It has been observed that the national government ought to have the power to provide for the support of the military, which includes the cost of recruiting soldiers, building and equipping ships, and all other expenses related to military operations. But these are not the only things the government should have the power to tax for. It should also include funding for the government officials, paying off national debt, and any other expenses that need to be paid out of the national treasury. The government must have the power to collect taxes in some form.
OriginalIT HAS been already observed that the federal government ought to possess the power of providing for the support of the national forces; in which proposition was intended to be included the expense of raising troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all other expenses in any wise connected with military arrangements and operations. But these are not the only objects to which the jurisdiction of the Union, in respect to revenue, must necessarily be empowered to extend. It must embrace a provision for the support of the national civil list; for the payment of the national debts contracted, or that may be contracted; and, in general, for all those matters which will call for disbursements out of the national treasury. The conclusion is, that there must be interwoven, in the frame of the government, a general power of taxation, in one shape or another.
It is necessary for a government to have the power to secure a steady and adequate amount of money, as much as the community will permit, in order to function properly. If the government does not have this power, it will have to either rely on stealing from the people, or the government will weaken and eventually fail.
OriginalMoney is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body politic; as that which sustains its life and motion, and enables it to perform its most essential functions. A complete power, therefore, to procure a regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources of the community will permit, may be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in every constitution. From a deficiency in this particular, one of two evils must ensue; either the people must be subjected to continual plunder, as a substitute for a more eligible mode of supplying the public wants, or the government must sink into a fatal atrophy, and, in a short course of time, perish.
In the Ottoman Empire, the ruler has complete control over his subjects but cannot impose new taxes. As a result, governors with that power exploit the people, and the ruler takes money from them to meet his own needs and those of the state. In America, from a similar cause, the national government is dwindling into failure because it cannot raise enough money. It is clear that the people of both countries would benefit if the government had the power to raise enough money to meet the needs of the public.
OriginalIn the Ottoman or Turkish empire, the sovereign, though in other respects absolute master of the lives and fortunes of his subjects, has no right to impose a new tax. The consequence is that he permits the bashaws or governors of provinces to pillage the people without mercy; and, in turn, squeezes out of them the sums of which he stands in need, to satisfy his own exigencies and those of the state. In America, from a like cause, the government of the Union has gradually dwindled into a state of decay, approaching nearly to annihilation. Who can doubt, that the happiness of the people in both countries would be promoted by competent authorities in the proper hands, to provide the revenues which the necessities of the public might require?
The current Articles of Confederation aimed to give Congress the power to provide for the financial needs of the country. However, it has been implemented ineffectively. Under the Articles, Congress has the authority to determine financial needs and requests money from the states. While the states are obligated to fulfill these requests, in practice this obligation is often ignored. It will continue this way as long as the national revenues are dependent. on the states as intermediaries. This system has reduced us to this failed situation, to our own mortification and the happiness of our enemies.
OriginalThe present Confederation, feeble as it is intended to repose in the United States, an unlimited power of providing for the pecuniary wants of the Union. But proceeding upon an erroneous principle, it has been done in such a manner as entirely to have frustrated the intention. Congress, by the articles which compose that compact (as has already been stated), are authorized to ascertain and call for any sums of money necessary, in their judgment, to the service of the United States; and their requisitions, if conformable to the rule of apportionment, are in every constitutional sense obligatory upon the States. These have no right to question the propriety of the demand; no discretion beyond that of devising the ways and means of furnishing the sums demanded. But though this be strictly and truly the case; though the assumption of such a right would be an infringement of the articles of Union; though it may seldom or never have been avowedly claimed, yet in practice it has been constantly exercised, and would continue to be so, as long as the revenues of the Confederacy should remain dependent on the intermediate agency of its members. What the consequences of this system have been, is within the knowledge of every man the least conversant in our public affairs, and has been amply unfolded in different parts of these inquiries. It is this which has chiefly contributed to reduce us to a situation, which affords ample cause both of mortification to ourselves, and of triumph to our enemies.
The way to fix the current financial situation is to change the system that caused it. The only solution is to allow the national government to collect its own money through regular taxes, like in other properly run governments. No clever ideas can come up with another way to fix the problems caused by not having enough money in the public treasury.
OriginalWhat remedy can there be for this situation, but in a change of the system which has produced it in a change of the fallacious and delusive system of quotas and requisitions? What substitute can there be imagined for this ignis fatuus in finance, but that of permitting the national government to raise its own revenues by the ordinary methods of taxation authorized in every well-ordered constitution of civil government? Ingenious men may declaim with plausibility on any subject; but no human ingenuity can point out any other expedient to rescue us from the inconveniences and embarrassments naturally resulting from defective supplies of the public treasury.
The smarter adversaries of the constitution admit that this reasoning is strong, but qualify this by noting a difference between internal and external taxation. The former they would leave to the state governments, the latter duties and tariffs they would cede to a federal government. This distinction, however, would violate the principle that power ought to be proportionate to its end—these external duties would not be enough and still leave the federal government dependent on state governments. Any man familiar with public credit can realize that even the grandest scale of external taxation power would not be enough even for current needs. The future demand may be even greater. Throughout history, the needs of a nation are usually at least equal to its resources.
OriginalThe more intelligent adversaries of the new Constitution admit the force of this reasoning; but they qualify their admission by a distinction between what they call INTERNAL and EXTERNAL taxation. The former they would reserve to the State governments; the latter, which they explain into commercial imposts, or rather duties on imported articles, they declare themselves willing to concede to the federal head. This distinction, however, would violate the maxim of good sense and sound policy, which dictates that every POWER ought to be in proportion to its OBJECT; and would still leave the general government in a kind of tutelage to the State governments, inconsistent with every idea of vigor or efficiency. Who can pretend that commercial imposts are, or would be, alone equal to the present and future exigencies of the Union? Taking into the account the existing debt, foreign and domestic, upon any plan of extinguishment which a man moderately impressed with the importance of public justice and public credit could approve, in addition to the establishments which all parties will acknowledge to be necessary, we could not reasonably flatter ourselves, that this resource alone, upon the most improved scale, would even suffice for its present necessities. Its future necessities admit not of calculation or limitation; and upon the principle, more than once adverted to, the power of making provision for them as they arise ought to be equally unconfined. I believe it may be regarded as a position warranted by the history of mankind, that, IN THE USUAL PROGRESS OF THINGS, THE NECESSITIES OF A NATION, IN EVERY STAGE OF ITS EXISTENCE, WILL BE FOUND AT LEAST EQUAL TO ITS RESOURCES.
To admit that debts may be provided for by state-based requisitions, is on the one hand to admit that this system cannot be depended upon, and on the other to depend upon it. Those who have studied this system know that it will weaken the country and cause fights between parts of the government and between the states. It’s not likely that this system will work better than it has in the past. It should be remembered that if less is required of the states, they will collect proportionately less reserves to answer the demand when requested. If one were to believe the dissenters, they would be led to conclude that there is some fixed point in the economy where all the needs of society of society will be filled and any further spending is unnecessary. How would a government, half-funded, fulfill its purposes? The government will lack energy and stability, and it will be hard for people to have confidence in it.
OriginalTo say that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions upon the States, is on the one hand to acknowledge that this system cannot be depended upon, and on the other hand to depend upon it for every thing beyond a certain limit. Those who have carefully attended to its vices and deformities as they have been exhibited by experience or delineated in the course of these papers, must feel invincible repugnancy to trusting the national interests in any degree to its operation. Its inevitable tendency, whenever it is brought into activity, must be to enfeeble the Union, and sow the seeds of discord and contention between the federal head and its members, and between the members themselves. Can it be expected that the deficiencies would be better supplied in this mode than the total wants of the Union have heretofore been supplied in the same mode? It ought to be recollected that if less will be required from the States, they will have proportionably less means to answer the demand. If the opinions of those who contend for the distinction which has been mentioned were to be received as evidence of truth, one would be led to conclude that there was some known point in the economy of national affairs at which it would be safe to stop and to say: Thus far the ends of public happiness will be promoted by supplying the wants of government, and all beyond this is unworthy of our care or anxiety. How is it possible that a government half supplied and always necessitous, can fulfill the purposes of its institution, can provide for the security, advance the prosperity, or support the reputation of the commonwealth? How can it ever possess either energy or stability, dignity or credit, confidence at home or respectability abroad? How can its administration be any thing else than a succession of expedients temporizing, impotent, disgraceful? How will it be able to avoid a frequent sacrifice of its engagements to immediate necessity? How can it undertake or execute any liberal or enlarged plans of public good?
Let’s imagine what would happen under the system in the very first war we enter as a nation. We will assume, for argument’s sake, that the revenue arising from import duties is enough to meet the public debt. Then, war breaks out. What would a government do in such an emergency? Understanding that it cannot depend on requesting money from the states and unable to get new resources, wouldn’t it divert funds appropriated for national debt instead to national defense? Its not easy to see how this could be avoided, and if undertaken, it is evident that it would destroy public credit at the very moment that credit became essential to public safety. In modern war, even rich countries need to borrow money. A country so poor as ours would feel this need even more. Few, however, would lend money to a government with no reliable way to pay its debts. The loans it might receive would be limited and burdensome.
OriginalLet us attend to what would be the effects of this situation in the very first war in which we should happen to be engaged. We will presume, for argument's sake, that the revenue arising from the impost duties answers the purposes of a provision for the public debt and of a peace establishment for the Union. Thus circumstanced, a war breaks out. What would be the probable conduct of the government in such an emergency? Taught by experience that proper dependence could not be placed on the success of requisitions, unable by its own authority to lay hold of fresh resources, and urged by considerations of national danger, would it not be driven to the expedient of diverting the funds already appropriated from their proper objects to the defense of the State? It is not easy to see how a step of this kind could be avoided; and if it should be taken, it is evident that it would prove the destruction of public credit at the very moment that it was becoming essential to the public safety. To imagine that at such a crisis credit might be dispensed with, would be the extreme of infatuation. In the modern system of war, nations the most wealthy are obliged to have recourse to large loans. A country so little opulent as ours must feel this necessity in a much stronger degree. But who would lend to a government that prefaced its overtures for borrowing by an act which demonstrated that no reliance could be placed on the steadiness of its measures for paying? The loans it might be able to procure would be as limited in their extent as burdensome in their conditions. They would be made upon the same principles that usurers commonly lend to bankrupt and fraudulent debtors, with a sparing hand and at enormous premiums.
It may seem that even if the national government had the power to tax, there would still not be enough money to fund the government during a war. However, there are two reasons not to worry about this. The first is that with the national government able to tax, all the resources of the country will be used to support the union. The second is that any money the government needs that it does not have can more easily be borrowed.
OriginalIt may perhaps be imagined that, from the scantiness of the resources of the country, the necessity of diverting the established funds in the case supposed would exist, though the national government should possess an unrestrained power of taxation. But two considerations will serve to quiet all apprehension on this head: one is, that we are sure the resources of the community, in their full extent, will be brought into activity for the benefit of the Union; the other is, that whatever deficiences there may be, can without difficulty be supplied by loans.
The power of taxation would enable the national government to borrow to meet its needs. Foreigners, as well as citizens, could then feel confident it could meet its debts. To depend upon a government that itself must depend on thirteen other governments to meet its contracts, however, would require some naiveté, which is rarely had in financial transactions.
