The Need of a Government at Least as Militarily Powerful as the One We’ve Proposed

We now must examine the need of a government as energetic as the one we’ve proposed.

This study will have three parts: the goals of federal government, the power needed to accomplish those goals, and who should be vested with such power. We will talk more about how that power should be divided and organized later.

The main goals for such a union are to protect its members, keep peace, both inside the country and outside, control trade with other countries and between states, and to manage foreign affairs.

The power needed to protect the union are to have an army and navy, to make rules for how they are run, to direct their operations, and to pay for them. These powers should have no limits because it’s hard to know what might happen in the future and how much we might need to protect ourselves. The dangers that countries face are many and different, so it’s not good to put limits on the people who are in charge of protecting the country. They should have as much power as they need and be the same organizations responsible for the country’s defense.

It is self-evident that the people who are expected to achieve a goal should have the necessary tools, and the tools should be proportioned to the goal itself.

The question of whether we should have a national government to take care of protecting the country is something that can be discussed. But once it is decided that we should have one, it should have all the power it needs to do its job. Unless it can be proven that the dangers facing the country can be predicted and limited, it must be accepted that the government in charge of protecting the country should not have its powers limited in any way that would make it less effective in creating, directing, or supporting the military.

This principle at least appears to have been recognized by the current confederation’s framers, although they have not provided enough power for its execution. Congress has the power to ask for soldiers and money, and to run the army and navy and make decisions about their actions. The states are supposed to give Congress what it needs to protect the country and promote the general well-being. It was believed that the states would do what was best for themselves and be honest in their obligations to the national government.

The plan has failed to work as intended and it is clear that a major change is needed. If we truly want the country to be strong and last, we must stop trying to control the states as a group, and instead make the laws of the federal government apply nationally. We should stop using the ineffective methods of asking for a certain amount of soldiers or money from each state, and instead give the national government the power to raise its own army and navy, and the money to pay for them, in the same ways that other countries do.

If our circumstances do demand a union of states rather than a single unified country, then we must decide at what government levels certain powers should be granted. If the federal government is in charge of protecting the country, it must have the power to make laws and regulations about building and maintaining an army, navy, and raising money for that purpose. The same goes for managing trade and any other areas that the national government is responsible for. If, on the other hand, local governments are in charge of justice between their constituents, they must have all the necessary power to make and enforce relevant laws. If we don’t give each part of the government enough power to do its job, it will not be able to manage important matters effectively.

Who would be better suited to protect the country than the government body in charge of protecting it? They will have the best information about how dangerous the situation is, and they will be most motivated to protect every part of the country. They will also feel the most responsible for making sure that they have the resources they need and they are the only ones that can make sure that all the states work together. It doesn’t make sense to give the national government the job of protecting the country but to give the states the power to do so. This will lead to lack of cooperation and inefficiency, and will make the cost of war higher and more difficult to bear. We have already seen this happen during the revolution we just had.

No matter how we look at it, it is unwise and dangerous to not give the federal government the necessary power to do the job it is responsible for. It is important that the people make sure that the government is set up in a way that it can be trusted with the power it needs. If a plan does not meet this requirement, it should be rejected. Wherever federal powers can be entrusted, it should be proportioned to meet its duty. The adversaries of adopting the Constitution would have been better off if they argued the national government was undeserving of power, rather than discussing the extent of its power. As it stands, the constitutional powers are not greater than necessary for managing the national interests. If, as some argue, it is true that the large size of the country makes it impossible to have a strong national government, then we should consider having separate smaller governments. But it does not make sense to give government important responsibilities without giving it the power to do them properly. We should choose a logical solution instead of trying to make things work that don’t.

I believe that it is possible to have a strong national government that works for the entire country. I don’t think that any convincing argument has been made that it is impossible. I hope that my previous explanations have made it clear that the size of the country is actually a good reason to have a strong national government. If we adopt the ideas of those against the new constitution as our political creed, we will confirm the gloomy predictions that a national system across the whole country cannot work.

I am met with one specific criticism regarding federal powers: there has not been provision made to prevent standing armies in peacetime. I will show how this objection is weak and unfounded.

This claim has been mostly asserted, rather than argued, and contradicts the practice of other nations and the general American sense. This objection assumes it is necessary to restrain the legislative authority of the nation in the establishment of its military, a principle unheard of except in one or two of our state constitutions.

