s maritime powers would divide us and deny us our own shipping: to block our rivalry, seize our profits, and clip our wings.
United, prohibitory trade regulations across all the states could force foreign nations to bid for our fast-growing market.
A federal navy, though outmatched by great powers, could tip a contest between two of them in the West Indies.
By steady union we may become the arbiter of Europe in America, erecting one great American system that dictates terms to the old world.
Disunited, weakness forfeits even neutrality, and the maritime powers reduce us to a passive commerce that enriches our enemies.
Vital trade rights ride on union: the fisheries and the navigation of the Western lakes and the Mississippi, else lost to stronger neighbors.
Free trade among the states multiplies each one’s commerce, and pooling every region’s resources brings a national navy within reach.
Few who know the subject dispute the union’s commercial value, at home and abroad alike. Appearances suggest our bold commercial spirit has already stirred unease in several maritime powers of Europe. They fear we will cut into the carrying trade that supports their navigation and naval strength. Those with colonies here fear neighbors who could build a powerful navy. Such fears point them toward dividing us and denying us active commerce in our own ships. That policy would keep us out of their navigation, take the profits of our trade, and clip the wings by which we might rise to dangerous greatness.
OriginalTHE importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those points about which there is least room to entertain a difference of opinion, and which has, in fact, commanded the most general assent of men who have any acquaintance with the subject. This applies as well to our intercourse with foreign countries as with each other.
There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of America, has already excited uneasy sensations in several of the maritime powers of Europe. They seem to be apprehensive of our too great interference in that carrying trade, which is the support of their navigation and the foundation of their naval strength. Those of them which have colonies in America look forward to what this country is capable of becoming, with painful solicitude. They foresee the dangers that may threaten their American dominions from the neighborhood of States, which have all the dispositions, and would possess all the means, requisite to the creation of a powerful marine. Impressions of this kind will naturally indicate the policy of fostering divisions among us, and of depriving us, as far as possible, of an ACTIVE COMMERCE in our own bottoms. This would answer the threefold purpose of preventing our interference in their navigation, of monopolizing the profits of our trade, and of clipping the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness. Did not prudence forbid the detail, it would not be difficult to trace, by facts, the workings of this policy to the cabinets of ministers.
United, prohibitions reaching every state at once could make foreign countries bid against each other for our markets. A fast-growing market of three million, mostly farmers, matters to any manufacturing nation. Suppose a government able to shut Great Britain out of our ports: could we not then win valuable privileges in her dominions? Some say she would trade with us through the Dutch. But her navigation loses the carriage of her own trade, and the Dutch take the chief profits. All this justifies believing Britain would relax her system and open her West India markets to us. Other nations would likely follow, unwilling to be supplanted here.
OriginalIf we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly to our prosperity in a variety of ways. By prohibitory regulations, extending, at the same time, throughout the States, we may oblige foreign countries to bid against each other, for the privileges of our markets. This assertion will not appear chimerical to those who are able to appreciate the importance of the markets of three millions of people--increasing in rapid progression, for the most part exclusively addicted to agriculture, and likely from local circumstances to remain so--to any manufacturing nation; and the immense difference there would be to the trade and navigation of such a nation, between a direct communication in its own ships, and an indirect conveyance of its products and returns, to and from America, in the ships of another country. Suppose, for instance, we had a government in America, capable of excluding Great Britain (with whom we have at present no treaty of commerce) from all our ports; what would be the probable operation of this step upon her politics? Would it not enable us to negotiate, with the fairest prospect of success, for commercial privileges of the most valuable and extensive kind, in the dominions of that kingdom? When these questions have been asked, upon other occasions, they have received a plausible, but not a solid or satisfactory answer. It has been said that prohibitions on our part would produce no change in the system of Britain, because she could prosecute her trade with us through the medium of the Dutch, who would be her immediate customers and paymasters for those articles which were wanted for the supply of our markets. But would not her navigation be materially injured by the loss of the important advantage of being her own carrier in that trade? Would not the principal part of its profits be intercepted by the Dutch, as a compensation for their agency and risk? Would not the mere circumstance of freight occasion a considerable deduction? Would not so circuitous an intercourse facilitate the competitions of other nations, by enhancing the price of British commodities in our markets, and by transferring to other hands the management of this interesting branch of the British commerce?