OriginalThe power of creating new funds upon new objects of taxation, by its own authority, would enable the national government to borrow as far as its necessities might require. Foreigners, as well as the citizens of America, could then reasonably repose confidence in its engagements; but to depend upon a government that must itself depend upon thirteen other governments for the means of fulfilling its contracts, when once its situation is clearly understood, would require a degree of credulity not often to be met with in the pecuniary transactions of mankind, and little reconcilable with the usual sharp-sightedness of avarice.
Those who think that everything will always be perfect in America may not see the importance of this, but for those who understand that there will be challenges, it is important to be prepared.
OriginalReflections of this kind may have trifling weight with men who hope to see realized in America the halcyon scenes of the poetic or fabulous age; but to those who believe we are likely to experience a common portion of the vicissitudes and calamities which have fallen to the lot of other nations, they must appear entitled to serious attention. Such men must behold the actual situation of their country with painful solicitude, and deprecate the evils which ambition or revenge might, with too much facility, inflict upon it. PUBLIUS
Federalist 31
In any kind of discussion, there are basic truths or first principles on which all other ideas depend. These truths have an internal logic that commands the mind’s agreement. If they do not produce this effect, it may be due to a problem with the senses, or the influence of strong emotions, interests, or prejudices. Some examples of these axioms in geometry are that the whole is greater than its part, equal things are equal to each other, two straight lines cannot enclose a space, and all right angles are equal to each other. Similarly, in ethics and politics, some first principles are that there cannot be an effect without a cause, the means should be proportionate to the end, every power should be appropriate for its purpose, and that there should be no limit on a power that is meant to achieve a purpose that is itself limitless. There are other truths, which if not true first principles, are so logical, obvious and in line with common sense that they demand agreement from a clear and unbiased mind.
OriginalIN DISQUISITIONS of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend. These contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection or combination, commands the assent of the mind. Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed either from some defect or disorder in the organs of perception, or from the influence of some strong interest, or passion, or prejudice. Of this nature are the maxims in geometry, that "the whole is greater than its part; things equal to the same are equal to one another; two straight lines cannot enclose a space; and all right angles are equal to each other." Of the same nature are these other maxims in ethics and politics, that there cannot be an effect without a cause; that the means ought to be proportioned to the end; that every power ought to be commensurate with its object; that there ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose which is itself incapable of limitation. And there are other truths in the two latter sciences which, if they cannot pretend to rank in the class of axioms, are yet such direct inferences from them, and so obvious in themselves, and so agreeable to the natural and unsophisticated dictates of common-sense, that they challenge the assent of a sound and unbiased mind, with a degree of force and conviction almost equally irresistible.
The ideas and concepts studied in geometry are so disconnected from emotion that it is easy for people to accept not only the simpler principles of the subject, but also the more complex and ideas that don’t cohere with our intuition. For example, the idea that finite matter can be divided infinitely, even down to the smallest particle, is accepted by mathematicians, though this is just as counterintuitive as many religious mysteries which often come under heavy scrutiny.
OriginalThe objects of geometrical inquiry are so entirely abstracted from those pursuits which stir up and put in motion the unruly passions of the human heart, that mankind, without difficulty, adopt not only the more simple theorems of the science, but even those abstruse paradoxes which, however they may appear susceptible of demonstration, are at variance with the natural conceptions which the mind, without the aid of philosophy, would be led to entertain upon the subject. The INFINITE DIVISIBILITY of matter, or, in other words, the INFINITE divisibility of a FINITE thing, extending even to the minutest atom, is a point agreed among geometricians, though not less incomprehensible to common-sense than any of those mysteries in religion, against which the batteries of infidelity have been so industriously leveled.
Morality and politics are far less agreeable. To a point, this is good. Caution is necessary to prevent against moral error. But this disagreeability may be carried too far, and may degenerate to stubborn unreasonableness. Though we cannot pretend to have the same level of certainty in morality and politics as in mathematics, some men can still have better or worse claims. The confusion is more frequently in the emotions of the reasoner than in the subject. Men too often yield to their biases and entangle themselves in words.
OriginalBut in the sciences of morals and politics, men are found far less tractable. To a certain degree, it is right and useful that this should be the case. Caution and investigation are a necessary armor against error and imposition. But this untractableness may be carried too far, and may degenerate into obstinacy, perverseness, or disingenuity. Though it cannot be pretended that the principles of moral and political knowledge have, in general, the same degree of certainty with those of the mathematics, yet they have much better claims in this respect than, to judge from the conduct of men in particular situations, we should be disposed to allow them. The obscurity is much oftener in the passions and prejudices of the reasoner than in the subject. Men, upon too many occasions, do not give their own understandings fair play; but, yielding to some untoward bias, they entangle themselves in words and confound themselves in subtleties.
How else—assuming objectors to the constitution are sincere—that such an obvious need for the general power of taxation should encounter challenges? Though these positions have been stated elsewhere, we may discuss them here again. They are as follows:
OriginalHow else could it happen (if we admit the objectors to be sincere in their opposition), that positions so clear as those which manifest the necessity of a general power of taxation in the government of the Union, should have to encounter any adversaries among men of discernment? Though these positions have been elsewhere fully stated, they will perhaps not be improperly recapitulated in this place, as introductory to an examination of what may have been offered by way of objection to them. They are in substance as follows:
A government should have every power needed to fulfill its responsibilities and execute the tasks entrusted to it. The only constraints on this power should be the public good and the collective will of the people.
OriginalA government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, and to the complete execution of the trusts for which it is responsible, free from every other control but a regard to the public good and to the sense of the people.
Because national defense and securing the peace from foreign or domestic violence is existential, the government’s power to provide for these duties should be limitless, but for the actual needs at hand and what resources are feasibly available.
OriginalAs the duties of superintending the national defense and of securing the public peace against foreign or domestic violence involve a provision for casualties and dangers to which no possible limits can be assigned, the power of making that provision ought to know no other bounds than the exigencies of the nation and the resources of the community.
As money is the essential means by which the country’s needs may be addressed, the power to generate revenue should be considered an inherent part of the government’s ability to respond to those needs.
OriginalAs revenue is the essential engine by which the means of answering the national exigencies must be procured, the power of procuring that article in its full extent must necessarily be comprehended in that of providing for those exigencies.
Theory and experience demonstrate that the power to generate revenue is ineffective when wielded over states collectively. Hence, the federal government must be granted the full and direct power to tax in the normal ways.
OriginalAs theory and practice conspire to prove that the power of procuring revenue is unavailing when exercised over the States in their collective capacities, the federal government must of necessity be invested with an unqualified power of taxation in the ordinary modes.
Some might agree that the national government ought to have the power to tax just based on these arguments. But those who oppose this idea in the proposed new constitution don’t agree and continue to fight against it. To better understand their point of view, let’s examine the arguments they use to argue against it.
OriginalDid not experience evince the contrary, it would be natural to conclude that the propriety of a general power of taxation in the national government might safely be permitted to rest on the evidence of these propositions, unassisted by any additional arguments or illustrations. But we find, in fact, that the antagonists of the proposed Constitution, so far from acquiescing in their justness or truth, seem to make their principal and most zealous effort against this part of the plan. It may therefore be satisfactory to analyze the arguments with which they combat it.
The counterargument against unrestricted federal power of taxation posits that such authority could eventually eclipse state-level taxing abilities, thereby undermining the state governments. Critics argue that states also have important roles and should have secure avenues for revenue. They assert that while the needs of the union are critical, they are not necessarily more important than the needs of individual states, both of which contribute to the well-being of the populace. The concern is that an unfettered federal taxation power would eventually drain states of the financial means necessary for their governance. This could make states wholly dependent on the goodwill or mercy of the federal government. The federal government, having the authority to override state laws, could even abolish state taxes on the grounds that they interfere with national objectives. Thus, by degrees, all the resources of taxation may become subject to federal taxation to the eventual exclusion and destruction of state governments.
OriginalThose of them which have been most labored with that view, seem in substance to amount to this: "It is not true, because the exigencies of the Union may not be susceptible of limitation, that its power of laying taxes ought to be unconfined. Revenue is as requisite to the purposes of the local administrations as to those of the Union; and the former are at least of equal importance with the latter to the happiness of the people. It is, therefore, as necessary that the State governments should be able to command the means of supplying their wants, as that the national government should possess the like faculty in respect to the wants of the Union. But an indefinite power of taxation in the LATTER might, and probably would in time, deprive the FORMER of the means of providing for their own necessities; and would subject them entirely to the mercy of the national legislature. As the laws of the Union are to become the supreme law of the land, as it is to have power to pass all laws that may be NECESSARY for carrying into execution the authorities with which it is proposed to vest it, the national government might at any time abolish the taxes imposed for State objects upon the pretense of an interference with its own. It might allege a necessity of doing this in order to give efficacy to the national revenues. And thus all the resources of taxation might by degrees become the subjects of federal monopoly, to the entire exclusion and destruction of the State governments."
This reasoning sometimes hinges on supposing that the federal government will usurp powers not granted to it, and at other times that it will operate only within its constitutionally defined powers. Only the latter can be fairly considered; assuming that the federal government will overstep its boundaries leads to speculative and unproductive debates. This kind of conjecture can generate an endless train of possible dangers, resulting in skepticism and indecision. Concerns about usurpation should focus on the structure and composition of the government, not the extent of its powers. The state governments are granted complete sovereignty by their original constitutions. If security against usurpation by the state exists because of the manner the state governments are formed and the dependence of their administrators on the people, then the same logic should be applied to the federal government.
OriginalThis mode of reasoning appears sometimes to turn upon the supposition of usurpation in the national government; at other times it seems to be designed only as a deduction from the constitutional operation of its intended powers. It is only in the latter light that it can be admitted to have any pretensions to fairness. The moment we launch into conjectures about the usurpations of the federal government, we get into an unfathomable abyss, and fairly put ourselves out of the reach of all reasoning. Imagination may range at pleasure till it gets bewildered amidst the labyrinths of an enchanted castle, and knows not on which side to turn to extricate itself from the perplexities into which it has so rashly adventured. Whatever may be the limits or modifications of the powers of the Union, it is easy to imagine an endless train of possible dangers; and by indulging an excess of jealousy and timidity, we may bring ourselves to a state of absolute scepticism and irresolution. I repeat here what I have observed in substance in another place, that all observations founded upon the danger of usurpation ought to be referred to the composition and structure of the government, not to the nature or extent of its powers. The State governments, by their original constitutions, are invested with complete sovereignty. In what does our security consist against usurpation from that quarter? Doubtless in the manner of their formation, and in a due dependence of those who are to administer them upon the people. If the proposed construction of the federal government be found, upon an impartial examination of it, to be such as to afford, to a proper extent, the same species of security, all apprehensions on the score of usurpation ought to be discarded.
Encroachments on power could come from both the federal government and the state governments. In a conflict over power, the side with more public support is likely to prevail. State governments, being closer to the people, would likely wield greater influence and hence be more apt to encroach upon the powers of the federal government than vice versa. But it’s hard to know for sure what will happen. It’s best to focus on the powers that are listed in the constitution. The people will ultimately be in charge and it’s hoped that they will make sure that the state and federal governments have equal power. With all this information, it should be easy to discard the objections to an indefinite power of taxation in the United States.