A stranger to American politics who read our newspaper would come to assume the plan either contains a positive order to keep up standing armies in times of peace, or it vests this power in the executive branch without interference by the legislative branch.

But if this stranger came to actually read the plan, he would be surprised to discover that neither was the case. Instead, the whole power of raising armies is lodged in the popularly elected legislature, not the executive. And there is a rule that says the government can only allocate money for the military for two years at a time. This precaution will be a great and real security against maintaining military establishments without real necessity.

This person, disappointed in the truth of his original opinion, might say to themselves that all the strong opinions and speeches must have had a reason motivating them. He would probably think that the people who care a lot about their freedom must have put strong rules in place about this in the past and that the new plan must be missing something that is causing all the fuss.

Under this impression, if he then examined the state constitutions, he would be disappointed to find out that only two states have laws that say the government can’t have an army during peacetime. The other eleven states say nothing or they have a law that expressly admits it.

Still, he may be persuaded that there most be some reason for the hubbub. He would never imagine that it was nothing more than deceptive people testing public gullibility. It would probably occur to him that he would may find the precautions he’s in search of in the agreement between the states, the Articles of Confederation. Maybe finally he could find the cause of the ruckus: no doubt this document would contain the explicit prohibition against a military in peacetime. He could think that the new plan is different from this agreement in this way and that is why people are upset.

But, when he examined these Articles of Confederation, he would only be more astonished when he found they imposed no such restraint on the United States. If he were quick-tempered, he may then pronounce that the clamor was just dishonest claims from harmful detractors! Why else would they be so vocal on a a point that has conformed to general American sense! If he were calmer, he might sigh and lament that such an important matter was being obscured by these critics. He would remark that this kind of conduct seems intended to mislead the people by enraging them rather than by making arguments to convince them.

Even though this opinion should not be well-tolerated, it may be worthwhile to review its intrinsic merits. Upon closer examination we will see that limiting the legislature’s establishment of the military would be improper, and would likely be ignored if imposed.

Even though the United States is far from Europe, there are still reasons to be careful and not too confident in our security. There are British and Spanish settlements on either side of us, and the West Indian islands belonging to these two countries have a shared interest with us. The Native American tribes on our western border are our natural enemies and they are more likely to be allies with these European powers. Also, the improvements in navigation make it easier for distant nations to communicate, and it is possible that Britain and Spain might work together in the future. Furthermore, the family ties between France and Spain are becoming weaker. All these factors tell us not to be too sure that we are safe from danger.

Before and since the revolution, we have needed to keep small groups of soldiers on our western border to protect against Native American attacks. These soldiers will continue to be necessary in the future. These soldiers can either be taken from the local militia or from a permanent military. The first option is impractical and would be bad even if it was possible. The militia would not want to leave their homes and families to do this duty and even if they were forced, it would be too expensive and disruptive to people’s jobs and lives. The second option is to have a permanent group of soldiers paid by the government, but this would be like having a small army during peace time.

This is a simple version of the subject that shows the fault with a constitutional prohibition on a peacetime military, and that shows the necessity of leaving the matter to the discretion of the legislature.

It is clear that if we become stronger, Britain and Spain will also increase their nearby military presence. If we don’t want to be vulnerable to their attacks or takeovers, we will need to increase the number of soldiers at our borders. Some places will be especially important to protect because would also make future attacks for them easier. Some posts are also important to protect trade with the Native American tribes. It would be foolish to leave these places in a position where they could be easily taken by our neighboring countries.

If we want to be a nation that trades by sea or to be safe on our coast, we must have a navy as soon as possible. To have a navy, we need dock yards and weapons stores, and we will need an army to protect them. With a strong enough navy, a nation can protect these places with ships. But when a nation is just starting to build a navy, they will probably need soldiers to protect these places from attack.

Someone might argue that these things like the military should be provided by the individual state governments under the direction of the federal government. But this would invert the main principle justifying the union, as it would transfer the the common defense from from the union to the individual members, a project oppressive to some states, dangerous to all, and harmful to the country as a whole.