A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these questions will justify a belief that the real disadvantages to Britain from such a state of things, conspiring with the pre-possessions of a great part of the nation in favor of the American trade, and with the importunities of the West India islands, would produce a relaxation in her present system, and would let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets of those islands elsewhere, from which our trade would derive the most substantial benefits. Such a point gained from the British government, and which could not be expected without an equivalent in exemptions and immunities in our markets, would be likely to have a correspondent effect on the conduct of other nations, who would not be inclined to see themselves altogether supplanted in our trade.
Under an efficient government the union could soon build a federal navy, a further hold over Europe. No match for the great maritime powers, it would still weigh in a contest between two of them. A few timely ships in the West Indies would often decide a campaign. Our commanding position and our supplies there let us bargain for commercial privileges. Holding to the union, we may hope to become the arbiter of Europe in America. Divided, our rivalries would waste what nature placed within our reach, and warring nations that fear nothing from us would prey on our commerce. Neutrality is respected only when backed by power; weakness forfeits even that.
OriginalA further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations toward us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a federal navy. There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union under an efficient government would put it in our power, at a period not very distant, to create a navy which, if it could not vie with those of the great maritime powers, would at least be of respectable weight if thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties. This would be more peculiarly the case in relation to operations in the West Indies. A few ships of the line, sent opportunely to the reinforcement of either side, would often be sufficient to decide the fate of a campaign, on the event of which interests of the greatest magnitude were suspended. Our position is, in this respect, a most commanding one. And if to this consideration we add that of the usefulness of supplies from this country, in the prosecution of military operations in the West Indies, it will readily be perceived that a situation so favorable would enable us to bargain with great advantage for commercial privileges. A price would be set not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality. By a steady adherence to the Union we may hope, erelong, to become the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may dictate.
But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover that the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each other, and would frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature has kindly placed within our reach. In a state so insignificant our commerce would be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of all nations at war with each other; who, having nothing to fear from us, would with little scruple or remorse, supply their wants by depredations on our property as often as it fell in their way. The rights of neutrality will only be respected when they are defended by an adequate power. A nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being neutral.
Under a vigorous national government, our united strength would baffle every European combination against our growth. It would even remove the motive, by putting success out of reach. Active commerce, wide navigation, and a flourishing marine would follow of necessity. Disunited, those combinations might succeed, and the maritime nations could dictate the terms of our political existence. They share an interest in being our carriers, and a greater one in preventing our becoming theirs. So they would probably combine to cripple our navigation and confine us to a passive commerce.
OriginalUnder a vigorous national government, the natural strength and resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth. This situation would even take away the motive to such combinations, by inducing an impracticability of success. An active commerce, an extensive navigation, and a flourishing marine would then be the offspring of moral and physical necessity. We might defy the little arts of the little politicians to control or vary the irresistible and unchangeable course of nature.
But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist and might operate with success. It would be in the power of the maritime nations, availing themselves of our universal impotence, to prescribe the conditions of our political existence; and as they have a common interest in being our carriers, and still more in preventing our becoming theirs, they would in all probability combine to embarrass our navigation in such a manner as would in effect destroy it, and confine us to a PASSIVE COMMERCE. We should then be compelled to content ourselves with the first price of our commodities, and to see the profits of our trade snatched from us to enrich our enemies and persecutors. That unequaled spirit of enterprise, which signalizes the genius of the American merchants and navigators, and which is in itself an inexhaustible mine of national wealth, would be stifled and lost, and poverty and disgrace would overspread a country which, with wisdom, might make herself the admiration and envy of the world.
The union holds rights of great moment to our trade: the fisheries, and navigation of the Western lakes and the Mississippi. Break up the confederacy, and stronger partners would settle the delicate questions against us. Spain’s designs on the Mississippi need no comment. France and Britain share the fisheries, where our mastery lets us undersell them in their own markets. What is more natural than a wish to shut out such dangerous competitors?
OriginalThere are rights of great moment to the trade of America which are rights of the Union--I allude to the fisheries, to the navigation of the Western lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. The dissolution of the Confederacy would give room for delicate questions concerning the future existence of these rights; which the interest of more powerful partners would hardly fail to solve to our disadvantage. The disposition of Spain with regard to the Mississippi needs no comment. France and Britain are concerned with us in the fisheries, and view them as of the utmost moment to their navigation. They, of course, would hardly remain long indifferent to that decided mastery, of which experience has shown us to be possessed in this valuable branch of traffic, and by which we are able to undersell those nations in their own markets. What more natural than that they should be disposed to exclude from the lists such dangerous competitors?