OriginalIt should not be forgotten that a disposition in the State governments to encroach upon the rights of the Union is quite as probable as a disposition in the Union to encroach upon the rights of the State governments. What side would be likely to prevail in such a conflict, must depend on the means which the contending parties could employ toward insuring success. As in republics strength is always on the side of the people, and as there are weighty reasons to induce a belief that the State governments will commonly possess most influence over them, the natural conclusion is that such contests will be most apt to end to the disadvantage of the Union; and that there is greater probability of encroachments by the members upon the federal head, than by the federal head upon the members. But it is evident that all conjectures of this kind must be extremely vague and fallible: and that it is by far the safest course to lay them altogether aside, and to confine our attention wholly to the nature and extent of the powers as they are delineated in the Constitution. Every thing beyond this must be left to the prudence and firmness of the people; who, as they will hold the scales in their own hands, it is to be hoped, will always take care to preserve the constitutional equilibrium between the general and the State governments. Upon this ground, which is evidently the true one, it will not be difficult to obviate the objections which have been made to an indefinite power of taxation in the United States. PUBLIUS
Federalist 32
I don’t think that there would be any real danger to the state governments if the national government had the power to control how much money they raise. I believe that the sense of the people, the risk of provoking state governments, and a need of local administrations for local purposes would prevent such an oppressive power. That said, I am willing to concede that individual states should possess an independent ability to tax for their own wants. In making this concession, I affirm that—besides tariffs—they would absolutely retain that authority under this proposed constitution. Any attempt of the national government to stop that would be considered a violent assumption of power.
OriginalALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the consequences which seem to be apprehended to the State governments from a power in the Union to control them in the levies of money, because I am persuaded that the sense of the people, the extreme hazard of provoking the resentments of the State governments, and a conviction of the utility and necessity of local administrations for local purposes, would be a complete barrier against the oppressive use of such a power; yet I am willing here to allow, in its full extent, the justness of the reasoning which requires that the individual States should possess an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues for the supply of their own wants. And making this concession, I affirm that (with the sole exception of duties on imports and exports) they would, under the plan of the convention, retain that authority in the most absolute and unqualified sense; and that an attempt on the part of the national government to abridge them in the exercise of it, would be a violent assumption of power, unwarranted by any article or clause of its Constitution.
Consolidating the states into one national power would imply a subordination of the parts to the general will. But that is not the plan, the plan is only a partial union—besides those powers exclusively delegated to the federal government, the state governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they already had. The reduction in state sovereignty would only exist in three cases (1) When the Constitution expressly grants exclusive authority to the union, for example, exclusive legislation over the district that will be set aside as the seat of government; (2) when the Constitution grants a power to the federal government while explicitly prohibit states from exercising that same power, for example, with tariffs; and (3) when the powers granted to the federal government would be contradictory if exercised by the states, for example, the rule of naturalizing citizens must be uniform between states, and thus cannot be given to individual states.
OriginalAn entire consolidation of the States into one complete national sovereignty would imply an entire subordination of the parts; and whatever powers might remain in them, would be altogether dependent on the general will. But as the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, EXCLUSIVELY delegated to the United States. This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty, would only exist in three cases: where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to the Union, and in another prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and where it granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally CONTRADICTORY and REPUGNANT. I use these terms to distinguish this last case from another which might appear to resemble it, but which would, in fact, be essentially different; I mean where the exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of occasional interferences in the POLICY of any branch of administration, but would not imply any direct contradiction or repugnancy in point of constitutional authority. These three cases of exclusive jurisdiction in the federal government may be exemplified by the following instances: The last clause but one in the eighth section of the first article provides expressly that Congress shall exercise "EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATION" over the district to be appropriated as the seat of government. This answers to the first case. The first clause of the same section empowers Congress "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises"; and the second clause of the tenth section of the same article declares that, "NO STATE SHALL, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except for the purpose of executing its inspection laws." Hence would result an exclusive power in the Union to lay duties on imports and exports, with the particular exception mentioned; but this power is abridged by another clause, which declares that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State; in consequence of which qualification, it now only extends to the DUTIES ON IMPORTS. This answers to the second case. The third will be found in that clause which declares that Congress shall have power "to establish an UNIFORM RULE of naturalization throughout the United States." This must necessarily be exclusive; because if each State had power to prescribe a DISTINCT RULE, there could not be a UNIFORM RULE.
The power to impose taxes on items—besides tariffs—is an authority that both the United States and individual states share. This is because there is no language in the Constitution that explicitly makes this power exclusive to the Union nor that denies the states this power. In fact, the restriction on taxing imports and exports, by omission of other limits, implies that the states do have the power to tax other things. This is called a “negative pregnant” by lawyers. Any other view is unnecessary, dangerous, and obviously could not have been the intention of this language.
OriginalA case which may perhaps be thought to resemble the latter, but which is in fact widely different, affects the question immediately under consideration. I mean the power of imposing taxes on all articles other than exports and imports. This, I contend, is manifestly a concurrent and coequal authority in the United States and in the individual States. There is plainly no expression in the granting clause which makes that power EXCLUSIVE in the Union. There is no independent clause or sentence which prohibits the States from exercising it. So far is this from being the case, that a plain and conclusive argument to the contrary is to be deduced from the restraint laid upon the States in relation to duties on imports and exports. This restriction implies an admission that, if it were not inserted, the States would possess the power it excludes; and it implies a further admission, that as to all other taxes, the authority of the States remains undiminished. In any other view it would be both unnecessary and dangerous; it would be unnecessary, because if the grant to the Union of the power of laying such duties implied the exclusion of the States, or even their subordination in this particular, there could be no need of such a restriction; it would be dangerous, because the introduction of it leads directly to the conclusion which has been mentioned, and which, if the reasoning of the objectors be just, could not have been intended; I mean that the States, in all cases to which the restriction did not apply, would have a concurrent power of taxation with the Union. The restriction in question amounts to what lawyers call a NEGATIVE PREGNANT that is, a NEGATION of one thing, and an AFFIRMANCE of another; a negation of the authority of the States to impose taxes on imports and exports, and an affirmance of their authority to impose them on all other articles. It would be mere sophistry to argue that it was meant to exclude them ABSOLUTELY from the imposition of taxes of the former kind, and to leave them at liberty to lay others SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL of the national legislature. The restraining or prohibitory clause only says, that they shall not, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF CONGRESS, lay such duties; and if we are to understand this in the sense last mentioned, the Constitution would then be made to introduce a formal provision for the sake of a very absurd conclusion; which is, that the States, WITH THE CONSENT of the national legislature, might tax imports and exports; and that they might tax every other article, UNLESS CONTROLLED by the same body. If this was the intention, why not leave it, in the first instance, to what is alleged to be the natural operation of the original clause, conferring a general power of taxation upon the Union? It is evident that this could not have been the intention, and that it will not bear a construction of the kind.
Both state and federal governments have the right to impose taxes. Even if both choose to tax the same item, this doesn’t mean one is constitutionally forbidden from doing so; it just might not be practical. Policy disagreements can happen, but they don’t make one level of government’s power to tax invalid. For that to happen, the Constitution would have to clearly state that only one has that authority, and in the case of taxation, it doesn’t. So, both the state and the federal government maintain their power to tax, even if they have to navigate some challenges to do so effectively.
OriginalAs to a supposition of repugnancy between the power of taxation in the States and in the Union, it cannot be supported in that sense which would be requisite to work an exclusion of the States. It is, indeed, possible that a tax might be laid on a particular article by a State which might render it INEXPEDIENT that thus a further tax should be laid on the same article by the Union; but it would not imply a constitutional inability to impose a further tax. The quantity of the imposition, the expediency or inexpediency of an increase on either side, would be mutually questions of prudence; but there would be involved no direct contradiction of power. The particular policy of the national and of the State systems of finance might now and then not exactly coincide, and might require reciprocal forbearances. It is not, however a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional repugnancy that can by implication alienate and extinguish a pre-existing right of sovereignty.
The Constitution intentionally leaves certain powers with the states, unless it explicitly transfers them to the federal government. This dual authority is a logical outcome of dividing power between state and federal levels. The Constitution makes it clear when it wants to restrict state powers by inserting clauses that explicitly deny states certain authorities. The tenth section of the first article is an example, where it specifically limits state powers. This phrasing supports the idea that states retain all powers not expressly given to the federal government, and denies any claim to the contrary.
OriginalThe necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases results from the division of the sovereign power; and the rule that all authorities, of which the States are not explicitly divested in favor of the Union, remain with them in full vigor, is not a theoretical consequence of that division, but is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument which contains the articles of the proposed Constitution. We there find that, notwithstanding the affirmative grants of general authorities, there has been the most pointed care in those cases where it was deemed improper that the like authorities should reside in the States, to insert negative clauses prohibiting the exercise of them by the States. The tenth section of the first article consists altogether of such provisions. This circumstance is a clear indication of the sense of the convention, and furnishes a rule of interpretation out of the body of the act, which justifies the position I have advanced and refutes every hypothesis to the contrary. PUBLIUS
Federalist 33
The remaining arguments against the taxation provisions in the U.S. Constitution hinge on two clauses. The first, from the eighth section of the first article, gives Congress the power to make all necessary and proper laws to execute its powers. The second, from the sixth article, establishes that the U.S. Constitution, federal laws, and treaties are the “supreme law of the land,” overriding any state laws to the contrary. These clauses are often cited to question the balance of taxation powers between the federal and state governments.
OriginalTHE residue of the argument against the provisions of the Constitution in respect to taxation is ingrafted upon the following clause. The last clause of the eighth section of the first article of the plan under consideration authorizes the national legislature "to make all laws which shall be NECESSARY and PROPER for carrying into execution THE POWERS by that Constitution vested in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof"; and the second clause of the sixth article declares, "that the Constitution and the laws of the United States made IN PURSUANCE THEREOF, and the treaties made by their authority shall be the SUPREME LAW of the land, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
The two clauses in question have faced severe criticism, painted as instruments to annihilate local governments and personal freedoms. Despite the intense outcry, these clauses essentially restate what is already implicitly true: creating a federal government with defined powers naturally gives it the authority to carry out those powers. The clauses merely clarify the government’s ability to enact laws to execute its roles and establish federal law as the highest law. The vehement opposition to these parts of the Constitution seems less justified when one considers that they simply make explicit what would have been implicitly true anyway. Thus, even if these clauses were removed, the function and operation of the federal government would remain essentially the same. The emotional intensity of the arguments against these clauses is hard to justify given their basic, declarative nature.
OriginalThese two clauses have been the source of much virulent invective and petulant declamation against the proposed Constitution. They have been held up to the people in all the exaggerated colors of misrepresentation as the pernicious engines by which their local governments were to be destroyed and their liberties exterminated; as the hideous monster whose devouring jaws would spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor profane; and yet, strange as it may appear, after all this clamor, to those who may not have happened to contemplate them in the same light, it may be affirmed with perfect confidence that the constitutional operation of the intended government would be precisely the same, if these clauses were entirely obliterated, as if they were repeated in every article. They are only declaratory of a truth which would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication from the very act of constituting a federal government, and vesting it with certain specified powers. This is so clear a proposition, that moderation itself can scarcely listen to the railings which have been so copiously vented against this part of the plan, without emotions that disturb its equanimity.
A power is essentially the capacity to perform a specific action. In the context of a legislative power, this means the ability to enact laws. Specifically, if we talk about the power of laying and collecting taxes, it falls under legislative power. This power allows the government to make laws that specify how taxes will be laid and collected. To execute this power effectively, it requires laws that are “necessary and proper,” serving as the means to fulfill this specific legislative function. In essence, the power to do something and the means to execute that power are interconnected, especially in a legislative context where laws both define and enable that power.