The territories of Britain, Spain and the Native American tribes around us affect the whole country from Maine to Georgia. The danger is the same, so the protection should also be the same. Some states like New York are in a more dangerous position, and if each state only protected itself, it would not be fair to New York and would not be safe for the other states. Other problems would exist; the states with the bad luck to need to provide this protection would be unable to muster the necessary resources, which would put all the states in danger. If these states were able to grow their armies big enough, the other states would feel threatened by a few of its members being so powerful. They may in turn build bigger militaries which would lead to all states having armies much bigger than needed, undermining the national authority.

It has already been mentioned that the state government will likely compete with the national government for power, and that in any conflict, the people will likely side with their local government. If the state governments also had their own armies, they would be more likely to challenge the authority of the national government and try to take over. This would be more dangerous to the people’s freedom than leaving the military to the federal government. The people are more likely to be suspicious of the national government and therefore the army would be less likely to be used against the people. While this may seem counterintuitive, it has been proven throughout history that rights are most in danger when power is in the hands of those whom the people are least suspicious of.

The framers of the current confederation, aware of the danger to the union from separate state militaries, have expressly prohibited them from having either ships or troops without the consent of congress. The truth is, having a federal government and military forces controlled by states don’t work together. It’s like not having enough money for the federal government and not following the system of quotas and dues.

There are other views besides those presented where restraints on the national legislature will be equally apparent. The point of the argument is to prevent having an army during times of peace, but it is unclear how far these objections go: does it extend to just raising armies, or also to upkeep in times of peace? Imprecise definition of upkeep may render the military ineffectual to its purpose. What would upkeep look like in contradiction with Constitution? When would one decide its been violated? Would it be for a week, month, or year, or for as long as the danger of the threat continues? This latter case would admit that they might be kept up in times of peace, violating the literal meaning of the prohibition. It is also not clear who would decide when the danger is over; it would ultimately be up to the national government, which would allow them to raise an army and keep it as long as they think the danger persists. This would allow them to bypass the prohibition.

The need for this provision is based on the idea that the executive and legislative branches of government may work together to take over the government. If this were to happen, it would be easy to pretend that there is danger and use that as an excuse to raise an army. Even if there is no real danger, it would be easy to create the appearance of danger by starting conflicts with other countries or getting other countries to attack us. If we believe that this kind of takeover is likely and that it has a good chance of success, then the army that is raised, no matter the reason or excuse, could be used to carry out the takeover.

If it is decided to not allow the government to raise an army in times of peace, it would mean that the country would not be able to prepare for defense until it is actually invaded. This would mean that the country would not be able to prepare for war until it is already happening. We would expose our property and liberty to the mercy of invaders, and invite them by our weakness. All this because we are afraid that our own elected rulers will endanger than same liberty, and disallow them the power to preserve it.

It may be then objected that the country’s militia is enough to protect the country and that a standing army is not needed. This belief almost cost us our independence during the revolution, and cost lots of money that could have been saved. Our own experience is too recent to allow this type of reliance. Fighting a war against a professional and trained army can only be done with a similar force. This is important not only for strength and effectiveness but also for cost-efficiency. The American militia fought bravely during the revolution, but they alone could not have won the war. War is a skill that must be learned and perfected through practice, time and perseverance.

Violent policy is self-defeating, as it goes against the natural course of human affairs. Pennsylvania can currently illustrate this truth. The bill of rights of that state declares that standing armies are dangerous to liberty and may not be kept up in times of peace. Nevertheless, with only some disorder in one or two counties, Pennsylvania raised an army and will likely keep them as long as there is any appearance of danger. Massachusetts affords a similar lesson. The state (without waiting for the agreement of congress, as the Articles of Confederation require) raised troops to quell a domestic insurrection and still keeps a paid corps to prevent another revolt. The particular constitution of Massachusetts did not stop this measure, but it’s still useful to learn that it is sometimes essential to create forces in times of peace to guarantee security, and thus that it would be improper to control the legislature’s discretion. It also shows how little the rights of a weak government are respected even by its own citizens, and how poorly paper restrictions hold up against real necessity.

It was a rule of the Spartan government that someone should not be an admiral twice. After the Peloponnesian allies were defeated by the Athenians at sea, they asked for Lysander, who had already been an admiral, to lead the combined fleets. To please their allies and still act like they were following their old laws, the Spartans used a trick – they gave Lysander the power of admiral but called him ‘Vice Admiral’. This example shows that sometimes nations don’t follow their rules even when they think it’s necessary. Wise politicians know that if they put restrictions on their government that can’t be kept, it will damage the respect people have for the law and create a precedent for situations where breaches would be much less needed.