This trade is no partial benefit; all the navigating states may share in it. As a nursery of seamen it is indispensable to a navy. Union serves that object: a navy drawing on the resources of all is nearer than one from a single state. Each part brings its own advantage: the southern states furnish naval stores in plenty, tar, pitch, and turpentine. Their ship timber is more solid and lasting, a gain in naval strength and economy. Some southern and middle states yield better iron, and seamen must come chiefly from the North.
OriginalThis branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial benefit. All the navigating States may, in different degrees, advantageously participate in it, and under circumstances of a greater extension of mercantile capital, would not be unlikely to do it. As a nursery of seamen, it now is, or when time shall have more nearly assimilated the principles of navigation in the several States, will become, a universal resource. To the establishment of a navy, it must be indispensable. To this great national object, a NAVY, union will contribute in various ways. Every institution will grow and flourish in proportion to the quantity and extent of the means concentred towards its formation and support. A navy of the United States, as it would embrace the resources of all, is an object far less remote than a navy of any single State or partial confederacy, which would only embrace the resources of a single part. It happens, indeed, that different portions of confederated America possess each some peculiar advantage for this essential establishment. The more southern States furnish in greater abundance certain kinds of naval stores--tar, pitch, and turpentine. Their wood for the construction of ships is also of a more solid and lasting texture. The difference in the duration of the ships of which the navy might be composed, if chiefly constructed of Southern wood, would be of signal importance, either in the view of naval strength or of national economy. Some of the Southern and of the Middle States yield a greater plenty of iron, and of better quality. Seamen must chiefly be drawn from the Northern hive. The necessity of naval protection to external or maritime commerce does not require a particular elucidation, no more than the conduciveness of that species of commerce to the prosperity of a navy.
Free trade among the states advances each, as they exchange products at home and abroad. Enterprise gains scope from the diversity of those products: when one state’s staple fails, it can call in another’s. Variety in exports, no less than value, keeps foreign commerce active, for many kinds of goods can scarcely all be unsalable at once. Our whole commerce promises a far better balance than the thirteen states could show apart. The states would trade among themselves in any case, but that trade would be fettered and narrowed. Commercial unity, like political unity, comes only from unity of government.
OriginalAn unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished, and will acquire additional motion and vigor from a free circulation of the commodities of every part. Commercial enterprise will have much greater scope, from the diversity in the productions of different States. When the staple of one fails from a bad harvest or unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the staple of another. The variety, not less than the value, of products for exportation contributes to the activity of foreign commerce. It can be conducted upon much better terms with a large number of materials of a given value than with a small number of materials of the same value; arising from the competitions of trade and from the fluctuations of markets. Particular articles may be in great demand at certain periods, and unsalable at others; but if there be a variety of articles, it can scarcely happen that they should all be at one time in the latter predicament, and on this account the operations of the merchant would be less liable to any considerable obstruction or stagnation. The speculative trader will at once perceive the force of these observations, and will acknowledge that the aggregate balance of the commerce of the United States would bid fair to be much more favorable than that of the thirteen States without union or with partial unions.
It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the States are united or disunited, there would still be an intimate intercourse between them which would answer the same ends; this intercourse would be fettered, interrupted, and narrowed by a multiplicity of causes, which in the course of these papers have been amply detailed. A unity of commercial, as well as political, interests, can only result from a unity of government.
Our interests prompt us to aim at an ascendant in American affairs. The world divides into four parts, each with its own interests. Europe, by force and fraud, has extended her dominion over the other three, and plumes herself as Mistress of the World. It falls to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and teach that assuming brother moderation. Union will enable it; disunion will add another victim to his triumphs. Let the thirteen states, in strict and indissoluble union, erect one great American system, able to dictate terms between the old world and the new.
OriginalThere are other points of view in which this subject might be placed, of a striking and animating kind. But they would lead us too far into the regions of futurity, and would involve topics not proper for a newspaper discussion. I shall briefly observe, that our situation invites and our interests prompt us to aim at an ascendant in the system of American affairs. The world may politically, as well as geographically, be divided into four parts, each having a distinct set of interests. Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms and by her negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees, extended her dominion over them all. Africa, Asia, and America, have successively felt her domination. The superiority she has long maintained has tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of the World, and to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit. Men admired as profound philosophers have, in direct terms, attributed to her inhabitants a physical superiority, and have gravely asserted that all animals, and with them the human species, degenerate in America--that even dogs cease to bark after having breathed awhile in our atmosphere. Facts have too long supported these arrogant pretensions of the Europeans. It belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation. Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will will add another victim to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world! PUBLIUS