OriginalWhat is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing a thing? What is the ability to do a thing, but the power of employing the MEANS necessary to its execution? What is a LEGISLATIVE power, but a power of making LAWS? What are the MEANS to execute a LEGISLATIVE power but LAWS? What is the power of laying and collecting taxes, but a LEGISLATIVE POWER, or a power of MAKING LAWS, to lay and collect taxes? What are the proper means of executing such a power, but NECESSARY and PROPER laws?
The key point here is that the criticized provision in the constitution simply reaffirms an obvious truth: if the national legislature is granted the power to tax, it must also have the authority to pass all necessary and proper laws to effectively execute that power. In essence, the “sweeping clause” is not introducing any new, potentially dangerous authority; it is explicitly stating what should be implicitly understood—that to carry out the powers vested in it, the legislature can enact appropriate laws. While I have focused on the power of taxation, the same rationale applies to all other powers delineated in the constitution. The clause in question—often referred to derogatorily as the “sweeping clause”—is just an overarching statement allowing the national legislature to pass laws necessary for executing its vested powers. Any issues should not be with the clause itself, which may at worst be redundant, but rather with the specific powers that are granted, as those are what the clause acts upon. The provision is essentially harmless, serving more as a clarification than as a grant of unchecked power.
OriginalThis simple train of inquiry furnishes us at once with a test by which to judge of the true nature of the clause complained of. It conducts us to this palpable truth, that a power to lay and collect taxes must be a power to pass all laws NECESSARY and PROPER for the execution of that power; and what does the unfortunate and calumniated provision in question do more than declare the same truth, to wit, that the national legislature, to whom the power of laying and collecting taxes had been previously given, might, in the execution of that power, pass all laws NECESSARY and PROPER to carry it into effect? I have applied these observations thus particularly to the power of taxation, because it is the immediate subject under consideration, and because it is the most important of the authorities proposed to be conferred upon the Union. But the same process will lead to the same result, in relation to all other powers declared in the Constitution. And it is EXPRESSLY to execute these powers that the sweeping clause, as it has been affectedly called, authorizes the national legislature to pass all NECESSARY and PROPER laws. If there is any thing exceptionable, it must be sought for in the specific powers upon which this general declaration is predicated. The declaration itself, though it may be chargeable with tautology or redundancy, is at least perfectly harmless.
One may wonder why this clause was then introduced? The inclusion of this clause is likely an act of prudence, designed to head off any future attempts to limit or undermine the union’s granted authorities. The convention probably anticipated that one of the biggest threats to the national well-being would come from state governments attempting to weaken the federal structure. Given this, they might have seen it as essential to leave no room for ambiguity on such a crucial matter. The very outcry against this clause demonstrates its necessity. Therefore, the wisdom of including such a cautionary clause is confirmed by the controversy it has generated, which shows that there are indeed forces willing to challenge the authorities vested in the union.
OriginalBut SUSPICION may ask, Why then was it introduced? The answer is, that it could only have been done for greater caution, and to guard against all cavilling refinements in those who might hereafter feel a disposition to curtail and evade the legitimate authorities of the Union. The Convention probably foresaw, what it has been a principal aim of these papers to inculcate, that the danger which most threatens our political welfare is that the State governments will finally sap the foundations of the Union; and might therefore think it necessary, in so cardinal a point, to leave nothing to construction. Whatever may have been the inducement to it, the wisdom of the precaution is evident from the cry which has been raised against it; as that very cry betrays a disposition to question the great and essential truth which it is manifestly the object of that provision to declare.
It may be asked: who is to judge the necessity and appropriateness of laws for executing federal powers? The answer is twofold: First, this question is just as relevant whether the powers are explicitly granted or merely implied by a declaratory clause. Second, the initial judgment lies with the federal government itself, while the final say belongs to its constituents—the people. If the federal government oversteps its bounds and abuses its powers, it’s up to the people to refer to their agreed-upon standards and take corrective actions as deemed necessary and prudent. The legitimacy of any law is ultimately determined by the specific powers upon which it is based. For instance, if the federal government were to try to change a state’s inheritance laws, it would be clear that it had overstepped its jurisdiction. Similarly, if the federal government tried to nullify a state’s land tax, citing interference with federal taxation authority, it would clearly be encroaching on a jurisdiction that the Constitution assumes to be within the state’s purview. Any confusion or doubt regarding these jurisdictional limits is likely the result of deliberate attempts to muddy the waters by those opposed to the proposed constitutional framework. Their efforts aim to cloud straightforward truths, complicating what should be a clear understanding of the division of powers.
OriginalBut it may be again asked, Who is to judge of the NECESSITY and PROPRIETY of the laws to be passed for executing the powers of the Union? I answer, first, that this question arises as well and as fully upon the simple grant of those powers as upon the declaratory clause; and I answer, in the second place, that the national government, like every other, must judge, in the first instance, of the proper exercise of its powers, and its constituents in the last. If the federal government should overpass the just bounds of its authority and make a tyrannical use of its powers, the people, whose creature it is, must appeal to the standard they have formed, and take such measures to redress the injury done to the Constitution as the exigency may suggest and prudence justify. The propriety of a law, in a constitutional light, must always be determined by the nature of the powers upon which it is founded. Suppose, by some forced constructions of its authority (which, indeed, cannot easily be imagined), the Federal legislature should attempt to vary the law of descent in any State, would it not be evident that, in making such an attempt, it had exceeded its jurisdiction, and infringed upon that of the State? Suppose, again, that upon the pretense of an interference with its revenues, it should undertake to abrogate a landtax imposed by the authority of a State; would it not be equally evident that this was an invasion of that concurrent jurisdiction in respect to this species of tax, which its Constitution plainly supposes to exist in the State governments? If there ever should be a doubt on this head, the credit of it will be entirely due to those reasoners who, in the imprudent zeal of their animosity to the plan of the convention, have labored to envelop it in a cloud calculated to obscure the plainest and simplest truths.
The assertion that the laws of the union will be the “supreme law of the land” isn’t as controversial as some make it out to be. Laws, by their very nature, entail a form of supremacy; they establish rules that those under their jurisdiction are obliged to follow. This is a fundamental aspect of any political association. When individuals form a society, the laws of that society govern their conduct. The same principle applies when multiple political entities come together to form a larger political society, like a federal government. The laws enacted by this larger society, consistent with the powers granted to it by its constitution, must logically be supreme over its constituent parts. However, this doesn’t mean that any action taken by the federal government becomes supreme law. Only those laws that are enacted pursuant to its constitutional powers hold that status. Any actions that exceed those powers are not laws but usurpations, and they should be treated as such. The clause declaring the supremacy of federal laws is, therefore, a straightforward declaration of an inherent truth in a federal system. It’s worth noting that the clause explicitly limits this supremacy to laws made pursuant to the Constitution. This cautionary detail, though it would be understood even if not explicitly stated, underscores the framers’ intent to circumscribe federal power strictly within its constitutional boundaries.
OriginalBut it is said that the laws of the Union are to be the SUPREME LAW of the land. But what inference can be drawn from this, or what would they amount to, if they were not to be supreme? It is evident they would amount to nothing. A LAW, by the very meaning of the term, includes supremacy. It is a rule which those to whom it is prescribed are bound to observe. This results from every political association. If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number of political societies enter into a larger political society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers intrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those societies, and the individuals of whom they are composed. It would otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties, and not a government, which is only another word for POLITICAL POWER AND SUPREMACY. But it will not follow from this doctrine that acts of the large society which are NOT PURSUANT to its constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the smaller societies, will become the supreme law of the land. These will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such. Hence we perceive that the clause which declares the supremacy of the laws of the Union, like the one we have just before considered, only declares a truth, which flows immediately and necessarily from the institution of a federal government. It will not, I presume, have escaped observation, that it EXPRESSLY confines this supremacy to laws made PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION; which I mention merely as an instance of caution in the convention; since that limitation would have been to be understood, though it had not been expressed.
In a federal system under the proposed Constitution, a law enacted by the federal government to lay a tax would be supreme and couldn’t legally be obstructed by state laws. However, a federal law that negates or interferes with a state’s ability to collect its own tax—unless that tax is on imports or exports—would be an overreach, a usurpation of powers not granted by the Constitution. If both the federal and state governments levy taxes on the same object, and this dual taxation makes collection difficult or precarious, the issue would not stem from a lack of power on either side. Rather, it would result from imprudent use of power by either or both governments. Ideally, mutual interests should guide both levels of government to coordinate their actions to avoid such inconveniences. Individual states would still possess considerable taxing authority under the proposed Constitution. They would maintain the autonomy to raise revenue through all forms of taxation, except for duties on imports and exports. This shared authority in taxation is presented as a compromise, avoiding the complete subordination of state taxing powers to federal authority. The next paper will argue that this is the only feasible alternative, maintaining a balance of power in the federal system.
OriginalThough a law, therefore, laying a tax for the use of the United States would be supreme in its nature, and could not legally be opposed or controlled, yet a law for abrogating or preventing the collection of a tax laid by the authority of the State, (unless upon imports and exports), would not be the supreme law of the land, but a usurpation of power not granted by the Constitution. As far as an improper accumulation of taxes on the same object might tend to render the collection difficult or precarious, this would be a mutual inconvenience, not arising from a superiority or defect of power on either side, but from an injudicious exercise of power by one or the other, in a manner equally disadvantageous to both. It is to be hoped and presumed, however, that mutual interest would dictate a concert in this respect which would avoid any material inconvenience. The inference from the whole is, that the individual States would, under the proposed Constitution, retain an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise revenue to any extent of which they may stand in need, by every kind of taxation, except duties on imports and exports. It will be shown in the next paper that this CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the article of taxation was the only admissible substitute for an entire subordination, in respect to this branch of power, of the State authority to that of the Union. PUBLIUS
Federalist 34
I think it is clear from my last article that the states will have the same power as the nation when it comes to taxation, except for taxes on imports. Since this still leaves the greatest portion of the resources for the states, there can be no argument that they would not have the means to be self-sufficient and free from external control. The vastness of this fiscal field will become more evident as we later detail how little of the public expenses would actually fall under the responsibility of state governments.
OriginalI FLATTER myself it has been clearly shown in my last number that the particular States, under the proposed Constitution, would have COEQUAL authority with the Union in the article of revenue, except as to duties on imports. As this leaves open to the States far the greatest part of the resources of the community, there can be no color for the assertion that they would not possess means as abundant as could be desired for the supply of their own wants, independent of all external control. That the field is sufficiently wide will more fully appear when we come to advert to the inconsiderable share of the public expenses for which it will fall to the lot of the State governments to provide.
It is argued that it is impossible to have two authorities with the same power, but this is clearly wrong when there is counterfactual proof: in the Roman Republic, there were two separate legislatures for a long time with opposite interests, the Patrician, and the Plebeian. There may be many arguments that allowing each the power to annul or repeal the acts of the other is unwise, but it would be crazy to dismiss its existence. These two legislatures co-existed for ages as the Roman republic rose to greatness.