It was hardly to have been expected that during a popular revolution, the minds of men would stop at the proper balance between government power and protecting private rights. Our failure here is the source of many of our problems, and if we are not careful, we may keep trying different things without ever making real improvements.

The idea of limiting the government’s power to provide for national defense comes from a desire for freedom that is more excited than actually enlightened. In fact, only two states in this country have implemented it, and the rest have rejected it. They understand that trust must be placed somewhere by the very act of delegating power, and it is better to risk that trust being abused than to make it difficult for the government to protect the public. Those who are against the new Constitution are going against the general decision of the country. And, instead of learning from past mistakes, they want to make new and more dangerous ones. They want us to relax restrictions in ways that have been previously been condemned. Without trying to insult them personally, it is true that if their principles became popular, they would not fit the people of this country for any type of government at all. This danger will not happen. The people of America are too smart to be tricked into anarchy. And it is clear that a stronger government is necessary for the good of the community.

It is worth mentioning where the idea of not having military during peace time comes from. In speculative minds, it may arise from thinking about the nature and tendencies of militaries in past ages. But as a popular idea, the thoughts come from our ancestors.

In England, for a long time after the Norman conquest, the king had almost unlimited power. Slowly, the power of the king was reduced in favor of more freedom, first by the nobles and then by the people. But it was not until 1688, when the prince of Orange became king of Great Britain, that English freedom was complete. As part of the king’s power to make war, Charles II had 5,000 regular troops during peace time, and James II increased that number to 30,000, paid for by the government. To stop this dangerous power, it became part of the bill of rights that was created after the revolution that it is illegal to have a standing army during peace time without the permission of parliament.

In that kingdom, when liberty was at its best, no security was thought needed against the danger of standing armies beyond that they could not be raised or kept by the executive branch. The people who made the revolution were sensible and well-informed enough not to limit the discretion of the legislative branch. They knew that a certain number of troops were necessary for protection, that there was no way to know exactly how many would be needed, and that the power to combat any possible threat must exist in government. By leaving the power in the hands of the legislative branch, they proceeded with the most caution towards protecting the freedoms of the people while still maintaining the public security.

From the same ancestors, Americans may have inherited the belief that standing armies endanger liberty in times of peace. This belief was made stronger during the revolution, and the two states attempting to limit the power of the legislative branch in regards to military establishments exemplify this. The principles that had taught us to be wary of an overstepping monarch were extended to the representatives of the people. Some states even had unnecessary laws that stated that standing armies should not be kept up during peace times without the consent of the legislature. This is unnecessary because the power to raise armies is already with the legislatures and it is pointless to declare that something should not be done without the consent of a body that already has the only power to do it. This is why some state constitutions, like that of New York, do not mention this at all.

It is interesting that even in the two states that attempted to forbid military establishments during peace time, the language used is more of a warning than a prohibition. It is not stated that standing armies shall not be kept, but that they ought not to be kept during peace time. This unclear language seems to be the result of a struggle between a desire to completely ban such establishments and the belief that it would be unwise and unsafe to do so.

Is it possible to believe that such a provision, if the situation of the country requires it, would be seen by the legislature as a mere suggestion and would be ignored if the state needs it? The example of Pennsylvania already mentioned should be enough to answer that question. So, what is the point of having such a provision if it will not be followed when it is convenient not to?

Let’s consider if there is any comparison in terms of effectiveness between the provision mentioned earlier and the one in the new Constitution that limits appropriations for military purposes to two years. The former, by trying to do too much, will likely accomplish nothing, while the latter, by avoiding going too far and being able to adapt to the needs of the nation, will have a positive and strong effect.

The new Constitution’s provision that limits appropriations for military purposes will force the legislature of the United States to consider every two years whether or not to keep a military force. They will have to make a new decision and formally vote on it in front of the citizens. They will not even have the power to give the executive branch permanent funds for a military even if they were so incautious enough to do so. Since political bodies are often affected by political parties, there will likely be some members of the national legislature who will criticize the majority’s actions and decisions. The funding for a military force will always be a topic for debate. Whenever the question comes up, the public will pay attention and if the majority wants to go beyond what is allowed, the community will be warned and will have the opportunity to take action. Additionally, the state legislatures, who will always be careful and suspicious guardians of the rights of citizens against encroachments from the federal government, will be paying attention to the actions of the national leaders and will be ready not only to give voice to the people’s discontent but, if necessary, to act as its arm.

Plans to destroy the freedom of a great community take time to execute. A large army that threatens those liberties could only be formed through gradual increases, which would require not just a temporary agreement between the legislative and executive branches, but a continued conspiracy over a long period of time. Is it likely that such an agreement would exist at all? Is it likely that it would continue and be passed on through the changes in representatives that happen every two years with elections? Is it likely that every person, as soon as they become a member of the national senate or house of representatives, would become a traitor to their constituents and their country? Is it possible that no one would be smart enough to notice such a terrible conspiracy or brave enough to inform their constituents of the danger? If these ideas can be considered likely, then all delegated authority should come to an end and the people should take back all the power they have given away and divide themselves into as many states as there are counties, so they can manage their own affairs personally.

Even if such plans could be reasonably made, it would still be impossible to keep such a plan hidden. The very act of greatly increasing the army during a time of peace would reveal the plan. What reason could be given, in a country at peace, for such large increases in the military? The people would not be deceived for long, and once discovered, the plan and the planners would be destroyed quickly.

It has been argued that the provision that limits appropriations for military purposes to two years will not be effective because the executive branch, once in possession of a large enough force to make the people submit, would find the resources within that force to support itself without the legislature’s funding. But the question arises again, on what grounds could the executive branch be given such a large force during a time of peace? If the force was created to put down a rebellion or resist a foreign invasion, then it is not within the scope of the objection, which is against the power of keeping troops during peace time. Few people would argue that military forces should not be raised to put down a rebellion or resist an invasion, and if it becomes necessary to have an army that could threaten the liberty of the community in order to defend it, this is one of those unfortunate situations that cannot be prevented by any government or form of government. It could even happen as a result of a simple alliance, if it were ever necessary for confederates or allies to form an army for common defense.

However, this is an evil that is much less likely to happen in a united state than in a disunited state, in fact it is unlikely to happen even in that latter situation. It is difficult to imagine a situation where dangers so severe would threaten the entire union, that a force large enough to threaten our liberties would be required. Especially when considering the help that can be gotten from the militia, which should always be counted on as a valuable and powerful help. But in a state of disunion, as has been shown elsewhere, the opposite of this assumption would become not only probable but almost unavoidable.

It has been suggested in different ways that the proposed constitution cannot be enforced without the help of a military force. However, like most other objections, this is based on assertion but not reason. From what I can understand, the objection seems to come from the assumption that the people will not be willing to accept federal authority for their internal matters. Let’s ignore the lack of clarity of the distinction between internal and external matters, and instead consider whether there is any reason to make this assumption. Unless we also presume that the general government will be worse administered than the state governments, there does not seem to be room to presume such opposition. It can generally be said that people’s confidence and obedience to a government will be proportionate to the good or bad administration of that government. There are exceptions to this rule, but they are based on accidents that do not relate to the inherent pros or cons of a constitution. These can only be judged by general principles and maxims.

There are many reasons why people think that the national government will work better than state governments. Some of these reasons include: the broader choice of representatives, a national senate made up of wise and carefully chosen people, better knowledge and understanding in the national government, and less chance for faction as it is more out of the reach of the tempers of smaller society. We will look at more reasons later, but for now, we can say that until someone can show that the national government will be bad, we shouldn’t think that the laws made by the national government will have more trouble being followed than the laws made by state governments.

Being discouraged from crime is proportionate to the expected punishment. Won’t the federal government, with the resources of all the states, be more likely to deter sedition (and to encourage obedience) than a single state could? A disruptive faction may think itself capable of standing up to a state, but could hardly think the same against the federal government. If so, then there is less danger to the federal government than to its constituent states.

The more the national government is involved in the everyday things people do, the more likely it is that people will respect and like it. People get used to things that they see and experience often. A government that is not seen or experienced often will not be important to people. This means that if the national government is involved in more things that are important to people, it will be more respected and liked. And when the government is more respected and liked, it will have to use force less often to make people obey. When the government is involved in things that are important to people, it will be more likely to be obeyed without having to use force.