OriginalTo argue upon abstract principles that this co-ordinate authority cannot exist, is to set up supposition and theory against fact and reality. However proper such reasonings might be to show that a thing OUGHT NOT TO EXIST, they are wholly to be rejected when they are made use of to prove that it does not exist contrary to the evidence of the fact itself. It is well known that in the Roman republic the legislative authority, in the last resort, resided for ages in two different political bodies not as branches of the same legislature, but as distinct and independent legislatures, in each of which an opposite interest prevailed: in one the patrician; in the other, the plebian. Many arguments might have been adduced to prove the unfitness of two such seemingly contradictory authorities, each having power to ANNUL or REPEAL the acts of the other. But a man would have been regarded as frantic who should have attempted at Rome to disprove their existence. It will be readily understood that I allude to the COMITIA CENTURIATA and the COMITIA TRIBUTA. The former, in which the people voted by centuries, was so arranged as to give a superiority to the patrician interest; in the latter, in which numbers prevailed, the plebian interest had an entire predominancy. And yet these two legislatures coexisted for ages, and the Roman republic attained to the utmost height of human greatness.
In our constitution’s situation, there is no conflict like the one mentioned in the example. Neither side has the power to cancel out the other’s actions. In reality, it’s not likely to cause any problems because the needs of the states will probably narrow in a short amount of time, and the federal government will likely find it more convenient to stay away from the things the states would want to do.
OriginalIn the case particularly under consideration, there is no such contradiction as appears in the example cited; there is no power on either side to annul the acts of the other. And in practice there is little reason to apprehend any inconvenience; because, in a short course of time, the wants of the States will naturally reduce themselves within A VERY NARROW COMPASS; and in the interim, the United States will, in all probability, find it convenient to abstain wholly from those objects to which the particular States would be inclined to resort.
To make a more informed decision on this issue, we need to look at the difference between the objects that would need a federal provision for taxation, and the things that would need a state provision. We will see that the former are unlimited, and the latter are much more limited. We must keep in mind that we must consider not just the present, but also the future, and we cannot safely limit the government’s ability to provide for future needs as these needs will be unpredictable. Because the emergencies of the future can be limitless in end, it would be a mistake to limit the capacity to provide for those contingencies. While it might be possible to make a reasonable guess on how much money will be needed to cover current needs and to maintain current services, bounding them there would leave the government unable to protect the community against any future problems, such as war or civil unrest. One may also assert an ability to judge how much could be allocated to future dangers, but if we ask those people to show their numbers we will find those estimates vague and uncertain. We also cannot merely form such judgments against internal unrest, but as a commercial people we must support a navy, naval wars, and all sorts of contingencies that baffle arithmetic.
OriginalTo form a more precise judgment of the true merits of this question, it will be well to advert to the proportion between the objects that will require a federal provision in respect to revenue, and those which will require a State provision. We shall discover that the former are altogether unlimited, and that the latter are circumscribed within very moderate bounds. In pursuing this inquiry, we must bear in mind that we are not to confine our view to the present period, but to look forward to remote futurity. Constitutions of civil government are not to be framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies, but upon a combination of these with the probable exigencies of ages, according to the natural and tried course of human affairs. Nothing, therefore, can be more fallacious than to infer the extent of any power, proper to be lodged in the national government, from an estimate of its immediate necessities. There ought to be a CAPACITY to provide for future contingencies as they may happen; and as these are illimitable in their nature, it is impossible safely to limit that capacity. It is true, perhaps, that a computation might be made with sufficient accuracy to answer the purpose of the quantity of revenue requisite to discharge the subsisting engagements of the Union, and to maintain those establishments which, for some time to come, would suffice in time of peace. But would it be wise, or would it not rather be the extreme of folly, to stop at this point, and to leave the government intrusted with the care of the national defense in a state of absolute incapacity to provide for the protection of the community against future invasions of the public peace, by foreign war or domestic convulsions? If, on the contrary, we ought to exceed this point, where can we stop, short of an indefinite power of providing for emergencies as they may arise? Though it is easy to assert, in general terms, the possibility of forming a rational judgment of a due provision against probable dangers, yet we may safely challenge those who make the assertion to bring forward their data, and may affirm that they would be found as vague and uncertain as any that could be produced to establish the probable duration of the world. Observations confined to the mere prospects of internal attacks can deserve no weight; though even these will admit of no satisfactory calculation: but if we mean to be a commercial people, it must form a part of our policy to be able one day to defend that commerce. The support of a navy and of naval wars would involve contingencies that must baffle all the efforts of political arithmetic.
Admitting that we ought to try the novel and absurd experiment of tying the hands of government from offensive war, we certainly ought not to disable its defense from other nation’s aggression. Europe’s turmoil may come here, we are not out of reach. Even if their chaos subsides, what security can we have from other forces disturbing our peace? Remember, peace or war is not always out option; no matter how moderate or unambitious we may be, we cannot expect the same from other nations. Who would have thought that after the last war the tired France and Britain would already look so hostiley upon each other. To judge from the history of mankind, the destructive passions of war reign more powerfully in the human heart than mild sentiments of peace, and that to model our political system on speculations of the latter would be a weak proposition.
OriginalAdmitting that we ought to try the novel and absurd experiment in politics of tying up the hands of government from offensive war founded upon reasons of state, yet certainly we ought not to disable it from guarding the community against the ambition or enmity of other nations. A cloud has been for some time hanging over the European world. If it should break forth into a storm, who can insure us that in its progress a part of its fury would not be spent upon us? No reasonable man would hastily pronounce that we are entirely out of its reach. Or if the combustible materials that now seem to be collecting should be dissipated without coming to maturity, or if a flame should be kindled without extending to us, what security can we have that our tranquillity will long remain undisturbed from some other cause or from some other quarter? Let us recollect that peace or war will not always be left to our option; that however moderate or unambitious we may be, we cannot count upon the moderation, or hope to extinguish the ambition of others. Who could have imagined at the conclusion of the last war that France and Britain, wearied and exhausted as they both were, would so soon have looked with so hostile an aspect upon each other? To judge from the history of mankind, we shall be compelled to conclude that the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the human breast with much more powerful sway than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace; and that to model our political systems upon speculations of lasting tranquillity, is to calculate on the weaker springs of the human character.
What are the main costs for any government? Why do some European countries have so much debt? The answer is simple, war and rebellion. To protect a nation, there are certain institutions that must be supported, like the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, their related departments, and programs that help agriculture and manufacturing. These costs are small compared to those of defending the nation.
OriginalWhat are the chief sources of expense in every government? What has occasioned that enormous accumulation of debts with which several of the European nations are oppressed? The answers plainly is, wars and rebellions; the support of those institutions which are necessary to guard the body politic against these two most mortal diseases of society. The expenses arising from those institutions which are relative to the mere domestic police of a state, to the support of its legislative, executive, and judicial departments, with their different appendages, and to the encouragement of agriculture and manufactures (which will comprehend almost all the objects of state expenditure), are insignificant in comparison with those which relate to the national defense.
In Great Britain a small portion (1/15) of the income of the nation is used for monarchy-related expenses. The rest (14/15) is used to pay off debts from past wars, and to maintain fleets and armies. Some might argue that you can’t compare the costs of running a monarchy to the costs of running a republic. But it’s worth noting that a wealthy kingdom is likely to spend a lot more on its internal operations than a republic should. So, if you adjust for these differences, the overall proportion of spending might still be a good way to think about it.
OriginalIn the kingdom of Great Britain, where all the ostentatious apparatus of monarchy is to be provided for, not above a fifteenth part of the annual income of the nation is appropriated to the class of expenses last mentioned; the other fourteen fifteenths are absorbed in the payment of the interest of debts contracted for carrying on the wars in which that country has been engaged, and in the maintenance of fleets and armies. If, on the one hand, it should be observed that the expenses incurred in the prosecution of the ambitious enterprises and vainglorious pursuits of a monarchy are not a proper standard by which to judge of those which might be necessary in a republic, it ought, on the other hand, to be remarked that there should be as great a disproportion between the profusion and extravagance of a wealthy kingdom in its domestic administration, and the frugality and economy which in that particular become the modest simplicity of republican government. If we balance a proper deduction from one side against that which it is supposed ought to be made from the other, the proportion may still be considered as holding good.
We’ve racked up a big debt from just one war. If we consider that wars and conflicts are fairly common events between nations, it’s clear that federal spending will always be way higher than what states spend. It’s true that many individual states have a lot of debt too, mostly due to the recent war. But if we adopt the new system of government being proposed, those state debts will eventually be paid off. After that, states will only really need money to cover basic government functions. Even if we account for unexpected costs, the total amount each state would need ought to fall considerably short of two hundred thousand pounds.
OriginalBut let us advert to the large debt which we have ourselves contracted in a single war, and let us only calculate on a common share of the events which disturb the peace of nations, and we shall instantly perceive, without the aid of any elaborate illustration, that there must always be an immense disproportion between the objects of federal and state expenditures. It is true that several of the States, separately, are encumbered with considerable debts, which are an excrescence of the late war. But this cannot happen again, if the proposed system be adopted; and when these debts are discharged, the only call for revenue of any consequence, which the State governments will continue to experience, will be for the mere support of their respective civil list; to which, if we add all contingencies, the total amount in every State ought to fall considerably short of two hundred thousand pounds.
When creating a long-term government system, it’s best to plan for ongoing expenses rather than short-term ones, which would amount to state governments needing about two hundred thousand pounds annually for their routine operations. The financial needs of the entire country—the federal government—could be much higher and are difficult to even estimate. By the logic proposed, how could we argue that state governments ought to command the power to raise funds in excess of two hundred thousand pounds? Doing so would further take funds out of the hands of the union, providing for public welfare of the union, in order to put them in the hands of those state governments who have no just use for those excess funds.
OriginalIn framing a government for posterity as well as ourselves, we ought, in those provisions which are designed to be permanent, to calculate, not on temporary, but on permanent causes of expense. If this principle be a just one our attention would be directed to a provision in favor of the State governments for an annual sum of about two hundred thousand pounds; while the exigencies of the Union could be susceptible of no limits, even in imagination. In this view of the subject, by what logic can it be maintained that the local governments ought to command, in perpetuity, an EXCLUSIVE source of revenue for any sum beyond the extent of two hundred thousand pounds? To extend its power further, in EXCLUSION of the authority of the Union, would be to take the resources of the community out of those hands which stood in need of them for the public welfare, in order to put them into other hands which could have no just or proper occasion for them.
If the convention had tried to divide up revenue sources between the federal and state governments based on their respective needs, it would’ve been hard to find a source that was just right for both. Any source would either be too much or too little—either insufficient for current needs or excessive for future ones. If we were to separate revenue by type, like external and internal taxes, the states would end up with a disproportionate share of the money. Roughly speaking, states would get two-thirds of all possible revenue but would only need to cover a small fraction (from one-tenth to one-twentieth) of total expenses. Meanwhile, the federal government would only get one-third of the community’s resources, but would have to pay for the vast majority (from nine-tenths to nineteen-twentieths) of the expenses. Even if we were to leave property taxes exclusively to the states, there’d still be a mismatch between the money coming in and the needs to be met. The states would have one-third of the community’s resources to cover, at most, one-tenth of its expenses. No matter how you slice it, giving states a dedicated fund would not be adequate to pay off their existing debts. States would still have to rely on the federal government to help them meet their financial obligations.
OriginalSuppose, then, the convention had been inclined to proceed upon the principle of a repartition of the objects of revenue, between the Union and its members, in PROPORTION to their comparative necessities; what particular fund could have been selected for the use of the States, that would not either have been too much or too little too little for their present, too much for their future wants? As to the line of separation between external and internal taxes, this would leave to the States, at a rough computation, the command of two thirds of the resources of the community to defray from a tenth to a twentieth part of its expenses; and to the Union, one third of the resources of the community, to defray from nine tenths to nineteen twentieths of its expenses. If we desert this boundary and content ourselves with leaving to the States an exclusive power of taxing houses and lands, there would still be a great disproportion between the MEANS and the END; the possession of one third of the resources of the community to supply, at most, one tenth of its wants. If any fund could have been selected and appropriated, equal to and not greater than the object, it would have been inadequate to the discharge of the existing debts of the particular States, and would have left them dependent on the Union for a provision for this purpose.