It is clear that the government being proposed has a better chance of avoiding the use of force than the type of league that most opponents want. The league that opponents want would only be able to make the states obey by using force. It has been shown that in this kind of league, states often do not follow the laws and that the only way to fix this is by using war and violence.

The plan proposed by the convention would allow the national government to use the regular local officials to enforce its laws. This will make it hard for people to tell where the laws are coming from and will give the national government the same power as state governments to make people obey its laws. Also, laws made by the national government will be the supreme law of the land, and all officials in each state will have to promise to follow them. This means that the state officials will help the national government make sure its laws are followed. If the national government is run well, it is likely that its laws will be followed without any problems. Even if someone thinks the national government might not be run well, it’s hard to see how the government officials would benefit from not making the laws be followed.

There may be times when the national government will have to use force. These lessons have been learned by our own experiences and by examples from other countries: emergencies exist in all societies, rebellions and uprisings are inevitable, and that governing by the simple force of law is not realistic—it is but a dream of some political experts who don’t listen to what has been learned from experience.

If there are emergencies under the national government, force is the only answer. The amount of force should proportionately match the severity of the problem. If the problem is small and in one area of a state, the local militia would be enough to handle it, and we would presume they would be ready to do that duty. A small insurrection can be dangerous for the wider scope of government, not just the local one it targets, so it would be in the best interest of the public and the rights of the union for the citizens to oppose the insurgents. If the national government is shown to be good for the people, it is unlikely that they would not support it during such emergencies.

If a large part of a state or the entire state has an uprising, a different kind of force may have to be used. Massachusetts and Pennsylvania had to use troops to stop internal disorder. Suppose New York wanted to take back control of Vermont, could they do it with just the militia? Wouldn’t they need a more formal force? If states need a different kind of force in extreme cases, why should it be an issue with the national government? People who say they care about the union, but object to the proposed constitution, should not raise an objection that applies ten times more to the plan they want. Why would you favor the chaos and revolutions, common in smaller republics, over the risks that may be associated with a more centralized, larger government?

We can look at this another way: what if, instead of one single system, two, three, or even four different unions were formed? Wouldn’t the challenges be the same as for one government for all states? If the federal government needed to use force beyond the militia to maintain its authority, wouldn’t smaller confederacies have to do the same? Whether we have one government for all states, different governments for some of them, or as many disconnected governments as there are states, there could be a need to use a force other than the militia to keep the peace and uphold the law against rebellious violent acts.

No matter what other people may think, the best way to prevent military forces from forming during peacetime is to put the power of the government into the hands of the people’s representatives. This is the only way to guarantee that the people’s rights and freedoms will be respected in a civil society.

If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then no other way to protect themselves except by exercising their original right to self-defense, which supersedes government. This right can be more effectively exercises against a national government than against rulers of an individual state. In a single state, if the rulers become tyrannical, the people are disadvantaged by the lack of localized governance, making coordinated resistance difficult. Citizens would find themselves without tools but their courage and despair. Because the usurping rulers would still be operating under the guise of legal authority, they could quash opposition before it gains momentum. The smaller the area, the easier it is to obtain and organize intelligence and suppress resistance. Only lucky circumstances would help save the popular resistance.

Larger states present greater obstacles to potential usurpers. The natural strength of the people, in proportion to the artificial strength of the government, is greater than in small states and more able to resist. In a confederacy, the people are the masters of their own fate. Power checks power, the state and federal governments would check each other. Citizens have the option to leverage one against the other as a means of redress if their rights are violated. How wise it would be to cherish the union for this prized power!

It ought be assumed that the state governments will protect the public from any kind of oppression by the national government. People in charge of making decisions are usually more aware of potential danger of usurpation than the general public. Plus, the legislature has the resources to oppose any threat to freedom, and they can then easily connect with other states and unite to defend their rights.

The size of the country also provides security. We have already seen this during enemy attacks. The same would be true if someone tried to control the national government. If the federal army is able to control one state, the distant other states will still be able to fight back. The attackers will have to abandon their gains to move on to the next state and the first one will be able to fight back again.

We should remember also that the number of people in the country also affects the military force. For a long time, it will not be possible to maintain a large army. Furthermore, the means of growing a larger army—namely population growth—also increases the natural strength of the populace. It is impossible to think that the federal government will ever be able to build an army strong enough to take over the whole population, who by having state governments, are able to take organized self-defense measures with the regularity of an independent nation.