The previous discussion supports the idea that both federal and state governments should have the ability to tax. This is better than making state taxing power completely subordinate to that of the federal government; any attempt to neatly divide revenue sources between the two levels of government would have ended up harming the interests of the country as a whole just to maintain state power. The convention decided that this shared power to tax was a better option than completely sidelining state authority. This arrangement allows the federal government to have a broad power to tax while also ensuring states can generate enough revenue to meet their own needs. There are few other ways to view the important subject of taxation that we will next consider.
OriginalThe preceding train of observation will justify the position which has been elsewhere laid down, that "A CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the article of taxation was the only admissible substitute for an entire subordination, in respect to this branch of power, of State authority to that of the Union." Any separation of the objects of revenue that could have been fallen upon, would have amounted to a sacrifice of the great INTERESTS of the Union to the POWER of the individual States. The convention thought the concurrent jurisdiction preferable to that subordination; and it is evident that it has at least the merit of reconciling an indefinite constitutional power of taxation in the Federal government with an adequate and independent power in the States to provide for their own necessities. There remain a few other lights, in which this important subject of taxation will claim a further consideration. PUBLIUS
Federalist 35
Before we examine other objections to an indefinite power of taxation in the union, I want to make one comment. If the government only had the power to collect taxes on certain objects, then it would create two problems: the first would be that certain industries would be unfairly oppressed, and the second that the taxes would be spread unevenly between different states and also between citizens of the same state.
OriginalBEFORE we proceed to examine any other objections to an indefinite power of taxation in the Union, I shall make one general remark; which is, that if the jurisdiction of the national government, in the article of revenue, should be restricted to particular objects, it would naturally occasion an undue proportion of the public burdens to fall upon those objects. Two evils would spring from this source: the oppression of particular branches of industry; and an unequal distribution of the taxes, as well among the several States as among the citizens of the same State.
Suppose that the federal power of taxation was confined to just import tariffs; the government, having no other way to raise funds, would often be tempted to push these duties to a harmful excess because they had no other way to raise funds. Some people doubt this, thinking that higher taxes would limit people’s spending and encourage domestic manufacturing. But all extremes are bad. Excess import tariffs create smuggling, which is always detrimental to the lawful trader and to revenue generation itself. High duties can give domestic manufactures an unfair monopolistic advantage, making other segments of society dependent on them. High duties distort the market and make it less efficient, and they oppress the merchant who often have to pay out of pocket because passing the costs on would make them uncompetitive.
OriginalSuppose, as has been contended for, the federal power of taxation were to be confined to duties on imports, it is evident that the government, for want of being able to command other resources, would frequently be tempted to extend these duties to an injurious excess. There are persons who imagine that they can never be carried to too great a length; since the higher they are, the more it is alleged they will tend to discourage an extravagant consumption, to produce a favorable balance of trade, and to promote domestic manufactures. But all extremes are pernicious in various ways. Exorbitant duties on imported articles would beget a general spirit of smuggling; which is always prejudicial to the fair trader, and eventually to the revenue itself: they tend to render other classes of the community tributary, in an improper degree, to the manufacturing classes, to whom they give a premature monopoly of the markets; they sometimes force industry out of its more natural channels into others in which it flows with less advantage; and in the last place, they oppress the merchant, who is often obliged to pay them himself without any retribution from the consumer. When the demand is equal to the quantity of goods at market, the consumer generally pays the duty; but when the markets happen to be overstocked, a great proportion falls upon the merchant, and sometimes not only exhausts his profits, but breaks in upon his capital. I am apt to think that a division of the duty, between the seller and the buyer, more often happens than is commonly imagined. It is not always possible to raise the price of a commodity in exact proportion to every additional imposition laid upon it. The merchant, especially in a country of small commercial capital, is often under a necessity of keeping prices down in order to a more expeditious sale.
It is true that more often than not, the costs are paid by the consumers. Because consumers across various states end up paying these duties, the revenue should go into a shared fund that benefits all states rather than just the states where the goods are imported. But it is not equitable for this to be the sole source of funds. For instance, when the duties are paid by the merchant, the states that import more goods would bear a heavier tax burden, making it unfair to their citizens. This inequality would increase between states proportionally with the tax. Furthermore, states with strong manufacturing sectors would consume fewer imported goods and thus contribute less to a duty-based tax system, creating more inequality as non-manufacturing states pay a disproportionate amount of taxes. States would not be contributing in proportion to their abilities. To make the system more equitable would require excise taxes. New York should be more deeply interested in these situations because we are an importing state, and is less likely than other states to become a manufacturing state quickly. We would suffer doubly from restraining the union’s taxation powers to just imports.
OriginalThe maxim that the consumer is the payer, is so much oftener true than the reverse of the proposition, that it is far more equitable that the duties on imports should go into a common stock, than that they should redound to the exclusive benefit of the importing States. But it is not so generally true as to render it equitable, that those duties should form the only national fund. When they are paid by the merchant they operate as an additional tax upon the importing State, whose citizens pay their proportion of them in the character of consumers. In this view they are productive of inequality among the States; which inequality would be increased with the increased extent of the duties. The confinement of the national revenues to this species of imposts would be attended with inequality, from a different cause, between the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing States. The States which can go farthest towards the supply of their own wants, by their own manufactures, will not, according to their numbers or wealth, consume so great a proportion of imported articles as those States which are not in the same favorable situation. They would not, therefore, in this mode alone contribute to the public treasury in a ratio to their abilities. To make them do this it is necessary that recourse be had to excises, the proper objects of which are particular kinds of manufactures. New York is more deeply interested in these considerations than such of her citizens as contend for limiting the power of the Union to external taxation may be aware of. New York is an importing State, and is not likely speedily to be, to any great extent, a manufacturing State. She would, of course, suffer in a double light from restraining the jurisdiction of the Union to commercial imposts.
As long as the dangers of extreme taxes are respected, the government might also find that their own tax revenue would be impacted if import taxes were too high and guard against this extreme. This might be the case if other avenues are open to them, but if closed, hope might cause them to experiment with higher import duties lured by false hope that it could solve their fiscal challenges. Initial success in raising revenue through higher duties might lead to incorrect conclusions about the efficacy of the approach. It would then take a long. time to correct these false opinions. Necessity, especially in politics, can lead to false reasoning and flawed policies. Even if the government does not resort to excessive import taxes, inequalities among states would exist due to the other causes previously discussed. Let us now examine more objections.
OriginalSo far as these observations tend to inculcate a danger of the import duties being extended to an injurious extreme it may be observed, conformably to a remark made in another part of these papers, that the interest of the revenue itself would be a sufficient guard against such an extreme. I readily admit that this would be the case, as long as other resources were open; but if the avenues to them were closed, HOPE, stimulated by necessity, would beget experiments, fortified by rigorous precautions and additional penalties, which, for a time, would have the intended effect, till there had been leisure to contrive expedients to elude these new precautions. The first success would be apt to inspire false opinions, which it might require a long course of subsequent experience to correct. Necessity, especially in politics, often occasions false hopes, false reasonings, and a system of measures correspondingly erroneous. But even if this supposed excess should not be a consequence of the limitation of the federal power of taxation, the inequalities spoken of would still ensue, though not in the same degree, from the other causes that have been noticed. Let us now return to the examination of objections.
One frequently repeated objection is that the House of Representatives is not large enough to represent all classes of citizens and the interests of the entire community. That sounds like a good idea, but when you take a closer look, it is not realistic and not necessary. Later, we will look at whether the House of Representatives has enough people, but for now, let’s look at the subject at hand.
OriginalOne which, if we may judge from the frequency of its repetition, seems most to be relied on, is, that the House of Representatives is not sufficiently numerous for the reception of all the different classes of citizens, in order to combine the interests and feelings of every part of the community, and to produce a due sympathy between the representative body and its constituents. This argument presents itself under a very specious and seducing form; and is well calculated to lay hold of the prejudices of those to whom it is addressed. But when we come to dissect it with attention, it will appear to be made up of nothing but fair-sounding words. The object it seems to aim at is, in the first place, impracticable, and in the sense in which it is contended for, is unnecessary. I reserve for another place the discussion of the question which relates to the sufficiency of the representative body in respect to numbers, and shall content myself with examining here the particular use which has been made of a contrary supposition, in reference to the immediate subject of our inquiries.
The idea of an actual representation of all classes of people is impractical. Unless it were expressly provided for in the Constitution that each different occupation should send one or more members, it would never otherwise take place in practice. Mechanics and manufactures will always be inclined, with a few exceptions, to give their votes to merchants before people of their own profession because merchants are seen as more capable advocates of their interests. They know enough that life has not given them the natural talents suited for deliberative assemblies, and that merchants would best oppose others that were unfriendly to the manufacturing trades. We may thus consider merchants as the natural representatives of all types of people.
OriginalThe idea of an actual representation of all classes of the people, by persons of each class, is altogether visionary. Unless it were expressly provided in the Constitution, that each different occupation should send one or more members, the thing would never take place in practice. Mechanics and manufacturers will always be inclined, with few exceptions, to give their votes to merchants, in preference to persons of their own professions or trades. Those discerning citizens are well aware that the mechanic and manufacturing arts furnish the materials of mercantile enterprise and industry. Many of them, indeed, are immediately connected with the operations of commerce. They know that the merchant is their natural patron and friend; and they are aware, that however great the confidence they may justly feel in their own good sense, their interests can be more effectually promoted by the merchant than by themselves. They are sensible that their habits in life have not been such as to give them those acquired endowments, without which, in a deliberative assembly, the greatest natural abilities are for the most part useless; and that the influence and weight, and superior acquirements of the merchants render them more equal to a contest with any spirit which might happen to infuse itself into the public councils, unfriendly to the manufacturing and trading interests. These considerations, and many others that might be mentioned prove, and experience confirms it, that artisans and manufacturers will commonly be disposed to bestow their votes upon merchants and those whom they recommend. We must therefore consider merchants as the natural representatives of all these classes of the community.
When it comes to the educated professions, not much needs to be said: they don’t form a separate group in society; and depending on their situation and skills, they are equally trusted and chosen by each other and by other parts of the population.
OriginalWith regard to the learned professions, little need be observed; they truly form no distinct interest in society, and according to their situation and talents, will be indiscriminately the objects of the confidence and choice of each other, and of other parts of the community.
Only landowners remain, and I take this bloc to be perfectly united. No tax can be laid on land that will not affect both those large and small landowners. No tax can be imposed on land that won’t hurt the owner of many acres as much as the owner of one acre. So all land owners have a shared interest in keeping taxes as low as possible. Even if we imagined a difference between the rich landowner and the middling farmer, what reason is there to conclude that the former would stand a better chance of being elected to the national legislature than the latter? If we look at our own senate and assembly, we see that moderate landowners prevail in both. When two candidates are equally qualified, people will vote for those people they trust, regardless of how much money they have.
OriginalNothing remains but the landed interest; and this, in a political view, and particularly in relation to taxes, I take to be perfectly united, from the wealthiest landlord down to the poorest tenant. No tax can be laid on land which will not affect the proprietor of millions of acres as well as the proprietor of a single acre. Every landholder will therefore have a common interest to keep the taxes on land as low as possible; and common interest may always be reckoned upon as the surest bond of sympathy. But if we even could suppose a distinction of interest between the opulent landholder and the middling farmer, what reason is there to conclude, that the first would stand a better chance of being deputed to the national legislature than the last? If we take fact as our guide, and look into our own senate and assembly, we shall find that moderate proprietors of land prevail in both; nor is this less the case in the senate, which consists of a smaller number, than in the assembly, which is composed of a greater number. Where the qualifications of the electors are the same, whether they have to choose a small or a large number, their votes will fall upon those in whom they have most confidence; whether these happen to be men of large fortunes, or of moderate property, or of no property at all.
It is said that all types of citizens should have representatives in the government so that their needs are met. But we know that this won’t happen if people are allowed to vote freely. In this situation, the government would mainly be made up of landowners, merchants, and professionals. However, there is no real danger that the needs of different citizens won’t be understood by these three groups. Landowners will know what is good and bad for land, merchants will understand the needs of mechanics and manufacturers, and educated professionals will be unbiased and promote whatever is best for the community.
OriginalIt is said to be necessary, that all classes of citizens should have some of their own number in the representative body, in order that their feelings and interests may be the better understood and attended to. But we have seen that this will never happen under any arrangement that leaves the votes of the people free. Where this is the case, the representative body, with too few exceptions to have any influence on the spirit of the government, will be composed of landholders, merchants, and men of the learned professions. But where is the danger that the interests and feelings of the different classes of citizens will not be understood or attended to by these three descriptions of men? Will not the landholder know and feel whatever will promote or insure the interest of landed property? And will he not, from his own interest in that species of property, be sufficiently prone to resist every attempt to prejudice or encumber it? Will not the merchant understand and be disposed to cultivate, as far as may be proper, the interests of the mechanic and manufacturing arts, to which his commerce is so nearly allied? Will not the man of the learned profession, who will feel a neutrality to the rivalships between the different branches of industry, be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between them, ready to promote either, so far as it shall appear to him conducive to the general interests of the society?
Considering the temporary feelings or attitudes that may be prevalent in certain areas of society, is it not more likely that someone who has done extensive research and gathered lots of information will be better able to judge them than someone whose observations are limited to their friends and neighbors? It makes sense that a person running for public office, who depends on the votes of the people to stay in power, will make sure to understand their attitudes and preferences and consider them in their decisions. This dependence and the need to be held accountable by the laws they help create form strong bonds between elected officials and their constituents.
OriginalIf we take into the account the momentary humors or dispositions which may happen to prevail in particular parts of the society, and to which a wise administration will never be inattentive, is the man whose situation leads to extensive inquiry and information less likely to be a competent judge of their nature, extent, and foundation than one whose observation does not travel beyond the circle of his neighbors and acquaintances? Is it not natural that a man who is a candidate for the favor of the people, and who is dependent on the suffrages of his fellow-citizens for the continuance of his public honors, should take care to inform himself of their dispositions and inclinations, and should be willing to allow them their proper degree of influence upon his conduct? This dependence, and the necessity of being bound himself, and his posterity, by the laws to which he gives his assent, are the true, and they are the strong chords of sympathy between the representative and the constituent.
No part of the government requires as much extensive information and knowledge as taxation. The man who understands these principles best will be least likely to resort to oppressive expedients or to sacrifice a particular class of citizens for revenue. It can be shown that the most productive method of financing as also the least burdensome. To tax people wisely, one must understand the people’s habits, how they think, and their country’s resources. Everyone can decide for themselves who is most qualified for this job.
OriginalThere is no part of the administration of government that requires extensive information and a thorough knowledge of the principles of political economy, so much as the business of taxation. The man who understands those principles best will be least likely to resort to oppressive expedients, or sacrifice any particular class of citizens to the procurement of revenue. It might be demonstrated that the most productive system of finance will always be the least burdensome. There can be no doubt that in order to a judicious exercise of the power of taxation, it is necessary that the person in whose hands it should be acquainted with the general genius, habits, and modes of thinking of the people at large, and with the resources of the country. And this is all that can be reasonably meant by a knowledge of the interests and feelings of the people. In any other sense the proposition has either no meaning, or an absurd one. And in that sense let every considerate citizen judge for himself where the requisite qualification is most likely to be found. PUBLIUS
Federalist 36
We have so far seen that politicians will usually be landowners, merchants, and professionals. Even though there are exceptions to this rule, they are not in sufficient number to influence the general makeup of government. There are strong minds from all walks of life who are able to overcome their disadvantages and make a difference. The door should be open to everyone. We can hope to see examples of this in federal and state governments, but these are rare cases and do not change the overall conclusion.
OriginalWE HAVE seen that the result of the observations, to which the foregoing number has been principally devoted, is, that from the natural operation of the different interests and views of the various classes of the community, whether the representation of the people be more or less numerous, it will consist almost entirely of proprietors of land, of merchants, and of members of the learned professions, who will truly represent all those different interests and views. If it should be objected that we have seen other descriptions of men in the local legislatures, I answer that it is admitted there are exceptions to the rule, but not in sufficient number to influence the general complexion or character of the government. There are strong minds in every walk of life that will rise superior to the disadvantages of situation, and will command the tribute due to their merit, not only from the classes to which they particularly belong, but from the society in general. The door ought to be equally open to all; and I trust, for the credit of human nature, that we shall see examples of such vigorous plants flourishing in the soil of federal as well as of State legislation; but occasional instances of this sort will not render the reasoning founded upon the general course of things, less conclusive.
Different trades and occupations, like the carpenter, blacksmith, and linen manufacturer, have rival interests, just like different sectors of the economy. Unless the legislature were unreasonably larger, it is impossible to recognize every individual sector’s interest. But I will no longer dwell on the matter as objections to this point are not well-defined enough to be worth addressing.
OriginalThe subject might be placed in several other lights that would all lead to the same result; and in particular it might be asked, What greater affinity or relation of interest can be conceived between the carpenter and blacksmith, and the linen manufacturer or stocking weaver, than between the merchant and either of them? It is notorious that there are often as great rivalships between different branches of the mechanic or manufacturing arts as there are between any of the departments of labor and industry; so that, unless the representative body were to be far more numerous than would be consistent with any idea of regularity or wisdom in its deliberations, it is impossible that what seems to be the spirit of the objection we have been considering should ever be realized in practice. But I forbear to dwell any longer on a matter which has hitherto worn too loose a garb to admit even of an accurate inspection of its real shape or tendency.
There is another, better defined objection that merits our attention. It has been said that the national government won’t be able to tax properly because it won’t have enough knowledge of local conditions and its laws might interfere with state laws. This lack-of-knowledge problem seems entirely untrue. When a state legislature needs to know details about one of its counties, they get it from the people in that county. The same thing can happen in the national government. Don’t we assume that the men who will be sent there will be smart enough to communicate that information? When it comes to taxation, it’s not about knowing every mountain, river, path, and highway in each state. It’s about knowing the state’s situation and resources, what it makes and buys, its wealth and industry, and so on.
OriginalThere is another objection of a somewhat more precise nature that claims our attention. It has been asserted that a power of internal taxation in the national legislature could never be exercised with advantage, as well from the want of a sufficient knowledge of local circumstances, as from an interference between the revenue laws of the Union and of the particular States. The supposition of a want of proper knowledge seems to be entirely destitute of foundation. If any question is depending in a State legislature respecting one of the counties, which demands a knowledge of local details, how is it acquired? No doubt from the information of the members of the county. Cannot the like knowledge be obtained in the national legislature from the representatives of each State? And is it not to be presumed that the men who will generally be sent there will be possessed of the necessary degree of intelligence to be able to communicate that information? Is the knowledge of local circumstances, as applied to taxation, a minute topographical acquaintance with all the mountains, rivers, streams, highways, and bypaths in each State; or is it a general acquaintance with its situation and resources, with the state of its agriculture, commerce, manufactures, with the nature of its products and consumptions, with the different degrees and kinds of its wealth, property, and industry?
Governments in general, even those that are chosen by the people, often have one person or a group of people in charge of their money. They come up with the plans for taxes, which are later approved by the leader or law-makers. People who are curious and educated are the best qualified people to pick which things should be taxed, indicating that they must have some kind of knowledge of local circumstances required for taxation.
OriginalNations in general, even under governments of the more popular kind, usually commit the administration of their finances to single men or to boards composed of a few individuals, who digest and prepare, in the first instance, the plans of taxation, which are afterwards passed into laws by the authority of the sovereign or legislature.
Taxes can be divided into two groups: direct taxes and indirect taxes. People usually only object to direct taxes, but it’s hard to understand why they would object to indirect taxes (i.e. taxes on goods and services). The knowledge needed to implement these taxes is either self-evident based on the nature of the taxed article or easily obtainable, especially from well-informed people in the mercantile class. The circumstances affecting the taxation of a particular article are likely to be similar across different states, making it easier to implement such taxes uniformly. The main concern is to avoid taxing articles that have already been taxed by individual states. This information could easily be obtained from the states’ legal codes or representatives.
OriginalInquisitive and enlightened statesmen are deemed everywhere best qualified to make a judicious selection of the objects proper for revenue; which is a clear indication, as far as the sense of mankind can have weight in the question, of the species of knowledge of local circumstances requisite to the purposes of taxation. The taxes intended to be comprised under the general denomination of internal taxes may be subdivided into those of the DIRECT and those of the INDIRECT kind. Though the objection be made to both, yet the reasoning upon it seems to be confined to the former branch. And indeed, as to the latter, by which must be understood duties and excises on articles of consumption, one is at a loss to conceive what can be the nature of the difficulties apprehended. The knowledge relating to them must evidently be of a kind that will either be suggested by the nature of the article itself, or can easily be procured from any well-informed man, especially of the mercantile class. The circumstances that may distinguish its situation in one State from its situation in another must be few, simple, and easy to be comprehended. The principal thing to be attended to, would be to avoid those articles which had been previously appropriated to the use of a particular State; and there could be no difficulty in ascertaining the revenue system of each. This could always be known from the respective codes of laws, as well as from the information of the members from the several States.
At first, it may seem like the objection has more foundation when applied to real estate. However, if we look closer, we can see that this isn’t true. Land taxes are usually set in two ways: either by permanent or periodic valuations, or by discretionary assessments. Either way, the actual execution of tax assessments, which requires knowledge of local details, would be carried out by commissioners or assessors. These individuals could be either elected by the people or appointed by the government. The law’s role is to establish the framework within which these commissioners or assessors operate. This includes naming them or prescribing the manner of their election or appointment, defining their qualifications, and outlining their powers and duties. In all this, what is there than cannot just as well be performed by the national legislature as by the state legislature? Either body would be dealing with general principles, while the execution and attention to local details would be left to those appointed for that purpose.
OriginalThe objection, when applied to real property or to houses and lands, appears to have, at first sight, more foundation, but even in this view it will not bear a close examination. Land taxes are commonly laid in one of two modes, either by ACTUAL valuations, permanent or periodical, or by OCCASIONAL assessments, at the discretion, or according to the best judgment, of certain officers whose duty it is to make them. In either case, the EXECUTION of the business, which alone requires the knowledge of local details, must be devolved upon discreet persons in the character of commissioners or assessors, elected by the people or appointed by the government for the purpose. All that the law can do must be to name the persons or to prescribe the manner of their election or appointment, to fix their numbers and qualifications and to draw the general outlines of their powers and duties. And what is there in all this that cannot as well be performed by the national legislature as by a State legislature? The attention of either can only reach to general principles; local details, as already observed, must be referred to those who are to execute the plan.
There is an easy way to look at this problem that will be satisfactory for everyone: the national government can use the same methods and processes that each state uses for these kinds of taxation.
OriginalBut there is a simple point of view in which this matter may be placed that must be altogether satisfactory. The national legislature can make use of the SYSTEM OF EACH STATE WITHIN THAT STATE. The method of laying and collecting this species of taxes in each State can, in all its parts, be adopted and employed by the federal government.
Let’s remember that the proportion of taxes levied on each state is not to be arbitrarily decided by the national legislature. Instead, it is to be determined by the population of each state, as outlined in the second section of the first article of the U.S. Constitution. An actual census or enumeration of the population serves as the basis for this proportion, making it a data-driven process. This mechanism is intended to prevent partiality or oppression, as the tax burden is allocated based on objective numbers rather than legislative discretion. In addition to this precaution, there is an additional provision that “all duties imposts and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States.”
OriginalLet it be recollected that the proportion of these taxes is not to be left to the discretion of the national legislature, but is to be determined by the numbers of each State, as described in the second section of the first article. An actual census or enumeration of the people must furnish the rule, a circumstance which effectually shuts the door to partiality or oppression. The abuse of this power of taxation seems to have been provided against with guarded circumspection. In addition to the precaution just mentioned, there is a provision that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be UNIFORM throughout the United States."
It has been rightly observed that if the federal government finds it inconvenient to exercise the power of internal taxation, it can rely on requests for funds from the states instead. People then ask why not just rely on requisitions to begin with? There are two reasons for this. First, it is impossible to tell ahead of time if the power of taxation will be useful or not—it might be. Second, when the states know that the union can get money without them, they will be more likely to respond to such requisitions.
OriginalIt has been very properly observed by different speakers and writers on the side of the Constitution, that if the exercise of the power of internal taxation by the Union should be discovered on experiment to be really inconvenient, the federal government may then forbear the use of it, and have recourse to requisitions in its stead. By way of answer to this, it has been triumphantly asked, Why not in the first instance omit that ambiguous power, and rely upon the latter resource? Two solid answers may be given. The first is, that the exercise of that power, if convenient, will be preferable, because it will be more effectual; and it is impossible to prove in theory, or otherwise than by the experiment, that it cannot be advantageously exercised. The contrary, indeed, appears most probable. The second answer is, that the existence of such a power in the Constitution will have a strong influence in giving efficacy to requisitions. When the States know that the Union can apply itself without their agency, it will be a powerful motive for exertion on their part.
When it comes to the tax laws of the nation and its states, there can be no conflict between them. It is possible to avoid any interference between the policies of each. The best way to do this is to not do anything that either side had first started. Since neither can control the other, both will benefit from this agreement. As states settle their debts and streamline their expenses, the likelihood of conflicts with federal taxation will decrease. States can rely on simpler forms of taxation, like a small land tax, to meet their financial needs, further reducing the potential for conflict with federal taxation.
OriginalAs to the interference of the revenue laws of the Union, and of its members, we have already seen that there can be no clashing or repugnancy of authority. The laws cannot, therefore, in a legal sense, interfere with each other; and it is far from impossible to avoid an interference even in the policy of their different systems. An effectual expedient for this purpose will be, mutually, to abstain from those objects which either side may have first had recourse to. As neither can CONTROL the other, each will have an obvious and sensible interest in this reciprocal forbearance. And where there is an IMMEDIATE common interest, we may safely count upon its operation. When the particular debts of the States are done away, and their expenses come to be limited within their natural compass, the possibility almost of interference will vanish. A small land tax will answer the purpose of the States, and will be their most simple and most fit resource.
There have been a lot of worries and fears raised about this power of internal taxation. People are afraid that they will have to pay twice as much because of two sets of tax collectors and poll taxes that are seen as too harsh and unfair, but it’s all a political trick.
OriginalMany spectres have been raised out of this power of internal taxation, to excite the apprehensions of the people: double sets of revenue officers, a duplication of their burdens by double taxations, and the frightful forms of odious and oppressive poll-taxes, have been played off with all the ingenious dexterity of political legerdemain.
There are two cases in which it would not be possible for the government to have two sets of officers. The first is when the government has exclusive control over taxes, which applies to those on imports. The second is when the subject has not been regulated by state laws. In other cases, the government will likely avoid the same subject as the state or use the state officers and regulations to collect the taxes. This is the best solution since it will save money and avoid making anyone angry. Even if the plan does have some bad effects, it is still a workable solution.
OriginalAs to the first point, there are two cases in which there can be no room for double sets of officers: one, where the right of imposing the tax is exclusively vested in the Union, which applies to the duties on imports; the other, where the object has not fallen under any State regulation or provision, which may be applicable to a variety of objects. In other cases, the probability is that the United States will either wholly abstain from the objects preoccupied for local purposes, or will make use of the State officers and State regulations for collecting the additional imposition. This will best answer the views of revenue, because it will save expense in the collection, and will best avoid any occasion of disgust to the State governments and to the people. At all events, here is a practicable expedient for avoiding such an inconvenience; and nothing more can be required than to show that evils predicted to not necessarily result from the plan.
Despite some arguments, the idea that a system of undue influence should not be assumed to exist. Such a presumption is not a valid basis for argument. That said, if the federal government were actually trying to exert undue influence over the states, it would be more effective for it to use state officers for federal tasks and increase their pay. By using and rewarding state officers, the federal government would redirect state influence toward itself. However, such concerns are harmful and should not cloud the discussion.
OriginalAs to any argument derived from a supposed system of influence, it is a sufficient answer to say that it ought not to be presumed; but the supposition is susceptible of a more precise answer. If such a spirit should infest the councils of the Union, the most certain road to the accomplishment of its aim would be to employ the State officers as much as possible, and to attach them to the Union by an accumulation of their emoluments. This would serve to turn the tide of State influence into the channels of the national government, instead of making federal influence flow in an opposite and adverse current. But all suppositions of this kind are invidious, and ought to be banished from the consideration of the great question before the people. They can answer no other end than to cast a mist over the truth.
With regards to double taxation, the answer is obvious. The financial needs of the federal government must be met somehow. If these needs are met by federal taxation, then state governments won’t need to levy additional taxes for the same purpose. Whether the taxes are collected by the state or the federal government, the total tax burden on the community remains the same. The federal government is better positioned to levy certain kinds of taxes, like duties on imports, which are more convenient and less burdensome for the public. If the federal government takes on the responsibility of internal taxation, it will be more careful in choosing what to tax, aiming to minimize public dissatisfaction. Federal taxation would be more likely to target luxury items and wealth, thereby reducing the tax burden on the less wealthy and more numerous classes of society. It’s beneficial when the government’s interest in maintaining its power aligns with fair taxation, protecting the less wealthy from undue burden.
OriginalAs to the suggestion of double taxation, the answer is plain. The wants of the Union are to be supplied in one way or another; if to be done by the authority of the federal government, it will not be to be done by that of the State government. The quantity of taxes to be paid by the community must be the same in either case; with this advantage, if the provision is to be made by the Union that the capital resource of commercial imposts, which is the most convenient branch of revenue, can be prudently improved to a much greater extent under federal than under State regulation, and of course will render it less necessary to recur to more inconvenient methods; and with this further advantage, that as far as there may be any real difficulty in the exercise of the power of internal taxation, it will impose a disposition to greater care in the choice and arrangement of the means; and must naturally tend to make it a fixed point of policy in the national administration to go as far as may be practicable in making the luxury of the rich tributary to the public treasury, in order to diminish the necessity of those impositions which might create dissatisfaction in the poorer and most numerous classes of the society. Happy it is when the interest which the government has in the preservation of its own power, coincides with a proper distribution of the public burdens, and tends to guard the least wealthy part of the community from oppression!
I am against poll taxes, and I would be sad if they became part of the national government. But does it follow, that because there is a power to lay them, that they will actually be laid? Every state in the union has this power, and yet many don’t actually use them. Are state governments to be stigmatized as tyrannies because they possess this power? If they are not, then how would you lay such a charge this against a federal government? Despite not liking poll taxes, I still think the federal government should have this power. In certain emergencies, they may become necessary and the government ought to have this option, not the least because there are very few goods in this country that would be productive sources of taxation.
OriginalAs to poll taxes, I, without scruple, confess my disapprobation of them; and though they have prevailed from an early period in those States(1) which have uniformly been the most tenacious of their rights, I should lament to see them introduced into practice under the national government. But does it follow because there is a power to lay them that they will actually be laid? Every State in the Union has power to impose taxes of this kind; and yet in several of them they are unknown in practice. Are the State governments to be stigmatized as tyrannies, because they possess this power? If they are not, with what propriety can the like power justify such a charge against the national government, or even be urged as an obstacle to its adoption? As little friendly as I am to the species of imposition, I still feel a thorough conviction that the power of having recourse to it ought to exist in the federal government. There are certain emergencies of nations, in which expedients, that in the ordinary state of things ought to be forborne, become essential to the public weal. And the government, from the possibility of such emergencies, ought ever to have the option of making use of them. The real scarcity of objects in this country, which may be considered as productive sources of revenue, is a reason peculiar to itself, for not abridging the discretion of the national councils in this respect. There may exist certain critical and tempestuous conjunctures of the State, in which a poll tax may become an inestimable resource. And as I know nothing to exempt this portion of the globe from the common calamities that have befallen other parts of it, I acknowledge my aversion to every project that is calculated to disarm the government of a single weapon, which in any possible contingency might be usefully employed for the general defense and security. (I have now gone through the examination of such of the powers proposed to be vested in the United States, which may be considered as having an immediate relation to the energy of the government; and have endeavored to answer the principal objections which have been made to them. I have passed over in silence those minor authorities, which are either too inconsiderable to have been thought worthy of the hostilities of the opponents of the Constitution, or of too manifest propriety to admit of controversy. The mass of judiciary power, however, might have claimed an investigation under this head, had it not been for the consideration that its organization and its extent may be more advantageously considered in connection. This has determined me to refer it to the branch of our inquiries upon which we shall next enter.)(E1)
I have been examining the powers that would be given to the federal government, focusing on those that contribute to its energy and efficiency. Other powers, not discussed in this section, will be examined later to provide a more complete view of the subject. I think that after looking at the Constitution, most people will see that the objections to it are not valid. After even further investigation of it, sincere and honest people will find that it is the right choice to adopt. We as a nation can set an example for the world if we have the wisdom and courage to do so.
Original(I have now gone through the examination of those powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government which relate more peculiarly to its energy, and to its efficiency for answering the great and primary objects of union. There are others which, though omitted here, will, in order to render the view of the subject more complete, be taken notice of under the next head of our inquiries. I flatter myself the progress already made will have sufficed to satisfy the candid and judicious part of the community that some of the objections which have been most strenuously urged against the Constitution, and which were most formidable in their first appearance, are not only destitute of substance, but if they had operated in the formation of the plan, would have rendered it incompetent to the great ends of public happiness and national prosperity. I equally flatter myself that a further and more critical investigation of the system will serve to recommend it still more to every sincere and disinterested advocate for good government and will leave no doubt with men of this character of the propriety and expediency of adopting it. Happy will it be for ourselves, and more honorable for human nature, if we have wisdom and virtue enough to set so glorious an example to mankind!)(E1) PUBLIUS 1. The New England States. E1. Two versions of this paragraph appear in different editions.